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ABSTRACT
In spite of a corpus of work over the last three decades acknowledging the centrality of religion
in politics, (see e.g. Hunter, 1991; Layman, 2001; Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Wuthnow, 1988),
there remains a scarcity of research examining the consequences of religious communication in
political campaigns. The current study fills this void through an empirical exploration of the
effects of religious campaign appeals on prospective voters. Specifically, this interdisciplinary
investigation develops a theoretical framework and subsequent expectations as to how religious
appeals are likely to activate individual religiosity thereby influencing the formation of political
attitudes. Hypothesized expectations are then tested through a series of controlled media
experiments administered to college students and a representative cross-section of U.S. adults.
Consistent with expectations, results demonstrate exposure to religious appeals activates,
or “primes,” religiosity, which significantly influences individual political evaluations. Priming
effects are shown to be most pronounced based on one’s religious beliefs relative to level of
religious commitment or denominational affiliation. Those individuals holding more orthodox
religious beliefs become significantly more likely to evaluate a candidate favorably following
exposure to an appeal incorporating religious cues. At the same time, analysis demonstrates
religious priming effects are attenuated in more complex information environments. Individuals
exposed to additional partisan and non-partisan political information in the context of viewing
religious appeals become less reliant on religiosity in forming political attitudes. Nevertheless,
study findings strongly suggest religious beliefs remain a consequential consideration in the
minds of potential voters regardless of information environment complexity.
Additionally, experimental results point to the ability of candidates to prime religiosity
through both implicit and explicit appeals. In a novel experiment, study results illustrate that a
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candidate can effectively activate the religious beliefs of viewers without formally referencing
religion vis-à-vis implicit pro-life appeals and endorsement of traditional family values. Formal
analysis then explores the potential for candidates to face backlash effects for mounting religious
campaigns. Findings, however, suggest candidates face little adverse effects from explicitly
appealing to religion. Indeed, general social acceptance of religion in the U.S. suggests
candidates may appeal to religion more explicitly without fear of voter repercussions.
The study concludes with a discussion of study results and implications for political
discourse as well as a call for further research into the growing and influential role of religion in
modern American politics.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Faith doesn’t just influence me; it really defines me. I don’t wake up every day wondering what
do I need to believe. Let us never sacrifice our principles for anybody’s politics. Not now. Not
ever. I believe life begins at conception. We believe in some things. We stand by those things.
We live or die by those things. I’m Mike Huckabee, and I approve this message.
2008 Republican presidential candidate Mike Huckabee
“Believe” advertisement copy1
Former Arkansas Governor and Baptist minister Mike Huckabee’s words, delivered in a
political advertisement that aired during his unsuccessful bid for the 2008 Republican
presidential nomination, are, in many ways, emblematic of the now intimate role of religion in
American politics and political campaigns. The “Believe” ad extolling Huckabee’s Christian
beliefs through religious rhetoric and visual imagery
(see Figure 1.1) was released by his campaign in
November of 2008 prior to the Iowa caucus (Luo,
2007). Designed to simultaneously highlight his
evangelical tradition and distinguish his values from

Figure 1.1 – Huckabee “Believe” ad

those of his rivals, the ad garnered national media attention (e.g. Luo, 2007; Parker, 2007)
thereby helping Huckabee appeal to evangelicals and born-again Christians, a core voting bloc
representing 60% of 2008 Iowa Republican caucus goers (Langer, 2008). Originally thought a
second-tier candidate, the earned media coverage from the ad coupled with religiously-infused
stump speeches allowed governor Huckabee to connect with evangelicals and propelled the
relatively underfunded candidate from single digits to a commanding 10-point victory in Iowa.
The strategy of Huckabee to openly appeal to Christian voters, however, is neither new
nor an isolated case, for the “Believe” ad represents but one of myriad attempts by elites in the
modern American political environment to court the support of religious individuals. Indeed,
1

The “Believe” ad is available for viewing at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BjtGgfhKIvo&feature=relmfu.
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former Empower America and White House communications staffer David Kuo (2006) describes
how politicians routinely employ the strategic use of religious rhetoric to effectively
communicate with and mobilize religious individuals, especially Christian evangelicals – an
estimated to 10 to 40 million Americans Kuo argues comprise “the single most important
political constituency in America since the height of the labor movement in the 1950s” (p. xii).
In recent years political elites have increasingly relied on religious appeals in an attempt
to court Christian voters (Domke & Coe, 2008; Guth, 2004). From rather audacious attempts
such as Texas Governor Rick Perry’s religious Response, a 30,000-person national day of prayer
effectively serving to kick off his unsuccessful 2012 presidential bid, to the more mundane use of
religiously-tinged broadcast advertisements, political elites have frequently embraced such
appeals as a method of garnering political support. Employing the “God strategy,” Coe and
Domke (2006) note American presidents since 1980 have significantly increased religious
references in political speeches relative to presidents of previous decades (see also Domke &
Coe, 2008). At the same time, scholars have argued many such appeals are “narrowcasted” by
elites vis-à-vis the use of subtle, coded language and symbols (Calfano & Djupe, 2009; Domke
& Coe, 2008). The use of such “coded” language serves as a veritable “dog whistle” (Unger,
2007) permitting politicians to simultaneously communicate with particularly religious voters
without appearing overly religious, thereby minimizing potentially alienating relatively secular
individuals or provoking unwanted, critical media attention (Domke & Coe, 2008; Kuo, 2006).
During the 2008 election cycle alone, many viewers likely witnessed numerous religious
appeals in campaign ads, as scores of televised political ads aired by candidates across the nation
contained overt religious rhetoric and symbols.2 Religious campaign ads in the election cycle

2

Content analysis of all U.S. Congressional and gubernatorial ads aired during the 2008 election cycle demonstrates
roughly 5% of all ads contained overt religious verbiage or imagery (C. Weber, personal conversation, March 2012).
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ran the gamut, from presidential spots such as Huckabee’s “Believe” commercial described
above and Senator John McCain’s “The One” ad linking then Senator Barack Obama to Moses
parting the Red Sea (see Figure 1.2)3 to
Congressional spots such as Gregg Harper’s “For
Congress” ad, which aired in the race for
Mississippi’s 3rd Congressional district. The
advertisement lauded Harper’s role as “family man,
Figure 1.2 - McCain "The One" ad

deacon and Sunday school teacher” against visuals

presenting the candidate singing in a church choir
bathed in sunshine pouring through ornate stained
glass windows (see Figure 1.3).4
The use of such religious appeals, however,
takes on greater significance in light of the centrality
of religion to society and the intimate role played of

Figure 1.3 - Harper "For Congress" ad

religion in the lives of many Americans, particularly in the political realm (e.g. Gold & Russell,
2007; Guth, Kellstedt, Smidt & Green, 2006; Hammond, Shibley & Solow, 1994; Layman 2001;
Layman & Carmines, 1997). From a political perspective, literature suggests religious
considerations help structure individuals’ political attitudes and behaviors (Green et al, 1996;
Leege and Kellstedt, 1993), informing voters’ evaluations of political parties (Layman, 1997,
2001), presidential performance (Olson & Warber, 2008), candidates (Domke & Coe, 2008) and
issues (Frank, 2004; Layman & Carmines, 1997; Putnam & Campbell, 2010). At the same time,
research into religious traditions demonstrates a marked shift away from inter-denominational

3
4

McCain’s “The One” ad is available for viewing at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mopkn0lPzM8.
Harper’s “For Congress” ad is available for viewing at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CCBxy_gcfmw.
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(i.e. between denominations) toward intra-denominational (i.e. within denominations)
differences such that those embracing a more traditional or fundamentalist view of religious
doctrine have gravitated toward the Republican Party, while adherents of relatively liberal
religious beliefs have increasingly aligned with the Democratic Party (Layman, 2001; Wuthnow,
1988). Indeed, scholars have demonstrated one of the most potent predictors of political
behavior has been one’s religious beliefs – that is, one’s degree of religious traditionalism
(Hammond et al., 1994; Guth et al., 2006; Layman, 2001; Olson & Warber, 2008).
The proliferation of religious appeals in elite rhetoric at a time of increased voter reliance
on religion thus gives rise to important political considerations, not the least of which is the
effect of such appeals on potential voters. Surprisingly, however, scant work has examined the
impact and consequences of religious appeals in political discourse, especially in the context of
campaign communications. Although a resurgence of scholarly work has focused on the
prevalence of religion in political rhetoric and the increased prominence of religion in voter
decision formation, little is known about the effect of religious appeals on potential voters.
Given anecdotal, “insider” accounts suggesting such appeals are rather effective at courting
Christian individuals (Kuo, 2006), and the fact research has demonstrated campaigns, and
particularly political advertisements, to be consequential in terms of shaping voters’ political
judgments (e.g. Kahn & Kenney, 1999), the lack of attention paid the consequences of religious
appeals in campaign communications is perplexing.
A rare exception in this area is the work of Calfano and Djupe (2009), which
demonstrates that exposure to religious political information results in more favorable candidate
evaluations among evangelical individuals. Calfano and Djupe’s (2009) findings, although
notable, are necessarily limited owing to a singular experimental design as well as the use of
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mock candidates and stimulus materials. Moreover, the authors fail to thoroughly explicate a
causal mechanism for their findings. Although Calfano and Djupe (2009) argue subtle religious
statements serve as a heuristic in cueing in-group identity, it remains unclear what specific
psychological process explains their findings, nor what the effects of religious appeals may be in
the context of more complex information environments typical of actual political campaigns.
Research in political science, mass communication and psychology, however, provides
insight that helps explain Calfano and Djupe’s (2009) findings and, more importantly, serves as
the foundation for a more comprehensive examination of the possible consequences of religious
appeals. Prominent literature in political science and mass communication on media priming has
consistently demonstrated the ability of subtle appeals in political communication to activate, or
“prime,” voters’ attitudes, which are subsequently applied by voters in the formation of political
evaluations (e.g. Huber & Lapinski, 2006; Mendelberg, 2001; Valentino, Hutchings & White,
2002). Mendelberg (1997, 2001), for example, has shown subtle appeals to racialized issues
such as crime can activate existing racial predispositions, which subsequently influence how
individuals evaluate political figures (see e.g. Valentino et al, 2002).
Applied to religious appeals, work by Weber and Thornton (2012), which is based on
data included in this study, confirms that religious appeals are indeed consequential for religious
individuals regarding how candidates are evaluated. As the authors demonstrate, and as detailed
in this study, exposure to religious appeals primes one’s religious beliefs, which subsequently
influence evaluations of political candidates – an effect that is shown to vary based on the
complexity of one’s campaign information environment (Weber & Thornton, 2012).
Despite Weber and Thornton’s (2012) findings, however, multiple questions concerning
the effects of religious appeals on voters remain unanswered. It is still unclear, for example, how
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effective differing types of religious appeals (i.e. implicit or explicit appeals) are as a campaign
strategy or the degree to which candidates potentially risk backlash effects for employing
religious advertisements. Although religion is pervasive and widely embraced in the United
States (Putnam & Campbell, 2010), do candidates nonetheless risk alienating potential voters
that become turned off by overt religious appeals or by media drawing attention to a candidate’s
use of religion for political gain? From this perspective, are more subtle, implicit religious
appeals perhaps a more effective campaign strategy?
At the same time, it is unknown how political partisanship influences the effect of
religious appeals, particularly as it relates to campaign environments. As political campaigns are
inherently partisan events and given the strength of one’s partisan predispositions to influence
political behavior (Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes, 1960; Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norpoth &
Weisberg, 2008), one questions how the presence of partisan political cues – a common
component of political campaign ads – may influence the effectiveness of religious appeals.
In an effort to address these and other unanswered questions and given the lack of
empirical research examining religious appeals more generally, this dissertation explores the
consequences of religious appeals in political campaign messaging. The study specifically
focuses on the consequences of religious appeals in alternative information environments as well
as differences in the effectiveness of implicit and explicit religious appeals. The study
additionally examines the potential for candidates employing religious appeals to suffer adverse
effects from viewers exposed to media coverage critical of religion in politics. In so doing, the
project fills a lacuna in the religion and politics academic literature. Much like scholars have
offered comprehensive accounts of the use and consequences of emotions (Brader, 2006) and
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racial appeals (Mendelberg, 2001) in political campaigns, the current study offers a more
complete picture of the effects of religious appeals as a campaign strategy.
It does so by merging literature on the role of religion in politics with priming research
drawn from mass communication, political science and psychology. The interdisciplinary nature
of the study thus offers value to multiple academic disciplines. For religious scholars, the study
examines the effects of religious appeals by differing religious dimensions thereby offering a
glimpse into how appeals resonate with voters based on one’s religious affiliation relative to
degree of religious commitment or nature of one’s religious beliefs. The study simultaneously
promises practical information to campaign strategists by empirically demonstrating how and
under what conditions religious appeals affect potential voters. These contributions aside,
however, the study’s primary benefit lies in its contribution to scholars of religion and politics,
namely to advance understanding of the influential and growing role of religion in modern
American political campaigns. Only through rigorous, empirical analysis of the consequences of
religious appeals in campaigns can we move beyond the compelling, yet incomplete anecdotal
accounts offered of the use of religion by political elites in modern American politics.
To that end, the study proceeds with a thorough interdisciplinary review of literature in
Chapter 2, in the process setting forth a series of testable hypotheses, which are then summarized
at the end of the chapter. Specifically, Chapter 2 opens with a review of the changing role of
religion in American politics over the last half century, which is then wedded to research on
media and political priming to derive how religious appeals embedded in campaign appeals are
likely to influence religious voters. The discussion then transitions into how alternative
information environments may influence the effectiveness of religious appeals, with particular
attention paid the potential for non-partisan campaign information and partisan cues to moderate

7

priming effects. Drawing heavily on racial priming research, I then develop a framework how
implicit and explicit religious appeals are likely to resonate with voters and conclude with a
discussion of the likelihood for religious appeals to result in backlash effects for candidates.
Following a review of the literature, Chapter 3 focuses on methodological aspects of the
study and describes the media experiments designed to test study hypotheses. The experiments
are briefly summarized followed by a discussion of the participant samples used in study
experiments. In contrast to previous research, I rely on both college student samples and a
nationally-representative adult sample. Religious measures of the nationally-representative adult
sample are compared to measures drawn from college student samples, with results indicating
striking religious congruence between the two age groups in terms of religious traditionalism
among Christian identifiers, thereby bolstering confidence in overall study findings.
Chapter 4 begins the first of four analytical chapters and focuses on priming by various
religious dimensions and in low information environments. The chapter opens with a factor
analysis of religious measures confirming distinct religious dimensions for religious behaviors
(i.e. commitment) and beliefs (i.e. traditionalism). Results from a series of regression models are
then presented. Consistent with expectations, exposure to religious appeals in a low-information
environment produces significant priming effects, which are shown to be most pronounced based
on one’s religious beliefs. Moreover, these effects are demonstrated in a college student sample
and subsequently extended to a nationally-representative cross section of U.S. adults.
The regression models presented in Chapter 4 are then expanded in Chapter 5 to explore
priming effects in more complex, non-partisan information environments. As hypothesized,
results indicate religious priming effects are significantly reduced when individuals are exposed
to additional non-partisan candidate information prior to viewing a religious campaign appeal.
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Chapter 6 then explores the effect of partisan cues on religious priming. Experimental findings
suggest the presence of partisan cues in religious appeals offsets religious priming effects while
simultaneously promoting partisan priming. Partisan cues effectively activate one’s political
predispositions resulting in viewers becoming less reliant on their religious beliefs in forming
political evaluations.
Transitioning from the effect of religious appeals in alternative information environments
to the consequences of different types of religious appeals, Chapter 7 explores differences
between subtle, implicit appeals and overt, explicit appeals. Results demonstrate both implicit
and explicit appeals to resonate among religious traditionalists with no significant difference
between the two types of ads. Additional analysis reveals, however, that political sophistication
significantly moderates the relationship between implicit and explicit religious appeals. Priming
effects are shown to be more pronounced for political novices presented an explicit religious
appeal, while implicit appeals appear to resonate with the politically attentive. Chapter 7 then
returns to the effect of appeals in information environments by examining the potential for
candidates to face backlash effects for being “called out” for their use of religious appeals vis-àvis media coverage critical of elites merging religion and politics. Results, however, yield little
evidence that exposure to critical messaging reduces any religious priming effect among
traditionalists.
Following formal analysis, the study concludes in Chapter 8 with a review of substantive
findings and discussion of study implications. The conclusion likewise offers a brief discussion
of study limitations as well as avenues for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The Role of Religion in Modern American Politics
Religion is deeply rooted in American society (e.g. Herberg, 1955; Greeley, 1972;
Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Wuthnow, 1988). Scholars have even termed the United States “God
Land” (O’Brien, 1999) for its intimate connection to religion. In his classic on American culture,
Tocqueville (1956) long ago noted the instrumental role religion plays in advancing democracy,
an observation that continues to ring true today (Putnam & Campbell, 2010). Although religious
participation has declined modestly in recent years among the youngest Millennial generation, an
overwhelming majority of Americans nonetheless demonstrate marked religious adherence (Pew,
2010; Putnam & Campbell, 2010). Consider, more Americans are involved in religious
organizations than in any other type of voluntary association (Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Wald
& Calhoun-Brown, 2006), with religious related involvement often more intense than
participation in other voluntary organizations (Steensland et al., 2000). More than 60% of
Americans report involvement in religious organizations, a greater rate than those professing
involvement in a hobby, sports, arts and music combined (Putnam & Campbell, 2010). Globally,
Americans embrace religion at far greater rates relative to other western democracies (Murihead,
Rosenblum, Schlozman & Shen, 2006).
Given the pervasiveness of religious participation in American society, it comes as little
surprise religion plays a similarly pivotal role in modern politics, especially as it relates to the
development of one’s political attitudes and worldviews (Green et al, 1996; Hunter, 1991; Leege
& Kellstedt, 1993; Wuthnow 1988, 1989). Influential religious socialization frequently begins
early in life (Carroll & Roof, 1993) with the symbols, pedagogy and practices espoused by
religious organizations serving to shape one’s world and cultural views (Steensland et al, 2000).
10

Although overt political preaching from the pulpit is rare in most religious traditions, individuals
nonetheless glean information from religious services, and especially communication with fellow
congregants, that similarly shapes their socio-political beliefs (Djupe & Gilbert, 2002; Green et
al, 1988; Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Wald, Owen, & Hill, 1998; Welch et al., 1993).
Indeed, the ability of religion to influence the socio-political views of potential voters has
marked implications for campaigns and elections. It is important to note, however, the role
religion plays in modern American politics has fundamentally evolved over the past half century.
Such a shift is readily observed in the presidential elections of 1960 and 2004. Massachusetts
Senator John F. Kennedy enjoyed the support of more than 80% of Roman Catholics in 1960
(Silk & Walsh, 2008); yet by 2004, Senator John F. Kerry, also a Massachusetts Catholic, lost
the Catholic vote (47% to 52%) to President George W. Bush, a religiously devout Protestant
(Guth et al., 2006). How did such a religious transformation in American politics occur whereby
self-identified Catholics would disproportionately support a devout Protestant over a Catholic?
Historical research into religion in American society and politics in the early to mid 20th
century embraced an ethnoreligious framework, revealing distinct ecumenical divisions. In his
seminal work, Protestant-Catholic-Jew, Herberg (1955) noted marked tension between the three
major traditions, especially between Protestants and Catholics, owing in large part to ethnic and
socio-economic differences. While Catholics were largely centered in urban areas and composed
of less educated, working class Irish and Italian immigrants, relatively more educated English
Protestants tended to reside in rural areas with large percentages involved in agricultural-related
activities. Beyond ethnic and socio-economic factors, the major religious traditions were
likewise divided by suspicion and prejudices that further imposed cultural differences thereby
leading to stronger in-group attachments (Wuthnow, 1988). In 1950, for example, the National
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Association of Evangelicals (Protestants) passed a resolution noting its “grave concern” for the
“militant and aggressive tactics of the Roman Catholic hierarchy within and upon our (the)
government” (National Association of Evangelicals, 1950, p. 10, cited in Wuthnow, 1988, p. 74).
Such profound cleavages translated into distinct political views and voting preferences.
While urban, working class Catholics connected to machine politics and organized labor strongly
supported Democratic candidates and policies, rural, non-southern Protestants disproportionately
favored Republican candidates and initiatives (Wuthnow, 1988). Indeed, voting studies of this
period confirmed the rather monolithic political behavior of the religious traditions (Lazarsfeld et
al., 1944; Berelson et al., 1954), perhaps best illustrated by the presidential election of 1960
mentioned above wherein Kennedy enjoyed the overwhelming support of Roman Catholics.
From this perspective, one’s adherence to either of the major Christian religious
traditions was largely predictive of political behavior. Conceptualizing religion in terms of a
Protestant-Catholic dichotomy, although simplistic, nonetheless captured the most significant
religious effect on voting behavior, as non-southern Protestants primarily backed Republicans,
and Catholics largely supported Democrats for much of the 20th century (Olson & Warber,
2008). Edwards (1990) analysis of 35 years of presidential job approval data from the early
1950s through the mid 1980s demonstrates significant, remarkably stable differences between
Protestants and Catholics regarding support for presidents of this period, thus illustrating the
relative effectiveness of examining political behavior in terms of broad religious traditions.
The Counterculture Movement and the Onslaught of the Culture Wars
The past four decades, however, have witnessed a profound religious shift toward intradenominational differences (Hunter, 1991; Layman, 2001; Wuthnow, 1988). The historical
divide between Catholics and Protestants has been displaced by a growing rift within religious
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denominations between those embracing more fundamentalist or “orthodox” beliefs relative to
those adhering to secular or “progressive” doctrinal interpretations (Hunter, 1991; Wuthnow,
1988, 1989). This orthodox-progressive division has encouraged political battle lines drawn on a
host of divisive social issues ushering in the “culture wars” (Hunter, 1991).
Scholars and pundits alike argue the shift toward intra-denominational division along a
fundamentalist-progressive fault line has been driven, in large part, by the formal entry of the
Christian Right into the political arena (Dione, 1991; Hunter, 1991; Layman, 2001, Putnam &
Campbell, 2010; Thomas & Dobson, 1999). Religious groups such as the Moral Majority, the
Christian Coalition, Focus on the Family and others have fueled ongoing cultural discussions in
the political arena and given prominence to religious positions on divisive social issues. Indeed,
Putnam and Campbell (2010) argue the foray of the Christian Right into politics represented an
“aftershock” precipitated by religious individuals’ visceral reaction to the liberalization of sexual
practices and political policies during the counterculture of the 1960s and early 1970s, especially
as it relates to the issues of abortion and the decline of longstanding, traditional sexual norms.
As the Christian Right voiced conservative political positions on these and other social issues,
“religiosity and conservative politics became increasingly aligned, and abortion and gay rights
became emblematic of the emergent culture wars” (Putnam & Campbell, 2010, p. 120).
In political terms, the potency of religion thus transitioned away from marked ecumenical
division toward the degree to which one embraces traditional religious beliefs, such as inerrancy
of Biblical scripture (Layman 1997, 2001). Indeed, recent scholarly work has demonstrated
marked intra-denominational differences consistent with an orthodox-progressive religious
division (Abramowitz, 1995; Green, Guth & Fraser 1991; Guth et al., 2006; Layman, 2001). In
contrast to one’s denominational affiliation, religious traditionalism has been shown to be a more
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reliable indicator of one’s policy preferences as well as a more robust predictor of partisan
identification, vote choice and presidential approval (Layman 1997, 2001; Layman & Carmines,
1997; Olson & Warber, 2008). Owing to the link between religiosity and conservative policy
positions advocated of the Christian Right, traditionalists more often self identify as Republican,
support Republican candidates and stake out conservative policy positions on both social and
fiscal issues (Green & Guth, 1988; Kohut et al., 2000; Hunter 1991; Layman 2001).
Guth et al.’s (2006) analysis of the 2004 U.S. presidential election illuminates the chasm
between religious traditionalists and progressives in terms of political preferences. While nearly
80% of self-identified evangelicals backed President George W. Bush, Senator John Kerry
enjoyed the support of 72% of secularists and religious minorities. The election results thus
reinforce Hunter’s (1991) culture wars thesis in illustrating the predictive power of one’s
religious beliefs on political behavior in modern campaigns. Guth et al.’s (2006) findings
likewise dovetail with Layman’s (2001) conclusion that the parties have effectively realigned on
religious beliefs resulting in a “Great Divide,” or “God Gap” between the parties (e.g. Sullivan,
2008). Republicans and Democrats are now largely divided along a traditionalist-modernist
cleavage moderated by religious differences on cultural issues (Layman, 2001).
As religious affiliation has waned in its ability to successfully predict political behaviors,
scholars have broadened their approach in examining the influence of religion in the political
process. No longer is analysis based simply on one’s allegiance to a particular religious tradition
adequate to capture the complexity of religious effects in the modern political environment. Thus
scholars now recognize three distinct religious dimensions commonly known in the literature as
the dimensions of “behaving,” “believing” and “belonging” (Kohut et al., 2000; Leege &
Kellstedt, 1993; Olson & Warber, 2008). Behaving refers to one’s religious commitment as
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measured through religious behaviors such as frequency in church attendance or reading the
Bible. In contrast, believing refers to the degree to which one adheres to specific beliefs such as
inerrancy in scripture or certainty in Biblical concepts (e.g. God, heaven, hell). Consistent with
historical approaches to the study of religion, scholars likewise continue to recognize one’s
affiliation with a particular religious denomination, which represents the dimension of belonging.
Although much focus on the effect of religion in politics now centers on religious beliefs,
notable ethnoreligious differences persist thus necessitating continued examination of the role of
affiliation, or “belonging” on political behavior. Black Protestants and Jews, for example,
continue to display pronounced support for the Democratic Party in spite of holding relatively
orthodox religious beliefs (Layman, 2001). Nonetheless, the culture wars literature and its
progeny (e.g. Hunter, 1991; Layman, 2001; Wuthnow, 1988) makes clear, the potency of
religion in American politics for the majority of the electorate currently resides in the degree to
which voters embrace traditional religious beliefs. Voters across religious traditions who adhere
to more orthodox beliefs hold more conservative positions on a host of social and fiscal issues
(Fiorina et al, 2006; Kohut et al., 2000). The once durable division between Protestants and
Catholics has effectively disappeared as Catholics, and especially evangelical Protestants, have
migrated toward the Republican Party, while mainline Protestants have trended toward the
Democratic Party (see e.g. Fowler et al., 2004; Kohut et al., 2000; Manza & Brooks, 1999). In
effect, the entry of the Christian Right into the political arena served to make salient traditional
religious beliefs, in the process reorienting the parties around religiously-infused social issues.
Courting Christians and The Rise of Religious Rhetoric
In response to the Christian Right’s entry into politics and corresponding politicization of
religion, candidates and political elites have increasingly pivoted toward religious voters.
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Invoking the “God Strategy,” Domke and Coe (2008) demonstrate how modern American
presidents have increasingly and intentionally courted religious voters through various appeals:
be it increased visits to places of religious significance; frequent use of religious verbiage and
imagery in presidential rhetoric and in the naming of legislative initiatives (e.g. Clinton’s “New
Covenant”); or simply declaring more national days of prayer. Party platforms have likewise
been crafted to resonate with religious voters by drawing on divisive social issues such as
abortion, school prayer or gay marriage (Domke & Coe, 2008).
Analyzing more than 75 years of presidential speeches, Coe and Domke (2006) argue
Ronald Reagan ushered in a new era of “God talk,” demonstrating Reagan referred to God at
more than twice the rate of presidents dating back to FDR. Guth (2004) similarly notes how
President George W. Bush frequently employed religious rhetoric and themes in his presidency
to court evangelicals, especially following the events of September 11, 2001 (see also Domke,
2004). President Barack Obama has likewise followed in this tradition. During his first six
months in office, Obama infused political speeches with references to Jesus Christ and other
religious aspects far more often than George W. Bush did during the same period of his
presidency (Javers, 2009). In a speech delivered at Georgetown University in April 2009, for
example, Obama referenced Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount, which he followed the next month in a
commencement address at the University of Notre Dame in commenting of his prior community
work in Chicago, “It was through this service that I was brought to Christ” (Javers, 2009).
Although much of Obama’s presidential rhetoric has been overt, scholars likewise argue
religious appeals often rely on subtle, coded themes and images crafted to reach religious voters
without necessarily alienating more secular voters (Albertson, 2006; Domke & Coe, 2008;
Unger, 2007; Weiss, 2010). Indeed, Calfano and Djupe (2009) describe “the code” as a “highly
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sophisticated communication strategy…designed to appeal to an in-group without rousing outgroup suspicions” (p. 329). Unger (2007) likens this process to dog whistling in that it reaches
its intended audience outside the awareness of non-religious voters. The code as implemented by
elites has included such practices as the subtle inclusion of Biblical scripture or religious
references in speeches designed to appeal to religious conservatives. Former George W. Bush
White House staffer David Kuo (2006) describes how Republicans frequently included strategic
passages in speeches drawing on Biblical scripture and religious hymns such as, “I believe in an
America that recognizes the worth of every individual, and leaves the ninety-nine to find the one
stray lamb,” and “There is power, wonder working power, in the goodness and faith of the
American people (p.60, see also Calfano & Djupe, 2009, p. 329-330). These practices are
thought beneficial given the belief that such rhetoric resonates with religious individuals.
The expectation that subtle religious themes and imagery matter to religious voters is
congruent with a corpus of literature that has demonstrated the potency of campaign appeals
often resides in their use of coded images and language (e.g. Huber & Lapinski, 2006;
Mendelberg, 2001; Valentino et al., 2002). In an experimental design examining the effects of
“coded” appeals on college students, Calfano and Djupe (2009) demonstrate such appeals
enhance support for candidates among evangelical students without alienating more secular
students. Although Calfano and Djupe’s (2009) findings are limited by their lone experimental
design and non-representative student sample as well as the use of fictitious candidates and
campaign information, study results nonetheless provide useful insight as a starting point into the
potential effects of religious appeals as a campaign strategy. Indeed, study results suggest the
ability of religious appeals in political campaigns to activate or “prime” religious considerations
among potential voters.
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Priming Religious Traditionalism in Political Campaigns
This study, therefore, extends the work of Calfano and Djupe (2009) and research in the
area of religion in politics by examining religious appeals through the lens of priming. A corpus
of research across academic disciplines has demonstrated the ability of exposure to media to
significantly influence consumers’ subsequent behaviors and judgments (see e.g. Anderson,
1997; Bushman, 1995; Iyengar et al., 1982,1984; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Krosnick & Kinder,
1990; Mendelberg, 2001; Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 2007). Much of this work rests on the concept
of priming, the psychological process wherein exposure to a given stimulus activates, or
“primes,” existing mental constructs, which then serve as standards for subsequent evaluations of
other concepts (Goidel, Shields & Peffley, 1997; Higgins, 1996).
Although multiple theoretical approaches could be applied to examine the effects of
religious appeals, priming provides an ideal lens to examine effects born of both implicit and
explicit messaging. Framing, for example, speaks to outcome effects brought about by the
presentation of an issue, in essence an overarching theme that subsequently influences individual
understanding of an event (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, 1997).
While a campaign can frame a candidate as explicitly religious, as noted, appeals to religion are
frequently subtle, often employing cues tangential to the primary theme of an advertisement or
speech. Because priming effects may emerge from mere exposure to a stimulus that promotes
subsequent activation of concepts and not a shift in the understanding of an issue per se, priming
thus provides an intuitive approach to examine effects born of both subtle and overt messaging.
The application of priming as a framework to study media effects is vast, ranging from
the study of political priming (e.g. Goidel et al., 1997; Krosnick & Kinder, 1990) to the role of
media violence on subsequent behavior (e.g. Bushman, 1998; Josephson, 1987) to the
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reinforcement of gender and racial stereotypes (e.g. Domke, 2001; Hansen & Hansen, 1988;
Johnson, Trawalter & Dovidio, 2000). The theoretical foundation of priming rests on network
models of memory (e.g. Collins & Loftus, 1975; Collins & Quillian, 1969), which conceive of
information stored as concepts or nodes and associated such that priming one concept (e.g.
president) can activate other linked concepts (e.g. Barack Obama) that are then applied to
evaluate information (Dillman Carpentier et al., 2008). As it pertains to the political sector,
research into priming suggests prominent media coverage of an issue primes the likelihood that
individuals will subsequently use the highlighted issue as a criterion to evaluate political policies
or candidates (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2007).
Numerous scholars have substantiated that media coverage influences the factors by
which individuals evaluate political figures (e.g. Goidel et al, 1997; Hetherington, 1996; Iyengar
et al, 1982, 1984; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Pan & Kosicki, 1997). Indeed, priming effects have
been demonstrated across a host of political domains including: the activation of racial attitudes
through political advertisements (Mendelberg 2001; Huber & Lapinski 2006); the ability of news
coverage to influence presidential trait evaluations (Iyengar & Kinder 1987) and job approval
based on economic (Goidel & Langley, 1995; Hetherington, 1996), foreign policy and defense
news coverage (Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Krosnick & Kinder 1990; Pan & Kosicki, 1997); as
well as the priming of individual value orientations (Feldman & Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005).
The broad findings that exposure to media influences the manner in which individuals
evaluate political figures and issues through the activation of various knowledge structures, be it
racial attitudes, economic perceptions or other constructs, indicates the ability of media exposure
to similarly activate religious considerations. Likewise, Calfano and Djupe’s (2009) findings
that exposure to coded religious statements enhances favorability among evangelical students
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suggests priming effects are likely to emerge in the context of campaign appeals. In essence,
religious appeals should heighten the impact of religiosity on evaluations of political candidates.
Campaign ads drawing on religious appeals should resonate among voters such that religious
considerations become activated and subsequently used in formulating candidate evaluations.
More specifically, however, we should observe this effect to be most pronounced along
the “believing” dimension of religiosity – that is, based on one’s degree of religious
traditionalism as opposed to commitment or affiliation. The consistent findings drawn from the
culture wars literature demonstrating traditionalism to be more diagnostic on a host of political
behaviors relative to other religious dimensions (Hunter, 1991; Layman 1997, 2001; Layman &
Carmines, 1997; Olson & Warber, 2008) strongly suggests religious priming to be similarly
pronounced among traditionalists. I therefore expect: (H1) Exposure to religious appeals will
activate religious traditionalism, which will subsequently influence candidate evaluations. This
priming-traditionalism hypothesis thus proposes exposure to religious appeals to result in
religious priming, and these effects to be most pronounced based on one’s religious beliefs.
Assuming religious appeals are present in a political advertisement, one’s religious beliefs
should serve as a stronger predictor of candidate evaluation relative to other religious factors.
Religious Priming in Variable Information Environments
Providing religious priming occurs, regardless of particular religious dimension(s), it is
important to consider the context in which appeals are likely to emerge. Far from occurring in a
vacuum, religious appeals deployed in political campaigns are inevitably but a small part of
electoral environments rife in information. Thus, an obvious question arises as to how effective
a strategy of religious appeals may be for candidates faced with voters, even particularly
religious voters, routinely bombarded with additional, often non-religious political information.
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Research suggests priming effects may hinge, in large part, on the context of information
environments. Although disagreement exists as to when and under what circumstances priming
effects are most likely to occur, literature on political priming indicates effects are not pervasive
and uniform, but rather limited or bounded in practice. Krosnick and Kinder (1990) argue
priming effects to be moderated by political sophistication, with effects most pronounced among
political novices, owing to the idea that novices possess less complex beliefs. In essence,
sophisticates possess a richer store of considerations to draw upon, thereby limiting the effect of
any single piece of information (Krosnick & Kinder, 1990; see also Zaller, 1992; Zaller &
Feldman, 1992). Huber and Lapinski (2006) similarly contend priming to be more prominent
among novices because, unlike sophisticates, novices do not automatically bring predispositions
to the fore in formulating political judgments. To the extent relative sophisticates draw upon
predispositions in conflict with a stimulus message, potential priming effects become attenuated.
In contrast, Krosnick and Brannon (1993) suggest priming effects are dependent on one’s
ability to interpret, store and subsequently retrieve media messages, and it is only sophisticates
that possess the integrated schemata likely to yield significant priming effects. Sophisticates, not
novices, are thus most susceptible to priming. Taking yet a different approach, Goidel and
colleagues (1997) argue contextual factors such as the nature of news events and information
environments may influence potential priming effects as much, or more so, than political
sophistication or awareness, owing to variability in the complexity of information flows.
In the context of political campaigns, potential voters are bombarded by information from
competing candidates and campaigns, friends and colleagues, organizations and the press. This is
especially true of competitive elections producing more complex information environments.
Regardless of whether one embraces the view that political sophistication moderates priming

21

such that novices (Krosnick & Kinder, 1990) or sophisticates (Krosnick & Brannon, 1993) are
most affected, the complex information characteristics of political campaigns are likely to blunt
the effects of relatively isolated appeals as both novices and sophisticates become inundated with
campaign appeals and news coverage potentially priming them on a host of competing issues.
From this perspective, it is the complex informational nature of campaigns that is likely
to moderate the effect(s) of isolated campaign appeals. To examine how the relative complexity
of informational environments associated with campaigns may influence priming, the study
explores effects emerging from a more complex non-partisan environment by manipulating the
availability of additional secular candidate information. Further, and as discussed below, the
dissertation also examines priming effects in a partisan environment by manipulating the
presence of partisan cues in religious appeals. As competitive campaigns are rife with
information, it is worth noting virtually limitless informational aspects could be manipulated and
thus studied, such as the availability of oppositional messaging. I opt to explore the effects of
additional secular, non-partisan candidate information as well as the effects stemming from the
presence of partisan cues as both are realistic of information found in typical campaigns and, in
the case of partisan cues, shown to be highly influential in a voter’s calculus.
As priming effects should be reduced in relatively complex informational environments
where potential voters are faced with an array of secular candidate information on which to base
political evaluations, I anticipate (H2) Individual religious priming effects will be reduced in a
complex information environment relative to priming effects observed in an impoverished
information environment. This information-environment hypothesis thus assumes exposure to
additional secular, non-partisan political information will moderate the priming effects of
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religious appeals – a pattern that, if demonstrated, would speak to the relative applicability of
religious beliefs as an evaluative standard among voters in complex information environments.
Religious Priming in Variable Partisan Environments
Given the importance of party identification to political campaigns, it is likewise critical
to consider the impact of partisan information environments on the potential influence of
religious appeals. Literature on political behavior has long demonstrated the importance of one’s
partisan predispositions in shaping political attitudes (e.g. Campbell et al.,1960; Lewis-Beck et
al., 2008; Nie, Verba & Petrocik, 1976). Likewise, scholars have recognized the importance of
informational shortcuts, or heuristics, especially in the form of partisan cues to guide voter
decisions (e.g. Downs 1957; Mondak, 1993; Popkin, 1991). Rahn (1993) argues, for example,
that partisan cues are the “most powerful cues” provided in elections; “The cue provided by the
party label is simple, direct, and . . . consequential in shaping individuals’ perceptions and
evaluations of political candidates” (p. 473). Goren and colleagues (2009) similarly note the
pivotal role of party affiliation to the formation of individual political judgments, “Party
identification represents the most stable and influential political predisposition in the belief
systems of ordinary citizens” (p. 805). Given the influential power of partisan cues in campaigns
coupled with the strength of one’s religious beliefs to significantly shape political behavior (e.g.
Layman, 2001; Layman & Carmines, 1997), it is prudent to examine how partisanship and the
inclusion of partisan cues in religious appeals may alter any priming effects.
Although I am unaware of any work examining the extent to which one’s partisanship
and the presence of partisan cues may affect political evaluations in the context of religious
priming, researchers have examined the influential role of partisan cues in other domains.
Research has demonstrated partisan cues may influence partisans to alter relatively short-term
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perceptions on issues such as the state of the economy and presidential approval (Bartels, 2002).
More recent research has even confirmed the ability of partisan cues to modify the expression of
enduring political values such as equal opportunity and self-reliance (Goren et al., 2009).
Analyzing the effect of source cues on attitudes held toward ethnic minorities, Kam
(2007) finds partisan cues effectively blunt the effect of prior negative attitudes held of Hispanics
in determining vote choice. To the extent the mere presence of partisan cues significantly
attenuates deeply held ethnic attitudes, Kam’s (2007) work illustrates the potency of partisan
cues to shape political behavior. Explaining the strength of partisan cues, Kam (2007) argues,
“citizens…use party cues over attitudes toward an ethnic group because party cues are widely
shared heuristics that seem more appropriate and more legitimate for political decision-making”
(p. 362). The presence of partisan cues in religious appeals is therefore likely to be
consequential in determining the effectiveness of religious appeals in activating religious beliefs.
Applied to religious priming, Kam’s (2007) findings coupled with the enduring
attachment many have to political parties suggest the presence of partisan cues in religious
appeals to likely reduce, and perhaps overshadow, religious priming effects. Similar to the
informational effects hypothesized above (H2) suggesting religious priming to be moderated by
the presence of additional secular candidate information, so too will priming effects be
attenuated by the presence of partisan cues in religious appeals as party attachments individuals
possess will heavily influence evaluations. In essence, the presence of partisan cues will activate
enduring partisan attachments thereby reducing the impact of religion on candidate evaluation,
while simultaneously promoting evaluation based on one’s partisan predispositions.
Given this relationship, I expect (H3) The relationship between evaluations and
traditionalism will be strengthened among viewers of non-partisan religious appeals and reduced
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among those exposed to partisan religious appeals, while the relationship between evaluations
and partisan predispositions will be heightened among viewers of partisan religious appeals. In
essence, this partisan-influence hypothesis suggests evaluations will hinge on the presence of
partisan cues. While religious evaluation will be more pronounced among viewers of religious
appeals absent partisan cues, viewers of partisan religious appeals will become more reliant on
their partisan predispositions. Such effects would be consistent with the informationenvironment hypothesis above in that both hypotheses imply religious-based evaluation to wane
in the face of additional political information. Moreover, such findings would illuminate the
importance individuals place on religious considerations relative to traditional political factors in
formulating political judgments in diverse campaign information environments.
Implicit and Explicit Appeals and the Role of Societal Norms
Having considered the potential moderating influence of partisan and non-partisan
environments on religious priming effects, I now turn to the relative effectiveness of religious
appeals based on differences in appeal types. Given that religious appeals are crafted to resonate
with religious voters through both subtle and overt methods (Unger, 2007; Domke & Coe, 2008),
examination of potential differential effects based on appeal type warrants further study to more
fully explicate the strategic implications of religious appeals in modern political campaigns. To
develop theoretical expectations as to the effects likely to emerge from exposure to implicit and
explicit religious appeals, I rely on prior research drawn from racial priming literature, which
demonstrates implicit and explicit appeals resonate differently among potential voters (e.g.
Huber & Lapinski, 2006; Mendelberg, 2001; Valentino et al., 2002; White, 2007).
In her seminal work on racial appeals and campaign strategy, Mendelberg (2001) argues
the types of racial appeals employed by politicians changed in the wake of shifting societal
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norms on racial equality. Politicians routinely employed explicit racial appeals prior to the Civil
Rights era, but transitioned to the use of more implicit appeals in keeping with the shift in norms
toward racial equality following the Civil Rights movement. The transition to implicit appeals,
Mendelberg (2001) argues, simultaneously provided the ability of candidates to subconsciously
tap latent racial attitudes among voters without appearing as overtly racist – a proposition she
illustrates with the now (in)famous Willie Horton ad that subconsciously activated latent racial
attitudes by playing off of stereotypic portrayals of violent black men (Gilliam & Iyengar, 2000).
Given the shift in societal norms on race, the power of modern racial appeals thus relies on using
subtle code words and images (Valentino et al., 2002) as well as issues typically associated with
African-Americans such as crime (Gilliam & Iyengar, 2000) and welfare (Gilens, 1999) to
activate racial attitudes outside of voter awareness. As has been observed, in many contexts,
primes are more potent when subjects are unaware of their presence (Higgins, 1996).
Mendelberg (2001) additionally argues, however, when voters are made aware of
candidates playing the “race card,” the priming effect of racial attitudes on subsequent evaluation
diminishes. Calling attention to, or “calling out,” the subtle play on racial stereotypes by elites
serves to expose the act as a violation of racial norms, thereby evoking an egalitarian backlash
among voters and effectively muting any priming effects. More recently, Huber and Lapinski
(2006) have qualified Mendelberg’s findings in demonstrating the effect of racial appeals varies
with levels of sophistication – operationalized as education. Although highly-educated
individuals more likely to possess egalitarian norms dismiss explicit appeals consistent with
Mendelberg’s (2001) theory, novices are less likely to distinguish implicit from explicit appeals
and are primed by either appeal (Huber & Lapinski, 2006). Thus, for less-educated individuals,
implicit appeals are no more effective at priming racial attitudes.
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Given the lack of research examining the consequences of religious appeals, it is unclear
if the differences observed of implicit and explicit appeals in racial priming similarly hold in the
domain of religious priming. A caveat is recognition of the notable differences in societal norms
held of race and religion, and therefore how racial and religious priming strategies are likely to
play out in modern campaigns. Relative to societal views on race, religion plays a markedly
different role in society and modern American politics. A vast majority of Americans identify
with religious organizations with more people involved in religious denominations than in any
other type of voluntary association (Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Wald & Calhoun-Brown, 2006).
Indeed, it is the social acceptability of religion in American culture and the intimate role religion
plays for many individuals (Carroll & Roof, 1993; Greeley, 1972; Putnam & Campbell, 2010)
that suggests religion may be appealed to effectively in a much more explicit manner relative to
racial priming. Consider, a 2003 Pew Research poll found nearly twice as many individuals
(41%) responding there had been too little reference to religious faith and prayer by politicians as
opposed to too much (21%) (Pew, 2004). In 2010, 37% of respondents continued to state there
was too little expression of religion in politics relative to those believing there was too much,
29% (Pew, 2012). Moreover, as Domke and Coe (2008) note, some of the most effective
politicians, especially in presidential politics, have relied heavily on religious appeals in recent
decades (see also Coe & Domke, 2006).
Such findings suggest the ability of politicians to effectively appeal to potential voters
through more explicit strategies. At the same time, however, there are notable reasons why
implicit religious appeals may prove equally advantageous. Just as implicit racial appeals can
activate racial attitudes through subtly playing on media-perpetuated stereotypes (Gilens, 1999;
Gilliam & Iyengar, 2000; Peffley & Hurwitz, 2007; Valentino et al., 2002), candidates may be
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able to similarly activate religious considerations through subtle symbolic cues or to policy
positions that, although not specifically religious, have nonetheless become effectively
systematized to religion (e.g. pro-life, traditional marriage). Indeed, as Putnam and Campbell
(2010) note, the two most prominent issues among the Christian Right are abortion and the
promotion of traditional sexual norms. Hence, implicit appeals tapping such salient issues may
provide candidates the benefit of priming religious voters without appearing as overtly religious,
thus minimizing any backlash for explicitly exploiting religion or increased media scrutiny of
their religious tenets (Kuo, 2006) as faced by multiple candidates in the recent 2012 Republican
presidential primary campaign (Goldberg, 2011; Lizza, 2011; Wilder, 2011).
Given theoretical and practical considerations why both explicit and implicit religious
appeals are likely to be effective campaign strategies, I therefore expect (H4) Implicit and
explicit appeals to be equally effective in promoting religious priming. This implicit-explicit
appeals hypothesis thus implies candidates the ability to “speak” to religious voters through
ostensibly non-religious means, a finding that if demonstrated has marked implications for how
scholars consider the rhetoric of political elites, especially in the context of political campaigns.
At the same time, it is unclear what effect, if any, calling attention to candidates for
appealing to religion may have in potentially limiting the effect of religious appeals as a
campaign strategy, akin to the reduction of priming effects observed in racial priming literature
when candidates suffer backlash effects when “called out” by elites for their use of racial appeals
(Mendelberg, 2001). A caveat, however, is that powerful norms also shape societal views of
religion. Just as racial egalitarianism serves as a potent norm shaping racial priming strategies,
the long-adhered-to principle of separation of church and state influences the role of religion in
politics. In recent years, prominent proponents of church-state separation have very publically

28

denounced the overt use of religion by politicians and the mixing of religion and government in
general. During the 2008 election cycle, for example, First Freedom First, a partnership of The
Interfaith Alliance Foundation and Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
launched a national ad campaign promoting religious freedom vis-à-vis the separation of church
and state, while condemning the growing mix of religion and politics.
Moreover, recent polling demonstrates a trend toward individuals growing increasingly
uncomfortable with the use of religious rhetoric by politicians and the role of religion in politics,
even among self-identified Republicans and conservatives (Pew, 2008; Pew, 2012). The
combination of mounting public opposition to the overt mixing of religion in politics owing to
the principle of church-state separation coupled with growing unease – especially among
conservatives – about candidates’ use of religious rhetoric as well as increased media scrutiny of
candidates’ religious views (e.g. Cominsky, 2011; Keller, 2011) argues candidates may face
backlash effects by being called out for “inappropriately” using religion in campaigns.
Conversely, although there is a growing percentage of individuals expressing unease
about the use of religion by political elites, a sizable majority of individuals continue to respond
they are comfortable with the current volume of religion espoused by politicians or would
actually prefer additional expression (Pew, 2012). Taken together, the general level of comfort a
majority of Americans report with religious expression in modern politics coupled with marked
religious involvement demonstrated by large portions of the electorate seemingly precludes the
emergence of any notable backlash effects resulting from calling out candidates for appealing to
religion. Simply put, widespread socialization of religion in American society tends to negate
the likelihood calling attention to the strategic use of religion in campaigns will blunt religious
priming effects. As such, my final expectation is (H5) Calling out (i.e. drawing attention to) the
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use of religious appeals in political campaigns will not significantly attenuate religious priming
effects. This attention-attenuation hypothesis thus implies candidates will not suffer adverse
backlash effects from being called out for deploying religious political appeals.
Admittedly, the concept that candidates will suffer little adverse effects for mounting
explicit religious appeals runs counter to racial priming expectations, so too the proposition of no
difference in effects born of implicit and explicit appeals (i.e. H4). As noted, however, the social
acceptability of religion in American culture fundamentally alters expectations. Simply put,
religiosity does not evoke the same normative pressures that are associated with race in society.
As such, religion may be appealed to through more explicit methods by candidates without fear
of voter or electoral repercussions.
Study Hypotheses
Having established clear expectations, I now turn to formal methods and analysis. For
convenience, however, Table 2.1 summarizes hypotheses tested in subsequent chapters.
Table 2.1 – Study Hypotheses
H1 – The PrimingTraditionalism Hypothesis

Study Hypotheses
Exposure to religious appeals will activate religious traditionalism
(beliefs), which will subsequently influence candidate evaluations.

H2 – The InformationEnvironment Hypothesis

Individual religious priming effects will be reduced in a complex
information environment relative to priming effects observed in an
impoverished information environment.

H3 – The Partisan-Influence
Hypothesis

The relationship between evaluations and traditionalism will be
strengthened among viewers of non-partisan religious appeals and
reduced among those exposed to partisan religious appeals, while the
relationship between evaluations and partisan predispositions will be
heightened among viewers of partisan religious appeals.

H4 – The Implicit-Explicit
Appeals Hypothesis

Implicit and explicit appeals will be equally effective in promoting
religious priming.

H5 – The AttentionAttenuation Hypothesis

Calling out (i.e. drawing attention to) the use of religious appeals in
political campaigns will not significantly attenuate religious priming
effects.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Overview
As is evident from the literature review and proposed hypotheses, the overall project
focuses on the effects of various religious appeals on individual political behavior and in
differing information environments. Given the study’s concern with explaining media effects,
and therefore aspects of causality, the dissertation employs a series of media experiments. There
exists general agreement among scholars on the use of experiments for examining questions of
causality (e.g. Kinder & Palfrey, 1993; Weisberg, Krosnick & Bowen, 1996; Westley 1989;
Wimmer & Dominick, 2006). Wimmer and Dominick (2006), state the “experiment is
undoubtedly the best social science research method for establishing causality” (p. 231), while
Valentino, Hutchings and White (2002) note the experiment’s “greatest strength is its ability to
isolate the casual impact of communication factors on political attitudes and behavior” (p. 77).
Indeed, it is precisely the ability to isolate causal effects of communication on potential voters’
subsequent political evaluations that experimental designs are particularly appropriate for
examining the consequences of religious appeals on prospective voters.
In total, the study employs five individual experiments. For convenience, the design of
each experiment, including corresponding pre- and posttest measures, is discussed in greater
detail in the context of the analytical chapter focusing on the hypothesis each experiment is
designed to test. In general, however, each experiment employs a between subjects, pretestposttest design with subtle modifications in terms of survey instruments, experimental stimuli
and sample composition. Experiments #1 and #2, which are designed to test whether exposure to
religious appeals results in priming and the extent to which information environments may alter
priming effects, also incorporate multi-factorial manipulations as discussed in more detail in
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Chapter 4. These subtle differences aside, participants in each experiment were presented a
statement of informed consent and then completed a brief socio-political pretest. Participants
were then randomly assigned to an experimental condition exposing them to stimuli (campaign
advertisements) designed to test a hypothesis(es) under study, followed by a posttest survey
asking subjects to evaluate the candidate referenced in the stimulus material.5
Experimental Samples
In terms of study participants, four of five experiments rely on undergraduate student
samples drawn from the Louisiana State University Manship School of Mass Communication.
Although scholars have long relied on college student participants in conducting academic
research, some scholars have criticized the practice arguing college students possess markedly
different characteristics compared to typical adults, a situation that potentially undermines the
validity of research relying on college-student samples (e.g. Sears, 1986). Relative to adults,
Sears (1986) argues college students, on average, possess greater cognitive ability, yet have less
crystallized social and political attitudes. Likewise, college students have a greater need for peer
approval, yet simultaneously possess highly unstable peer and group relationships. Thus,
research employing college students, especially in the context of artificial experimental settings,
has the potential to produce ecologically biased associations relative to relationships observed of
adults in natural settings (Sears, 1986).
In an effort to address concerns over the possibility of student-based studies to produce
biased results, I additionally incorporate an experiment drawn on a nationally representative
cross section of adults.6 The adult study both replicates and extends one of the student-based
experiments, thereby permitting direct comparisons in terms of experimental effects between the

5
6

See Appendix for copies of IRB approval forms and survey instruments.
The adult experiment, discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, was fielded by Knowledge Networks in August, 2010.
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two age groups. As discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, the effects observed
between the two populations demonstrate striking similarities, a fact that provides reassurance in
current study findings born of college student subjects, and more importantly, provides
substantial credibility as to overall study findings regarding the effects of religious appeals on
potential voters – both younger and older voters alike.
To further alleviate any concerns over the use of both student and adult samples, I
additionally compare the religious attitudes held of college students and adults prior to formal
discussion of experimental results. Recall, the proposed hypotheses argue religious priming is
likely to be most pronounced based on one’s degree of traditionalism – that is, the extent to
which one adheres to orthodox or progressive religious beliefs. Consistent with the culture wars
literature (e.g. Hunter, 1991; Layman, 2001; Wuthnow, 1988), relative to religious affiliation
(i.e. “belonging”) or commitment (i.e. “behaving”), one’s religious beliefs should prove more
diagnostic in terms of observed priming effects. Thus, I examine any differences in the religious
beliefs of students and adults prior to further analysis in an effort to demonstrate the similarities
in beliefs held of self-identified Christian students and adults.
If, as prior research argues, influential religious socialization begins early in one’s life
(e.g. Carroll and Roof, 1993), religious beliefs should be reasonably well formed by the point
one attends college, and thus minimal difference between college students and adults should
emerge in terms of religious beliefs. Indeed, precisely because religious socialization begins
early in life relative to the formation of other attitudes (e.g. political beliefs), we should observe
general consistency in the beliefs of Christian adult and college student populations. Although
scholars have noted marked variability in religious commitment among college students relative
to adult populations, in large part because the collegiate experience tends to be disruptive in
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terms of religious attendance (Hoge, Johnson & Luidens, 1994; Putnam & Campbell, 2010),
underlying core beliefs should nonetheless persist. Indeed, the variability in religious behaviors
of individuals throughout life is a notable reason why scholars observe multiple dimensions of
religion and recognize the value of tapping religious traditionalism, as it tends to provide a more
stable, diagnostic measure across generations (Layman, 1997; Olson & Warber, 2008).
To illustrate similarities in religious beliefs held of adults and students, I construct index
measures of religious traditionalism created from responses from adult and student pretest
questionnaires, which I subsequently plot in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 below. The traditionalism
measure created from the student experiments consists of eight religious beliefs questions.7
Specifically, a single question taken from the General Social Survey asked students to describe
their views of Biblical literalism, with three response options ranging from the Bible is the literal
word of God to the Bible is a book of fables.8 Views on religious tradition were tapped with a
question drawn from the Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics (2004) asking students
to describe their thoughts on religious beliefs from the following options: “We should strive to
preserve beliefs and practices; we should strive to adapt beliefs and practices to new times; we
should strive to adopt new beliefs and practices.” Students’ religious orientation was tapped by
asking: “Which of the following best describes your religious views? Fundamentalist/
Evangelical; Traditional/Conservative; Mainline/Moderate; Progressive/Liberal; Not Religious.”
In addition to their views on Biblical literalism, religious tradition and orientation,
students were asked five belief certainty measures. Pretest student questionnaires asked
participants, “How certain is your belief in (God/heaven/hell/the devil/ that Jesus Christ is the
Son of God)” with possible responses ranging from “absolutely certain” to “I do not believe in
7

Religious measures used to form traditionalism indices for students and adults were selected based on a factor
analysis discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. See Table 4.1.
8
See Appendix Survey Instruments #1-3 for specific question wording.
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(God, heaven, etc).” All responses were recoded to indicate more traditional beliefs. The eight
questions were then summed to create a highly reliable measure of religious traditionalism
(α=.93) and scaled from 0 (progressivism) to 1(traditionalism).
A measure of religious traditionalism was similarly constructed from adult pretest
responses to four beliefs questions.9 Adults were presented the identical questions asked of
students regarding Biblical literalism, views on religious tradition, religious orientation self
placement and belief certainty that Jesus Christ is the Son of God. As with the student measure,
all responses were recoded to indicate more traditional views and then summed to create an
internally consistent traditionalism index variable (α=.82) scaled from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating
more orthodox views. The distribution of religious traditionalism among self-identified
Christian students is presented in Figure 3.1, while Figure 3.2 presents the distribution of
religious traditionalism among self-identified Christians in the national adult sample.

M = .80, SD = .15

Figure 3.1 – Religious traditionalism among self-identified Christian students
9

As Knowledge Networks determines sample size based, in part, on survey length, surveys instruments were
shortened to maximize sample size. Hence, only four beliefs measures were included in the online adult study.
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M = .73, SD = .21

Figure 3.2 – Religious traditionalism among self-identified Christian adults
As illustrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, remarkable similarity emerges for the distribution of
traditionalism among student and adult Christian identifiers. While students demonstrate a
slightly higher average level of traditionalism (M=.80, SD=.15) relative to adult participants
(M=.73, SD=.21), both groups nonetheless display a very similar distribution of traditionalism.
The similarity in the distributions of a nationally-representative adult sample as well as a
Southern college student sample speaks to common, core beliefs shared of self-identified
Christians in general (e.g. belief in God, heaven, Jesus Christ is the Son of God).10
As it pertains to the current study, the similarity in beliefs demonstrated of younger and
older participants alike provide a measure of reassurance in the use of college student samples to
examine potential priming effects resulting from exposure to religious appeals. Indeed, as
demonstrated in subsequent chapters, exposure to political appeals infused with religious cues
10

An important distinction here is that distributions are based on self-identified Christians within each sample – the
focus of the current study. Distributions based on all participants in each sample would likely reveal greater
variance in beliefs between age groups, owing to an increasing percentage of younger generations foregoing
organized religion (Pew, 2010; Putnam & Campbell, 2010).
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activates religious traditionalism, which significantly influences subsequent candidate
evaluations, and this effect is shown to be consistent across student and adult participants.
In sum, the similarity between the religious beliefs held of student and adult participants
suggests the effects observed of student populations to approximate those likely to emerge in
adult populations. Unlike other areas of academic research wherein scholars have expressed
concern that the use of “college sophomores” likely yields skewed results (e.g. Sears, 1986), the
consistency in religious beliefs observed of self-identified Christian students and adults in the
present study resulting in equally consistent priming effects presented in subsequent chapters
suggests the general appropriateness of using college students as experimental subjects. Having
established general consistency in the religious beliefs of Christian adults and students across
study experiments, I now turn to formal analysis examining the consequences of religious
appeals in political campaigns.
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CHAPTER 4
PRIMING RELIGIOUS TRADITIONALISM
Chapter Overview
Formal analysis begins by examining whether exposure to religious appeals in a lowinformation environment activates traditionalism leading to significant changes in political
behavior.11 Exposure to religious appeals should heighten the impact of religiosity on political
evaluations, and this effect should be most pronounced based on one’s religious beliefs – that is,
the degree to which one adheres to traditional religious doctrine. Recall, the religious-priming
hypothesis (H1) proposes that, consistent with the culture wars literature, religious appeals will
activate religious traditionalism, which will subsequently influence candidate evaluations.
To establish whether exposure to religious appeals primes traditional religious beliefs, the
chapter begins with a review of experimental procedures undertaken to test the religious-priming
hypothesis. Following a description of experiments, results of an exploratory factor analysis
performed on student religious pretest measures are presented. Consistent with previous
literature (Layman, 1997; Olson & Warber, 2008), a distinct dimension emerges for religious
commitment based on one’s religious behaviors as well as a clear dimension of traditionalism
based on religious beliefs. Index measures for traditionalism and commitment are then modeled
across posttest candidate evaluation measures with results confirming expectations – exposure to
religious appeals results in significant priming effects, which are shown to be most pronounced
for religious traditionalism relative to religious commitment or particular religious affiliation.
Experimental Procedures
To examine priming effects resulting from exposure to religious appeals, I rely on two
nearly identical experiments, the first administered to a sample of 161 LSU undergraduate
11

Chapter 4 explores priming effects in the absence of additional candidate information. Although Experiments #1
and #2 include an information manipulation, only the no-information conditions are analyzed in the current chapter.
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students, and the second experiment administered to a national cross section of 562 adults
recruited via random digit dialing. Specifically, the first experiment was fielded in September
2009 and conducted in the Manship School of Mass Communication’s Media Effects Lab, while
the second online experiment was fielded by Knowledge Networks in August 2010.12
I include analysis of experiments drawn on both a student and adult sample for three key
reasons. First, the student study included more extensive questionnaires13 including measures of
religious commitment, thus enabling diagnostic comparisons between religious commitment and
traditionalism. Second, the follow-up, online adult study served to both replicate initial student
findings and extend those to a nationally representative sample, thereby strengthening external
validity. Third, analyses reveal subtle, yet important differences in how religious appeals
resonate with participants in each population – an observation detailed later in the chapter.
Each experiment employed a 2 (Prior Information: Present, Absent) x 2 (Religious
Appeals: Present, Absent) condition, pretest-posttest design relying on identical stimuli. All
participants in both experiments completed a brief pretest questionnaire as described below and
then were randomly assigned to one of the four treatment conditions. The information factor
served to manipulate the participant’s information environment by presenting half of each
sample a one-page modified version of a candidate’s web site detailing his issue positions
(described below). The remaining subjects in each experiment did not view the web site.
Upon viewing (or not viewing) the candidate’s web site, participants in each experiment
were then exposed to an approximately one-minute advertisement of a candidate. The
advertisement served as the second factor – the religious appeals factor – under manipulation.

12

Of 1,298 participants initially recruited in the Knowledge Networks panel, 840 participants (64.7%) agreed to
participate yielding 562 complete responses for a 43.3% completion rate based on initial recruitment.
13
As noted, the online adult study employed abbreviated survey instruments owing to constraints imposed by
Knowledge Networks. As survey length determined sample size, surveys were shortened to maximize the sample.
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Half of participants in each experiment viewed the advertisement in its original form containing
religious cues, while the other participants viewed the same ad with the religious cues digitally
redacted. Save for the subtle edits, the ads were equivalent. All participants in both experiments
then completed a posttest survey of evaluative measures of the candidate as described below.
By manipulating the presence or absence of religious cues in the campaign
advertisement, the religious appeals factor served to test whether religious priming occurs upon
exposure to religious appeals – that is, a test of the priming-traditionalism hypothesis.
Simultaneously, the information manipulation served as a test of the information-environment
hypothesis by examining the influence of complex information environments on priming effects.
While the current chapter focuses on priming effects in low-information environments, that is
just the religious appeals manipulation, Chapter 5 additionally incorporates the information
factor in exploring the influence of information environments on priming effects.
Pretest Measures
Participants in the initial student-based experiment completed more extensive surveys,
while adult participants in the follow-up, online experiment completed abbreviated versions of
those used in the student experiment.14 For parsimony, discussion of each pretest focuses on
religious measures. However, additional questions were included and are provided in the
appendix for reference. Subjects in each experiment were presented a battery of questions
tapping aspects of their religiosity. Student participants were asked a religious salience question
tapping how important religion is in their life followed by a question asking their religious
affiliation among seven response options based on the historical development of major religious
traditions and denominations (Steensland et al., 2000). Student participants were also asked a
fundamentalist to progressive orientation question as well as a question tapping their views of
14

See Appendix Survey Instrument #1 for the student experiment and Survey Instrument #2 for the adult study.
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religious tradition (Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, 2004). Students’ religious
commitment was obtained with four behavioral questions ascertaining how often they prayed,
read the Bible, attended worship service and attended non-worship church services. Finally,
student participants were presented a battery of religious beliefs questions drawn from General
Social Surveys. Specifically, participants were asked their views on Biblical literalism as well as
their belief certainty in God, heaven, hell, the devil and whether Jesus Christ is the Son of God.
Adult participants in the online experiment were similarly asked to identify their religious
affiliation and how important religion was in their life. Likewise, adult participants were asked
four belief measures also posed of students in Experiment #1, specifically their views on Biblical
literalism and religious tradition, a fundamentalism vs. progressive self-placement measure and
their belief certainty that Jesus Christ is the Son of God. Additionally, participants in both the
student and national adult study were asked to identify their partisan affiliation and ideology on
seven-point scales ranging from “Strong Democrat” to “Strong Republican” and “Extremely
Liberal” to “Extremely Conservative,” respectively.
Experimental Stimuli
After completing the pretest, participants in each experiment were instructed they would
be exposed to candidate information released by the Saxby Chambliss for U.S. Senate campaign.
A relatively unknown senate candidate was selected to help minimize the possibility of a
polarizing figure overshadowing the effect of the information manipulation (Taber and Lodge,
2006). Participants were then randomly assigned to one of four conditions based on the 2 x 2
design described above. The information factor, designed to manipulate one’s information
environment, presented half of the participants in each experiment with a condensed version of
the 2008 Chambliss for Senate web site. The modified web site provided Chambliss’ position on
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the economy, energy, taxes, education and gun control – all statements consistent with the
candidate’s stated issue positions on his 2008 web site.15 No religious statements or issue
positions commonly associated with religion were provided so as to avoid priming religious
considerations with the information manipulation. Thus, the information factor manipulated the
extent of secular, non-partisan candidate knowledge possessed by a participant to determine if
more complex information environments potentially moderate religious priming effects – the
focus of Chapter 5.
Following the information manipulation wherein participants were exposed (or not) to the
additional candidate information, all subjects in each experiment then viewed an actual
advertisement released by the Chambliss campaign – specifically, Chambliss’ “Values” ad (see
Figure 4.1). The ad was selected for three critical
reasons: its inclusion of religious cues, its lack of
identifiable partisan cue and the fact it represents a “real
world” ad used in an actual campaign. The only aspect
that varied across conditions was the presence or absence

Figure 4.1 – Chambliss “Values” ad

of religious cues. In one condition, participants viewed the ad in its original form, which
included three religious cues: Americans should “be able to choose how they worship,” “I
believe in a loving and all powerful God,” and my beliefs force me to fight for, “the sanctity of
life.”16 While participants in the religious cues condition in each experiment viewed the ad
including the three religious appeals, participants in the control condition in both experiments
were exposed to the values ad with the three religious statements edited out. Save for these

15

See Appendix Experiment #1 web site manipulation.
Complete ad copy is available in the appendix with the three religious cues highlighted. The ad is also available
for viewing in its original form on at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yB_w2BxuCiE
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subtle edits, the ads were equivalent. 17 The religious cues manipulation thus permitted
examination of whether exposure to religious appeals activated religious considerations that were
subsequently applied on posttest evaluative measures.
Posttest Measures
Following the information and religious cues manipulations, all participants in each
experiment completed a posttest survey gauging their reactions to Chambliss across a host of
evaluative measures tapping cognitive, affective and behavioral aspects of participant attitudes
held of Chambliss. As with the pretest, student participants in the initial study completed a more
extensive posttest survey, while adult subjects in the follow-up study completed an abbreviated
version. The student posttest began with a battery of 10 trait-evaluation questions asking
participants to respond how well an adjective (e.g. wise, friendly, strong and moral) described
the candidate. Four questions then tapped affect toward the candidate by asking participants to
what extent the candidate made them feel: hopeful, angry, proud and disappointed. Student
participants were then presented two 100-point feeling thermometer questions designed to gauge
general evaluations of the candidate.
In addition, candidate competency was measured via five questions asking student
participants how competent the candidate would be in dealing with economic, healthcare, foreign
policy, education and social issues. As individuals should prefer candidates possessing similar
political preferences (Downs, 1957), student participants were asked two proximity questions. A
religious proximity question asked participants to what degree Chambliss shares their religious
views, while a political proximity measure asked to what degree Chambliss shares their political

17

The ad was edited in three places using a video-editing program. As Chambliss was not talking to the camera in
the first two edits, only “B-roll” was cut and audio edited rendering a smooth transition between frames. The third
edit required a subtle “jump cut” to remove the cue. As Chambliss expressed nearly identical facial expressions
between and after the phrase, the image does not appear modified. No edits were made to the cue condition.
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views. Finally, student participants were asked a single vote-likelihood question ascertaining
how likely they would be to vote for the candidate if they could.
Adult participants in the national follow-up study were presented a questionnaire eliciting
responses to four evaluative measures of Chambliss: likelihood in voting, general evaluations,
trait evaluations and candidate proximity. Specifically, adults were presented a single 10-point
scale question ascertaining how likely they would be to vote for Chambliss if they could.
Additionally, adult participants completed a single 100-point feeling thermometer question
tapping general evaluations of Chambliss as well as four specific trait measures asking how well
the adjectives wise, friendly, strong and moral described Chambliss. As with participants in the
student study, adult subjects were also asked the two proximity measures asking to what extent
Chambliss shared their religious and political views.
Differentiating Religious Dimensions
To determine whether exposure to religious appeals results in significant priming effects
and the extent to which traditionalism predicts those effects relative to one’s religious affiliation
or commitment, I first establish the presence of distinct religious dimensions. Since the adult
study used abbreviated surveys primarily tapping measures of traditionalism, I illustrate the
dimensionality of religion through an exploratory factor analysis of responses drawn from the
more extensive student pretest surveys. Previous literature suggests (Layman, 1997; Olson &
Warber, 2008) distinct dimensions of religiosity should emerge for measures of religious
traditionalism (i.e. beliefs) and commitment (i.e. behaviors).
As is evident from Table 4.1 below, factor analysis results confirm a two factor solution
consistent with a traditionalism and commitment dimension.18 Factors were extracted based on
Eigenvalues of 1 or greater and review of a scree plot. As indicated in Table 4.1, traditionalism
18

As religious measures are ordinal, factor estimates were generated using Mplus (Muthen & Muthen, 2005).
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and commitment, though strongly correlated (r=.69), nevertheless tap distinct aspects of
religiosity. While traditionalism is defined by one’s religious beliefs, commitment reflects one’s
religious devotion through specific behaviors.
Table 4.1 – Religious dimensions among initial student participants
Factor Analysis of Religious Measures
Traditionalism
(Beliefs)

Commitment
(Behaviors)

Correlation
How certain is your belief in:
Devil
Hell
Heaven
Jesus Christ is the Son of God
God
Biblical literalism
Fundamentalist-Progressive self placement
Views on religious tradition and practices

.69
.945
.939
.868
.859
.855
.824
.782
.723

.068
.091
.161
.137
.172
-.031
.046
.162

Frequency of Prayer
Importance of religion in your life

.632
.582

.306
.431

How often do you:
Participate in church activities other than worship service
Read the Bible
Attend worship service

-.060
.194
.409

1.000
.765
.617

Eigenvalues
8.67
1.10
Note: Exploratory Factor Analysis using Weighted Least Squares estimation and Promax Rotation.
Factors represent Eigenvalues greater than 1. Primary loading of a variable is indicated in bold.
Analysis run on original student sample Experiment #1 (N = 161).

As indicated by factor loading values highlighted in bold, measures of belief certainty in
various religious and Biblical concepts (e.g. God, heaven, Jesus) are primarily associated with
views regarding Biblical literalism, religious tradition and one’s self placement as fundamentalist
to progressive. In contrast, specific measures of behaviors indicative of one’s devotion or
commitment to religious practices (e.g. non-worship attendance, frequency in Biblical reading)
are similarly associated as a distinct religious construct. Frequency of prayer, although
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commonly recognized as a behavioral measure (e.g. Olson & Warber, 2008), loads primarily on
the beliefs dimensions. 19 Similarly, religious importance is more closely wedded to beliefs, yet
demonstrates a moderate level of cross loading with behavioral aspects. Taken as a whole,
however, results clearly indicate the presence of distinct religious dimensions based, in large
part, on one’s religious beliefs relative to religious behaviors.
Visualizing the Distributions of Religious Commitment and Traditionalism
Indeed, factor analytic results presented above demonstrate the complex nature of
religion and point to the need to consider multiple aspects of religion when analyzing potential
priming effects of religious appeals on voters. Although the dimensions of traditionalism and
commitment are correlated, they nonetheless tap unique aspects of one’s religiosity. To illustrate
the differences between traditionalism and commitment, Figure 4.2 and 4.3 below present the

Figure 4.2 – Religious traditionalism among self-identified Christian students

19

As frequency in prayer is commonly recognized as a behavioral measure, it is included in the composite
commitment measure discussed later in the chapter.
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distribution of religious traditionalism (i.e. beliefs) and commitment (i.e. behaviors) among selfidentified Christian students.20 As is evident comparing the two figures, the religious constructs
produce markedly different distributions among the same group of subjects. While traditionalism
is heavily skewed toward students holding relatively traditional beliefs, religious commitment
approximates a normal distribution. The difference between the two dimensions illustrates why
analysis of possible priming effects should consider multiple dimensions of religion, as analysis
premised on only one aspect of religion may potentially mask significant priming effects.

Figure 4.3 – Religious commitment among self-identified Christian students
As the factor analytic results clearly indicate, consistent with previous literature, distinct
dimensions exist in terms of religious traditionalism and commitment displayed by student
participants, which subsequently translates into marked differences in the distribution of each
construct among Christian identifiers. Having established the dimensionality of religion among
experimental participants, I now transition to analysis of the potential effects of exposure to

20

Distributions for each dimension are based on index measures, which are described in more detail below.
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religious appeals on voters in an effort to determine if, as hypothesized, one’s level of religious
traditionalism serves as a robust predictor of priming effects. Following the culture wars
literature (e.g. Hunter, 1991; Layman, 2001), exposure to religious appeals should activate
religious considerations thus heightening the impact of one’s religiosity on subsequent candidate
evaluations – an effect that is expected to be most pronounced based on religious traditionalism
relative to one’s level of religious commitment or religious affiliation.
Independent and Dependent Variables
Prior to modeling potential priming effects across various religious dimensions, I first
review independent and dependent measures constructed from pre- and posttest measures drawn
from Experiment #1 – the initial student-based experiment.21 A caveat here is that all
independent and dependent variables modeled, unless otherwise noted, are scaled from 0 to 1,
with 1 coded to indicate more positive evaluations (or traditionalism). Initially, I created index
variables for both religious traditionalism and commitment. To develop a measure of religious
traditionalism, I combined the eight beliefs measures identified on the factor analysis of student
participants (Table 4.1). Specifically, I combined the five belief certainty measures asking
participants how certain their belief is in God, heaven, hell, the devil and that Jesus Christ is the
Son of God with the Biblical literalism question as well as their views about preserving religious
practices and the single fundamentalist-progressive self-placement measure.22 All items were
then summed to create an internally consistent (α=.91) traditionalism index variable. A religious
commitment index variable was similarly created from the three behavioral measures identified
by the aforementioned factor analyses and frequency of prayer. Specifically, I combined
questions tapping how often participants attended worship, attended non-worship religious

21
22

See Appendix Survey Instrument #1 for precise question wording.
Religious importance was excluded as it fails to tap a specific belief and it tends to cross load with commitment.
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activities and how often they read the Bible with the frequency of prayer measure. The four
items were then summed to create a reliable religious commitment index variable (α=.85).
The posttest completed by student participants in Experiment #1 included a host of
candidate evaluative measures, which were collapsed into six dependent variables. Ten
questions asking participants how well various adjectives (e.g. wise, friendly, sincere) described
Saxby Chambliss were combined to create a highly reliable (α =.92) trait evaluations index
variable. Two traditional 100-point thermometer scale questions were combined to form a
reliable (r =.84) general evaluation variable. A composite competency measure was created
from five questions asking participants how competent Saxby Chambliss would be in dealing
with (economic, health care, foreign policy, education and social) issues (α =.88). Candidate
affect was tapped with four questions (α =.78) asking participants if Saxby Chambliss made them
feel (hopeful, angry, proud and disappointed). As voters should prefer candidates who share
their socio-political views, two items were combined to form a candidate proximity variable
(r=.56). Specifically, one question asked participants to what extent Chambliss shared their
political views, while a second question asked to what extent Chambliss shared their religious
views. Finally, a single question tapped likelihood in voting by asking subjects how likely they
would be to vote for Chambliss if they could.
Modeling Religious Priming Effects by Religious Commitment
I begin exploring potential priming effects by modeling religious commitment across the
six dependent variables and then turn to modeling religious traditionalism across the same
outcome measures.23 According to Hypothesis 1, stronger, more consistent effects should
emerge for traditionalism relative to commitment. As the present investigation is merely

23

A lack of diversity in terms of religious affiliation among student participants prohibits analysis by religious
affiliation. Religious affiliation, however, is modeled among the national adult sample later in the chapter.
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concerned with establishing the presence of priming effects among self-identified Christians
upon exposure to religious appeals – that is in a low-information environment – analyses are
restricted to the two no-information conditions.24
To test whether exposure to religious appeals activates one’s religious commitment,
which is subsequently applied by participants in their evaluation of Saxby Chambliss, I estimated
a series of regression models. Specifically, I regressed trait evaluations, general evaluations,
competency, affect, candidate proximity and vote choice on a dummy variable corresponding to
the religious cue manipulation (i.e. the presence “1” or absence “0” of religious cues in the ad),
religious commitment and the interaction of the religious cue and commitment. Table 4.2 below
presents the regression estimates for these models. Cell entries for the first five models present
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates, while the final column provides ordinal regression
estimates of the ordinal vote variable. Of interest in the current investigation is the two-way, cue
x commitment interaction variable, which represents the priming effect of exposure to religious
appeals based on one’s level of religious commitment. If exposure to religious appeals activates
one’s religious commitment, which subsequently heightens evaluation of Chambliss, we should
observe significant, positively signed estimates for the two-way interaction.
As is evident, all six two-way estimates are positively signed indicating exposure to
religious appeals results in consistently more favorable evaluations of Chambliss based on one’s
degree of religious commitment. Moreover, three of the six interaction estimates are statistically
significant – general evaluations (β= .40, SE= .20, p<.05), competency (β= .52, SE= .23, p<.05)
and candidate proximity (β= .47, SE= .20, p<.05). Among religiously committed participants,
exposure to religious appeals results in significantly more favorable general evaluations of
Chambliss as well as perceptions that he is more competent in dealing with political issues.
24

Priming effects in variable information environments are addressed in the next chapter.
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Likewise, the religiously committed are significantly more likely to respond that Chambliss
shares their political and religious views (i.e. candidate proximity) when exposed to the
advertisement possessing subtle religious cues.
Table 4.2 – Candidate evaluations by commitment among self-identified Christian students

Religious Cue
Commitment
Cue x
Commitment
Constant

Threshold 1
Threshold 2
Threshold 3

Priming by Religious Commitment among Student Participants
Trait
General
Competency
Affect
Candidate
Evaluations Evaluations
Proximity
-.14
-.22*
-.31*
-.14
-.18^
(.09)
(.10)
(.12)
(.10)
(.11)
-.01
-.03
-.08
.01
.04
(.12)
(.14)
(.16)
(.13)
(.15)
.16
.40*
.52*
.30
.47*
(.17)
(.20)
(.23)
(.19)
(.20)

Vote
-2.09^
(1.13)
.97
(1.55)
3.38
(2.16)

.77**
(.06)

.79**
(.08)

.77**
(.08)

.78**
(.07)

.62**
(.08)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-3.20
-1.13
1.76

N
72
72
72
72
72
72
R²
.06
.10
.13
.08
.16
Note: Models predicting trait evaluations, general evaluations, competency, affect, candidate proximity and
vote choice among a student sample. Cell entries provide unstandardized regression coefficients and
standard errors in parentheses. Analysis conducted on no-information conditions. ^p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01.

To further explicate the conditional effects of commitment on evaluations of Chambliss, I
plot the mean values for general evaluations (Figure 4.4) at both low and high levels of
commitment. Figure 4.4 depicts the mean value of general evaluations at the 10th and 90th
percentile of commitment among viewers in the cue and no cue conditions respectively. While
there is no notable effect of religious commitment among viewers of the advertisement without
religious cues, there is a significant rise in evaluations for Chambliss among progressively more
committed viewers of the advertisement possessing subtle religious cues. Mean general
evaluations rise from .63 for relatively non-committed religious cue viewers to .86 for deeply
committed Christian viewers.
51

General Evaluations

General Evaluations by Religious Commitment
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

Cues
No Cues

Lo

Hi
Commitment

Figure 4.4 – General evaluations by religious commitment among self-identified
Christian students.

Interestingly, Figure 4.4 also illustrates a modest backlash effect among relatively noncommitted viewers exposed to religious cues as evidenced by differences in evaluations of
Chambliss across conditions at low levels of commitment. Indeed, there is a significant negative
conditional effect of religiosity at low levels of commitment (10th percentile) for general
evaluations (β= -.15, SE=.075, p<.05) as well as competency (β= -.22, SE= .08, p<.05).25 That
is, relatively non-committed viewers of the religious cues evaluate Chambliss significantly lower
in terms of overall evaluations and competency relative to non-cue viewers possessing identical
levels of religious commitment. A caveat, however, is that such effects are partially offset by a
significant positive conditional effect of religiosity at high levels of commitment for evaluations
of candidate proximity (β= .17, SE= .08, p<.05) among religious cue viewers. Although
candidates may experience backlash among the uncommitted, they similarly benefit to the extent
religious appeals resonate with the religiously committed.
25

Regression estimates for general evaluations and competency in the religious cue condition presented in Table 4.2
above likewise confirm a decline in evaluation among uncommitted viewers. The significant negative estimates for
general evaluations and competency in the religious cue condition represent the effect of cue exposure for viewers
void of religious commitment.
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Potential backlash effects aside, however, results indicate that exposure to religious
appeals activates one’s level of religious commitment, which subsequently influences
evaluations of Chambliss. Individuals who frequently attend worship service or read the Bible,
for example, are significantly more likely to evaluate Chambliss favorably in terms of overall
evaluations and in terms of competency. Likewise, religiously committed Christians become
significantly more likely to respond Chambliss shares their political and religious views (i.e.
candidate proximity) upon exposure to religious cues. Religious commitment, however, fails to
positively predict attitudes regarding trait evaluations, affect or likelihood in voting for
Chambliss. Nonetheless, one’s degree of religious commitment as measured by various religious
behaviors serves as a reasonably effective criterion to evaluate the possible presence of religious
priming effects.
Modeling Religious Priming Effects by Religious Traditionalism
Recall, however, drawing on culture wars literature, one’s religious beliefs should serve
as a more diagnostic dimension of potential priming effects resulting from exposure to religious
appeals. Thus, I turn to modeling the same dependent variables by religious traditionalism.
Consistent with the aforementioned religious commitment analysis, I performed a series of
models regressing trait evaluations, general evaluations, competency, affect, candidate proximity
and vote choice on a dummy variable corresponding to the religious cue manipulation, religious
traditionalism and the interaction of the religious cue and traditionalism (cue x traditionalism).
Regression estimates for these models are displayed in Table 4.3 below, with cell entries
providing OLS estimates for the five continuous variables and ordinal regression estimates for
the categorical vote variable. In this case, we are interested in the interactive effect between the
cue and traditionalism (i.e. cue x traditionalism), which represents the priming effect of exposure
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to religious appeals based on one’s level of religious traditionalism. If Hypothesis 1 is correct,
we should observe significant positively signed estimates for the two-way interaction, thus
indicating exposure to religious appeals to activate participant traditionalism resulting in a
significant influence on evaluations of Saxby Chambliss.
Table 4.3 – Candidate evaluations by traditionalism among self-identified Christian students

Religious Cue

Priming by Religious Traditionalism among Student Participants
Trait
General
Competency
Affect
Candidate
Evaluations Evaluations
Proximity
-.46*
-.80**
-.96**
-.40^
-.56*
(.21)
(.23)
(.27)
(.23)
(.24)

Vote
-5.53**
(1.79)

Traditionalism

-.18
(.21)

-.20
(.24)

-.36
(.28)

.001
(.24)

.12
(.25)

-1.55
(1.79)

Cue x
Traditionalism

.49^
(.26)

.96**
(.28)

1.13**
(.33)

.50^
(.28)

.74**
(.30)

6.23**
(2.23)

Constant

.91**
(.17)

.93**
(.19)

1.02**
(.22)

.78**
(.19)

.55**
(.20)

Threshold 1
Threshold 2
Threshold 3

-4.96
-2.97
-.88

N
72
72
72
72
72
72
R²
.11
.27
.24
.13
.29
Note: Models predicting trait evaluations, general evaluations, competency, affect, candidate proximity and
vote choice among a student sample. Cell entries provide unstandardized regression coefficients and
standard errors in parentheses. Analysis conducted on no-information conditions. ^p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01.

A cursory examination of the results in Table 4.3 demonstrates the two-way, cue x
traditionalism variable to be positively signed and significant across all six evaluative measures.
Four of the six variables achieve robust levels of statistical significance – general evaluations (β=
.96, SE= .28, p<.01), competency (β= 1.13, SE= .33, p<.01), proximity (β= .74, SE= .30, p<.01)
and vote (β= 6.23, SE= 2.23, p<.01) – while trait evaluations (β= .49, SE= .26, p<.10), and affect
(β= .50, SE= .28, p<.10) demonstrate marginal levels of significance. Results provide clear,
consistent evidence that exposure to religious appeals activates traditionalism, which
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subsequently informs viewers’ evaluations of Chambliss. Those participants adhering to
traditional religious beliefs evaluate Chambliss more favorably across all evaluative dimensions
upon exposure to the “Values” ad incorporating the three subtle religious cues. Moreover,
consistent with hypothesized expectations (H1), priming effects are more pronounced for
measures of religious traditionalism relative to one’s religious commitment. In essence, one’s
religious beliefs (e.g. whether they observe a literal interpretation of scripture) are more
diagnostic of priming effects relative to their religious practices (e.g. church attendance).
In an effort to further examine the conditional influence of traditionalism on evaluations
of Chambliss, I plot the mean values for outcome measures across conditions. For parsimony,
effects for general evaluations (Figure 4.5) and vote (Figure 4.6) preference are presented as
illustrative of the general significant effect of traditionalism across all dependent variables.
Figure 4.5 displays the mean value of general evaluations at low (10th percentile) and high (90th
percentile) levels of traditionalism in both experimental conditions.
While there is no significant effect of traditionalism on general evaluations of Chambliss
among viewers of the appeal without religious cues, a highly significant effect emerges for
traditionalism among viewers of the ad with religious cues. The mean value of general
evaluations at low levels of traditionalism, .59, rises to .85 for highly traditional viewers exposed
to the campaign appeal with religious cues. In contrast, general evaluations for Chambliss are
effectively unchanged across levels of traditionalism among viewers of the ad without the
religious cues – .82 at low levels of traditionalism and .75 at the 90th percentile of traditionalism.
The results thus indicate the subtle religious cues in the campaign ad to activate religious beliefs,
which subsequently influence the perceptions viewers hold of Chambliss. Absent the cues,
however, religious traditionalism plays little role in general evaluations of Chambliss.
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Figure 4.5 – General evaluations by traditionalism among self-identified
Christian students
A similar effect is observed for likelihood in voting for Chambliss. Since the vote
preference variable is categorical, Figure 4.6 presents the predicted probability of a participant
selecting the most extreme category (i.e. “very likely” to vote for Chambliss if they could) across
levels of traditionalism among viewers in each condition. As demonstrated by the solid line, as
traditionalism rises, viewers of the ad with religious cues become much more likely to vote for
Chambliss if the opportunity presented itself. The probability of participants exposed to the ad
with religious cues responding they would be very likely to vote for Chambliss increases from
effectively 0 for extreme progressives to 51% for highly traditional respondents. Much like the
effect for general evaluations noted above, exposure to religious cues makes one’s religious
beliefs salient, which subsequently influence the perceptions individuals formulate of Chambliss.
While progressives rate Chambliss much less favorably, traditionalists respond with more
favorable evaluations of Chambliss.
Among those exposed to the campaign appeal without religious cues (the dashed line),
there is a notable decline in vote preference for Chambliss across levels of traditionalism.
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Although the negative effect does not reach statistical significance, it is interesting to note
progressives in the no-cue condition are more likely to vote for Chambliss relative to more
traditional participants. This result, however, reflects a modest number of ideologically
conservative subjects observing less traditional religious beliefs – an artifact that stems from
using subjects drawn from a relatively conservative college student population.

Vote Probability

Vote Preference by Religious Traditionalism
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Figure 4.6 – Vote preference by traditionalism among self-identified
Christian students
Of greater interest from a strategic perspective is the marked decline in evaluations of
Chambliss within the cue condition among less traditional participants. As illustrated in Figures
4.5 and 4.6 and as noted in the discussion of the commitment models, exposure to the religious
cues often results in pronounced negative effects among more moderate and progressive
participants when compared to moderates and progressives in the no-cue conditions. Moreover,
the negative effect occurring at lower levels of traditionalism is often far larger than the positive
effect occurring at higher levels of traditionalism. Consider, in terms of vote preference as
illustrated in Figure 4.6, it is not until the 90th percentile of traditionalism that the probability of
vote in the cue condition exceeds the probability among participants exposed to the ad without
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the religious cues. Likewise, for general evaluations illustrated in Figure 4.5, a positive effect
across conditions does not emerge until approximately the 60th percentile of traditionalism. In
essence, for religious cue viewers, the magnitude of the negative effect at lower levels of
traditionalism often exceeds the beneficial effects at higher levels of traditionalism.
Table 4.4 below helps demonstrate this aspect by presenting the conditional effect of
traditionalism on each of the continuous dependent variables at various levels of traditionalism.26
Cell entries provide the effect size of traditionalism across conditions with corresponding
standard errors in parentheses. For all variables, there is a negative effect of traditionalism at the
25th percentile and below, which is statistically significant for three of the five variables. Across
conditions, there is a significant difference in trait and general evaluations as well as competency
for Chambliss at lower levels of traditionalism with individuals exposed to the ad with religious
cues demonstrating much less favorable evaluations of Chambliss.
Table 4.4 – Conditional effect of traditionalism on dependent measures among self-identified
Christian students
Tradition
Level
10th
25th
50th
75th
90th

Conditional Effect of Traditionalism on Candidate Evaluations
Trait
General
Competency
Affect
Evaluations
Evaluations
-.11
-.17
-.23
-.30
(.07)
(.07)
(.07)
(.08)
-.04
-.10
-.10
-.15
(.04)
(.04)
(.04)
(.05)
-.05
-.001
-.03
.01
(.04)
(.04)
(.05)
(.04)
-.01
.07
.05
.05
(.04)
(.05)
(.05)
(.05)
.003
.10
.09
.07
(.05)
(.05)
(.06)
(.05)

Candidate
Proximity
-.12
(.07)
-.02
(.05)
.05
(.04)
.10
(.05)
.13
(.06)

Note: Cell entries provide the effect of traditionalism across conditions at indicated levels of traditionalism for trait
evaluations, general evaluations, competency, affect and candidate proximity among a student sample. Standard
errors are provided in parentheses. Analysis conducted on no-information conditions. Bold entries p<.05.

26

Conditional effects of traditionalism were generated using PROCESS (Hayes, 2012).
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Moreover, for only one variable – candidate proximity – is there a statistically significant
positive effect of traditionalism. In essence, only in terms of candidate proximity does exposure
to the campaign appeal possessing religious cues result in significantly more favorable
evaluations of Chambliss compared to subjects viewing the ad absent religious cues. From such a
perspective, the case for strategic benefit of incorporating religious cues in political appeals is
decidedly mixed. Although religious cues resonate with viewers potentially improving
perceptions of candidates among traditionalists, exposure to religious cues is just as likely – if
not more so – to result in a significant reduction in evaluations among less religiously traditional
viewers. It can certainly be argued that relative progressives are not likely to support overly
conservative candidates to begin with, thus the potential downside of employing religious cues is
partially mitigated for politically conservative candidates. Nonetheless, much more favorable
evaluations of Saxby Chambliss among progressive viewers of the campaign appeal without
religious cues should give pause to potential candidates considering employing religious appeals
in campaign ads – at least to the extent ads are to be presented to younger voters.
Religious Priming Effects by Religious Traditionalism among U.S. adults
Having demonstrated religious priming effects among a non-representative student
sample, I attempt to extend these effects to a nationally-representative sample of adults.
Confirming priming effects on a national cross section of adults would achieve two important
aspects. First, substantiating initial findings strengthens reliability in the use of student samples
in religious priming experiments as well as overall study results. Second, replication of effects
among a nationally-representative sample dramatically improves external validity in
demonstrating the potential for priming effects among Christian voters exposed to religious
appeals in the electorate at large.
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As discussed above, the initial 2 x 2, between-subjects experiment administered to an
LSU student sample was also conducted on a national cross section of U.S. adults. A small Time
Sharing Experiment for the Social Sciences (TESS) grant was secured to fund the national study,
which was fielded by Knowledge Networks on a representative panel of participants (N = 562) in
August of 2010. As noted above, the follow-up study employed identical Saxby Chambliss
information and religious cue manipulations as those used in the initial student experiment. The
national adult study, however, used abbreviated survey instruments27 in an effort to maximize
sample size. While the student study included six dependent variables, only questions tapping
four outcome measures were included on the adult posttest questionnaire. Likewise, the adult
pretest primarily included religious measures tapping traditionalism, as traditionalism was shown
to be more diagnostic of political evaluations among the student sample.
Specifically, and as detailed above, four pretest measures comprised the traditionalism
index measure for the adult sample (α =.82): a question asking participants their views on
Biblical literalism; a question based on the Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics
(2004) asking respondents to describe their views about religious traditionalism; a third question
tapping participants’ fundamentalist versus progressive orientation; and a final question
ascertaining respondents’ degree of certainty that Jesus Christ is the Son of God.
In terms of dependent measures, four questions tapped trait evaluations by asking
participants how well the terms qualified, moral, dishonest and strong describe Chambliss on a
scale from “extremely well” to “not well at all.” The four items were recoded and combined to
form an additive trait evaluations measure (α =.86). A single 100-point thermometer scale
question asking how much participants liked Saxby Chambliss served as a measure of general
evaluations. Likewise, a single question tapped vote likelihood by asking participants how likely
27

See Appendix Survey Instrument #2 for specific questions.
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they would be to vote for Chambliss if they could on a scale from 0 to 10. As with the initial
student experiment, the adult posttest included two proximity measures asking subjects how
much Chambliss shared their political and religious views. The two measures were summed to
create a composite candidate proximity variable (r =.73).
Consistent with earlier analyses, a series of models were performed by regressing the four
dependent measures – trait evaluations, general evaluations, candidate proximity and vote
preference – on a dummy variable corresponding to the religious cue manipulation, religious
traditionalism and the interaction of the religious cue and traditionalism (cue x traditionalism).28
Results are displayed in Table 4.5 below with cell entries providing OLS estimates for the four
outcome variables. Replication of initial study results takes the form of positively signed,
significant interaction effects between cue exposure and traditionalism (i.e. cue x traditionalism),
which indicates exposure to religious cues to significantly influence evaluations of Chambliss
upon activation of traditionalism among experimental subjects.
Consistent with results drawn on the initial student sample, adults demonstrate a similar
effect upon exposure to the Chambliss ad possessing religious cues. The significant interactive
effects produced across all four evaluative constructs – trait evaluations (β= .19, SE= .11, p<.10),
general evaluations (β= .48, SE= .17, p<.01), candidate proximity (β= .39, SE= .14, p<.01) and
vote preference (β= .53, SE= .18, p<.01) – indicate exposure to subtle religious cues to activate
traditionalism, which subsequently influences evaluations of Chambliss. It is consistently the
case across students and adults alike that religiosity plays a pivotal role in shaping attitudes of
Chambliss upon exposure to the campaign advertisement incorporating religious cues. Deeply
religious individuals, especially those adhering to traditional religious beliefs, consistently rate
Chambliss more favorably once exposed to religious appeals. Simply put, appeals invoking
28

Once again, analyses are restricted to the no-information conditions of the experiment.
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religious themes and imagery are consequential in shaping the perceptions of a candidate based
on a viewer’s religiosity, especially one’s level of religious traditionalism.
Table 4.5 – Candidate evaluations by traditionalism among self-identified Christian adults
Priming by Religious Traditionalism among Adult Participants
Trait
General
Candidate
Evaluations
Evaluations
Proximity
Religious Cue
-08
-.32*
-.25*
(.09)
(.13)
(.11)
Traditionalism
.25**
.26*
.35**
(.08)
(.12)
(.10)
Cue x Traditionalism
.19^
.48**
.39**
(.11)
(.17)
(.14)
Constant

.46**
(.06)

.41**
(.09)

.35**
(.07)

Vote
-.35*
(.14)
.24*
(.12)
.53**
(.18)
.39**
(.09)

N
211
212
209
212
R²
.18
.17
.24
.16
Note: Models predicting trait evaluations, general evaluations, candidate proximity and vote choice
among a nationally representative adult sample. Cell entries provide unstandardized regression
coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Analysis conducted on no-information conditions.
^p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01.

To further illustrate the importance of traditionalism in shaping perceptions of Chambliss
among adult viewers, the conditional effects of traditionalism for trait evaluations and vote
preference are graphically presented below. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 display mean values for each
dependent variable at low (10th percentile) and high (90th) levels of traditionalism across
conditions. Consider trait evaluations illustrated in Figure 4.7. As the no-cue (dashed) line
illustrates, trait evaluations for Chambliss rise across levels of traditionalism (.57 to .69) even
among viewers of the ad without the religious cues. For viewers of the ad with religious cues,
however, the effect is magnified as evidenced by the steeper cues (solid) line. Exposure to
religious cues activates religious traditionalism resulting in a significant rise in trait evaluations
of Chambliss; mean values climb from .57 for progressives to .78 among traditionalists.
Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 4.7, at no point on the chart is the mean trait evaluation of
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Chambliss lower among religious cue viewers, thus suggesting the ad with religious cues only
benefits Chambliss in terms of heightened perceptions of trait evaluations.

Trait Evaluations
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Figure 4.7 – Trait evaluations by traditionalism among self-identified Christians
Similar effects emerge for general evaluations, candidate proximity and vote preference
(Figure 4.8) in that exposure to religious cues heightens the impact of traditionalism on
evaluations of Chambliss. In terms of vote preference, for example, the mean value rises from
.50 to .61 across levels of traditionalism among viewers of the ad without religious cues. For
viewers of the appeal with religious cues, however, the mean value climbs from .40 to .76 across
levels of religious traditionalism. Deeply traditional viewers exposed to the ad become
significantly more likely to vote for Chambliss if presented the opportunity.
In contrast to trait evaluations, however, progressives are associated with a modest
decline in general evaluations and vote preference for Chambliss among religious cue viewers.
Unlike the pronounced conditional negative effects of traditionalism observed in the original
student study, however, the negative effects among adult progressives are much more modest.
Moreover, the gains in evaluations at higher levels of traditionalism observed of adults more than
offset the modest negative effects among relative progressives exposed to the religious cues.
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Figure 4.8 – Vote by traditionalism among self-identified Christians
Table 4.6 below presents the conditional effects of traditionalism on each evaluative
dimension of Chambliss for adult participants. Cell entries provide the effect size at various
levels of traditionalism with standard errors in parentheses. Although three of the four measures
demonstrate negative effects at lower levels of traditionalism (i.e. 10th and 25th percentile), unlike
student participants, none of the effects reaches statistical significance (p<.05) in the adult study.
Moreover, as noted above, the conditional effect of traditionalism for trait evaluations is never
negative across the range of traditionalism presented, thus implying religious cues only improve
trait evaluations of Chambliss for those above the 10th percentile of traditionalism.
Most striking, however, are the consistent, positive effects observed at higher levels of
traditionalism across all evaluations of Chambliss. Recall, a significant positive effect of
traditionalism emerged for only one variable – candidate proximity – among the student sample.
As is evident from Table 4.6, the effect of traditionalism is significant and pronounced for all
four measures of Chambliss at higher levels of religiosity for adults. Whereas exposure to the
cue was likely to produce a net negative effect among students, exposure to the cues among
adults appears to produce more consistent positive effects on evaluations of Chambliss when
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compared to viewers of the campaign appeal without religious cues. From a strategic standpoint,
results thus suggest the incorporation of religious cues in campaign ads to be potentially
beneficial in promoting improved evaluations of prospective candidates among adults.
Table 4.6 – Conditional effect of traditionalism on dependent measures among self-identified
Christian adults.
Tradition
Level
10th
25th
50th
75th
90th

Conditional Effect of Traditionalism on Candidate Evaluations
Trait
General
Candidate
Evaluations
Evaluations
Proximity
.002
(.04)
.03
(.03)
.06
(.02)
.09
(.03)
.09
(.03)

-.10
(.06)
-.03
(.04)
.05
(.04)
.08
(.04)
.12
(.05)

-.06
(.05)
.003
(.04)
.06
(.03)
.12
(.04)
.12
(.04)

Vote
-.10
(.06)
-.02
(.04)
.06
(.04)
.10
(.04)
.14
(.05)

Note: Cell entries provide the effect of traditionalism across conditions at indicated levels of traditionalism for trait
evaluations, general evaluations, candidate proximity and vote among a national adult sample. Standard errors are
provided in parentheses. Analysis conducted on no-information conditions. Bold entries p<.05.

Indeed, the results make clear, exposure to religious appeals primes religious
traditionalism among viewers leading to significantly more favorable evaluations of Chambliss
among relative traditionalists. Moreover, priming effects are much more pronounced for
measures of religious traditionalism relative to one’s level of religious commitment. Consistent
with a corpus of literature demonstrating traditionalism to be more diagnostic across a host of
political behaviors (e.g. Hammond et al., 1994; Guth et al., 2006; Layman, 2001), traditionalism
similarly emerges as a robust predictor of religious priming effects.
Modeling Religious Priming Effects by Religious Affiliation among U.S. Adults
As a final test of the predictive power of traditionalism relative to other religious
dimensions, I examine religious priming effects by affiliation. As noted above, the lack of
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diversity across religious traditions in the initial student sample prevented analysis based on
affiliation. The national adult sample, however, provides the necessary diversity to test priming
effects across major religious traditions. Recall, the historical divisions between major religious
traditions, especially Protestants and Catholics (Herberg, 1995), have given way to profound
intra-denominational differences between those embracing more orthodox doctrinal positions
relative to individuals adhering to more progressive beliefs (Hunter, 1991; Layman, 2001;
Wuthnow, 1988). Indeed, scholars have increasingly opted to examine alternative dimensions of
religion predicated on measurement of beliefs or behaviors as affiliation has waned in its ability
to predict political behavior (Layman, 1997; Olson & Warber, 2008).
Given the inability of religious affiliation to reliably predict political behavior, analysis of
priming effects across religious traditions should yield less conclusive results relative to those
emerging for measures of traditionalism presented above. To test the relative ability of religious
traditions to predict religious priming effects, I performed a series of models regressing trait
evaluations, general evaluations, candidate proximity and vote choice on a dummy variable
corresponding to the religious cue manipulation, a dummy variable corresponding to whether the
participant is Protestant (1) or Catholic (0) and the interaction of the religious cue and affiliation
(i.e. cue x Protestant). I opted to test the effects for Protestants vs. Catholics owing to the
historical division between the religious traditions (Herberg, 1995), and the fact the traditions
together capture the majority of Christian voters in the electorate.
The results of the regression models are presented in Table 4.7 below. Only participants
in the no-information conditions were modeled. Cell entries provide OLS estimates and standard
errors for each dependent variable. As with earlier analyses, interest focuses on the two-way
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interaction, in this case between the cue and participant affiliation (cue x Protestant), which
represents the influence of exposure to religious cues across the two major religious traditions.
Table 4.7 - Candidate evaluations by self-identified Protestants and Catholics

Religious Cue
Protestant
Cue x Protestant

Constant

N
R²

Priming by Religious Affiliation
Trait
General
Candidate
Evaluations
Evaluations
Proximity
.01
-.03
-.05
(.04)
(.07)
(.06)
-.01
.03
-.02
(.04)
(.06)
(.06)
.10^
.12
.18*
(.06)
(.08)
(.08)

Vote
-.003
(.07)
.03
(.07)
.11
(.09)

.63**
(.03)

.58**
(.05)

.61**
(.04)

.53**
(.05)

170
.07

172
.04

166
.07

171
.04

Note: Models predicting trait evaluations, general evaluations, candidate proximity and vote choice
among a nationally representative adult sample. Cell entries provide unstandardized regression
coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Protestant variable is dummy coded with “1” indicating
Protestant and “0” representing Catholic. Analysis conducted on no-information conditions. ^p<.10,
*p<.05, **p<.01.

If Catholic or Protestant identification alone is determinant of religious priming effects,
significant effects should emerge for the two-way, cue x Protestant variable. Coding of the
variable dictates a positively signed estimate to indicate more favorable evaluations among selfidentified Protestants, while a negatively signed coefficient suggests more favorable evaluations
among Catholic identifiers. As is evident, estimates across all four variables are positively
signed, while two estimates achieve at least a modest level of significance – trait evaluations (β=
.10, SE= .06, p<.10) and candidate proximity (β= .18, SE= .08, p<.05). The estimates thus
indicate Protestants to hold more favorable attitudes of Chambliss upon exposure to the religious
ad relative to Catholic viewers. Protestants are significantly more likely to believe Chambliss
shares their views and modestly more likely to hold favorable trait evaluations of Chambliss after
viewing the ad incorporating the subtle religious cues. Figure 4.9 below illustrates these effects
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by presenting the mean values for trait evaluations and candidate proximity for Catholics and
Protestants among viewer and non-viewers of the religious cues. While mean values for both
variables are relatively stable for Catholic cue and non-cue viewers, mean values among
Protestants increase significantly among those exposed to the ad with religious appeals.
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Figure 4.9 – Trait evaluations and proximity by religious affiliation
Although one’s affiliation as Catholic or Protestant predicts measures of trait evaluations
and proximity, affiliation fails to successfully predict overall candidate evaluations or vote
preference for Chambliss. As expected, affiliation provides an inconsistent diagnostic dimension
of religiosity when compared to traditionalism, as evidenced by the consistent significant
findings of traditionalism across all evaluative measures of Chambliss noted above.
Nevertheless, the affiliation analysis provides, to some degree, evidence of division between the
religious traditions in terms of political perceptions related to Chambliss.
Conclusion
The current chapter sought to establish whether exposure to religious appeals produces
significant priming effects in a low-information environment – that is, whether simply viewing
campaign appeals possessing religious symbols and rhetoric makes religiosity salient, thereby
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leading to changes in how individuals evaluate politicians. A corpus of research has
demonstrated the ability of media exposure to influence the attitudes individuals hold of political
figures and policies (e.g. Goidel et al., 1997; Hetherington, 1996; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987;
Mendelberg, 2001). Consistent with this literature, statistical analyses provide strong evidence
that exposure to religious appeals activates religious considerations among viewers, which
significantly influence how individuals perceive political candidates. As demonstrated, these
effects emerge in experiments administered to a college student sample as well as a nationallyrepresentative cross section of adults. The consistency of priming effects across differing
populations bolsters the case of priming effects likely to be observed of religious appeals
employed during political campaigns.
Moreover, although significant priming effects emerge for differing dimensions of
religiosity, it is consistently the case that observed effects are more pronounced based on one’s
level of traditionalism – that is, the degree to which a viewer adheres to orthodox religious
beliefs. Study results are thus congruent with previous research noting a marked shift away from
historical division between religious traditions and toward a growing orthodox vs. liberal divide
within denominations (e.g. Hunter, 1991; Layman, 2001; Olson & Warber, 2008; Wuthnow,
1988). As the experimental findings demonstrate, it is the nature of one’s religious beliefs that
determines greater susceptibility to religious priming effects relative to one’s religious affiliation
or behaviors. Put differently, in terms of isolating potential religious priming effects, it matters
far more whether one embraces a literal interpretation of Biblical scripture than whether he or
she happens to self identify as Protestant or Catholic or even the frequency with which they
happen to attend church or read the Bible.
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Taken as a whole, the analytical results discussed throughout this chapter confirm the
complex, multi-dimensional nature of religion and, more importantly, demonstrate the
consequential role religion serves in informing individual political behavior. The manner in
which religion exerts influence on political behavior is best captured by one’s level of
traditionalism. As evidenced by estimates drawn on a national sample of adults, traditionalism,
regardless of exposure to religious cues, significantly influences the manner in which individuals
evaluate political candidates. More importantly, however, the effect of traditionalism on
subsequent political evaluations becomes magnified upon exposure to campaign advertisements
incorporating subtle religious rhetoric. Across student and adult samples alike, results
consistently confirm that exposure to religious appeals heightens the impact of individual
religiosity leading to significant shifts in perceptions, with increasing levels of traditionalism
resulting in much more favorable attitudes held of an ad-sponsored candidate. Simply put,
religion matters when evaluating candidates, and it matters even more to the extent prospective
voters are primed to draw on their religious beliefs in formulating political perceptions.
Having clearly confirmed the effectiveness of religious campaign appeals to alter
individual political evaluations in a low-information environment – that is, in the context of brief
exposure to a single, non-partisan political ad – I now consider the relative effectiveness of
religious appeals in the context of variable information environments. As prospective voters are
often overloaded with competing information flows, especially in the context of high-stakes,
competitive campaigns, it is imperative to evaluate the potential effect of alternative political
information on religious appeals to further explicate the strategic effects of religiously-infused
campaigns.
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CHAPTER 5
PRIMING IN A NON-PARTISAN INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Chapter Overview
Political appeals do not occur in a vacuum; rather, they occur in diverse media
environments. Indeed, as campaign appeals are but a small portion of the information likely to
be conveyed throughout the course of a campaign, it is of interest to examine how religious
appeals operate in the context of information-rich environments to more accurately ascertain the
effects of religious appeals likely to emerge in an actual campaign. Although the results of the
previous chapter clearly demonstrate pronounced effects of exposure to a religious appeal when
little is known of the candidate, it remains unclear how the presence of additional information
characteristic of competitive campaigns may alter potential priming effects.
The current chapter, therefore, examines the effect of non-partisan, secular political
information on religious priming effects. Recall, the information-environment hypothesis (H2)
proposes that individual religious priming effects will be reduced in a complex information
environment relative to priming effects observed in an impoverished information environment.
In essence, the presence of additional political information disseminated in campaigns is likely to
attenuate the priming effects of religious appeals.
To test the potential moderating effects of non-partisan candidate information on
religious appeals, Chapter 5 draws on the aforementioned Saxby Chambliss experiments by
extending the traditionalism models presented in the previous chapter. While the prior chapter
only included analyses of the no-information conditions, expanded models in the present chapter
incorporate the information conditions thereby permitting examination of the influence of
secular, non-partisan political information on religious priming effects. The chapter begins with
a brief review of the Saxby Chambliss experiments, and then presents findings from a series of
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statistical models that provide persuasive evidence that the presence of non-religious information
significantly attenuates religious priming effects. When faced with a relatively complex
environment presenting politically relevant information of a candidate, participants exposed to
religious appeals become less reliant on their religious beliefs in formulating subsequent political
attitudes. Absent additional secular information, participants exposed to religious appeals
become heavily dependent on religion as a standard to evaluate a candidate. Following
discussion of the moderating effects of secular, non-partisan information on priming effects, the
chapter concludes with a brief summation of substantive findings.
Non-partisan Information Effects – Experimental Procedures
To examine the potential for complex, non-partisan information environments to
attenuate religious priming effects, I rely on the two Saxby Chambliss experiments detailed in
the previous chapter. In so doing, I additionally incorporate the information conditions to create
expanded models examining the influence of the information manipulations on subsequent
evaluations of Chambliss. To review, both the original student experiment and the adult online
experiment employed a 2 (Prior Information: Present, Absent) x 2 (Religious Appeals: Present,
Absent) condition, pretest-posttest design with each experiment employing identical Saxby
Chambliss stimuli. While analyses in the previous chapter focused on the no-information
conditions to isolate the effects of mere exposure to religious cues on individual evaluations of
Chambliss, the current investigation also incorporates participants exposed to the Chambliss web
site (i.e. the information manipulation) prior to ad exposure. By presenting or not presenting
participants with additional political information of the candidate prior to ad exposure, the web
site manipulation varies the complexity of the participant’s information environment thereby
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providing the ability to test the information-environment hypothesis, that is the extent to which
complex information environments attenuate the priming effects of religious appeals.
Given the diagnostic strength of traditionalism to predict religious priming effects as
consistently demonstrated in earlier analyses of the religious appeals factor, I similarly employ
traditionalism as a measure of religiosity in expanded models exploring the effects of the
information manipulation. In keeping with earlier analyses, expanded models incorporating
information manipulation effects examine potential influences across the six dependent measures
included on the student posttest as well as the four outcome variables covered on the abbreviated
posttest administered adults in the national online study. Specifically, models drawn on the
initial student sample (Experiment #1) examine potential effects on measures of trait evaluations,
general evaluations, competency, affect, candidate proximity and vote preference for Saxby
Chambliss. Likewise, analysis of the national adult sample (Experiment #2) examines measures
of trait evaluations, general evaluations, candidate proximity and vote preference for
Chambliss.29
Modeling Variable Information Effects on Religious Priming among a Student Sample
To explicate possible moderating effects arising in complex information environments, I
first model information influences on posttest evaluative measures provided by students in
Experiment #1. According to H2, religious priming effects should be reduced in complex
information environments relative to the effects observed in low information environments. To
test this hypothesis, I estimated a series of regression models in which trait evaluations, general
evaluations, competency, affect, candidate proximity and vote preference for Saxby Chambliss
were regressed on religious traditionalism, a dummy variable corresponding to the religious cue
manipulation (coded 1 for exposure and 0 for non-exposure), a dummy variable corresponding to
29

See Chapter 4 for detailed discussion of posttest evaluative measures for student and adult experiments.
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whether the participant was exposed (1) or not exposed (0) to the information manipulation and
all subsequent two and three way interactions (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003).
Recall from analyses in the previous chapter, a significant two-way, cue x traditionalism
estimate is interpreted as evidence of religious priming in that exposure to religious cues
activates participant religiosity resulting in marked influences on candidate evaluations. In
effect, exposure to political ads including religious appeals heightens the impact of religiosity on
subsequent perceptions of Saxby Chambliss. The current investigation further incorporates
whether participants are first exposed to secular information about Chambliss’ policy positions
across a host of political issues (denoted by the dummy information variable) prior to ad
exposure. If prior non-religious information influences the priming effect of religiosity on
attitudes toward Chambliss, we should observe a significant estimate of the three-way, cue x
information x traditionalism variable. While coding of model variables dictates that a positively
signed, two-way cue x traditionalism interaction provides evidence of religious priming effects
in that religious cue exposure yields more favorable evaluations of Chambliss, a negatively
signed, three-way cue x information x traditionalism interaction is taken as evidence of reduced
priming effects. In essence, the introduction of prior non-religious candidate information serves
to blunt the effects of religiosity on evaluations as participants presented the candidate web site
possess more diverse information to draw on in formulating opinions of Chambliss.
Estimates for specified regression models are presented in Table 5.1 below.30 Cell entries
for the first five models provide OLS estimates, while the last column presents ordinal regression
estimates of the categorical vote variable. Consistent with earlier analysis of the base
traditionalism models presented in Chapter 4, the two-way, cue x traditionalism estimates are
30

Consistent with regression models presented in Chapter 4, analysis is restricted to Christian identifiers given that
religious measures are primarily designed to tap Christian beliefs (e.g. belief certainty that Jesus Christ is the Son of
God) and the fact that most religious political appeals are specifically designed to resonate with Christian voters.
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positively signed across all dependent measures. Moreover, all estimates once again achieve
statistical significance – trait evaluations (β= .49, SE= .26, p<.10), general evaluations (β= .96,
SE= .30, p<.01), competency (β= 1.13, SE= .32, p<.01), affect (β= .50, SE= .28, p<.10),
candidate proximity (β= .74, SE= .31, p<.05) and vote preference (β= 6.18, SE = 2.19, p<.01).
The consistency of significance across all variables strongly suggests marked religious priming
effects for those exposed to the Chambliss ad with religious cues. The presence of religious cues
serves to prime religious beliefs, which are then drawn on in forming perceptions of Chambliss.
Those adhering to more orthodox religious beliefs consistently evaluate Chambliss more
favorably upon exposure to the religious appeal absent any additional candidate information.
A caveat to the pronounced priming effects, however, is the unknown influence
extraneous political information may exert on religious priming effects. In isolation, exposure to
religious political appeals produces substantial effects on candidate evaluations, but it remains to
be seen how durable such effects are in the context of information-rich environments realistic of
modern campaigns. Thus, we now turn to the effects of prior information on priming effects in
the form of the three way, cue x information x traditionalism interaction. Once again, negative
estimates of the three way variable are indicative that prior information reduces the priming
effect of exposure to religious cues.
Consistent with hypothesized expectation, estimates for the three way, cue x information
x traditionalism variable are negatively signed across all six dependent measures, with four of six
estimates at least modestly statistically significant – trait evaluations (β= -.58, SE= .35, p<.10),
general evaluations (β= -.71, SE= .41, p<.10), competency (β= -1.55, SE= .44, p<.01) and vote
preference (β= -7.84, SE= 2.98, p<.01). The fact all six estimates demonstrate a negative
relationship coupled with four of the six measures reaching statistical significance provides
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substantial evidence exposure to non-religious political information reduces the impact of
religiosity on subsequent candidate evaluations. Across four of six dependent measures,
perceptions of Chambliss are significantly reduced among participants exposed to Chambliss’
issue positions prior to viewing his religiously infused campaign ad. Results suggest individuals
become less reliant on religious beliefs as an evaluative standard of candidates in relatively
complex information environments presenting individuals more diverse political information.
Table 5.1 – Information effects on religious priming among self-identified Christian students
Variable Information Effects on Religious Priming among Student Participants
Trait
General
Competency
Affect
Candidate
Vote
Evaluations Evaluations
Proximity
Religious Cue
-.46*
-.80**
-.96**
-.40^
-.56*
-5.48**
(.21)
(.24)
(.26)
(.23)
(.25)
(1.79)
Traditionalism

-.18
(.21)

-.20
(.25)

-.36
(.27)

.001
(.24)

.12
(.26)

-1.55
(1.79)

Information

-.51*
(.20)

-.33
(.24)

-.90**
(.26)

-.12
(.23)

-.16
(.25)

-3.86*
(1.74)

Cue x
Traditionalism

.49^
(.26)

.96**
(.30)

1.13**
(.32)

.50^
(.28)

.74*
(.31)

6.18**
(2.19)

Cue x
Information

.61*
(.28)

.65
(.33)

1.34**
(.36)

.36
(.31)

.44
(.34)

7.52**
(2.43)

Traditionalism
x Information

.52*
(.25)

.34
(.29)

1.06**
(.32)

.09
(.28)

.10
(.31)

4.16*
(2.12)

Cue x Info x
Traditionalism

-.58^
(.35)

-.71^
(.41)

-1.55**
(.44)

-.36
(.39)

-.43
(.43)

-7.84**
(2.98)

Constant

.91**
(.17)

.93**
(.20)

1.01**
(.22)

.78**
(.19)

.55**
(.21)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-5.00
-2.93
-.88

141
.14

141
.18

141
.23

141
.10

141
.24

141
-

Threshold 1
Threshold 2
Threshold 3
N
R²

Note: Models predicting trait evaluations, general evaluations, competency, affect, candidate proximity and vote
choice among a student sample. Cell entries provide unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors
in parentheses. ^p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01.
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To demonstrate the moderating effect exposure to additional information has on
evaluations of Chambliss, Figures 5.1 and 5.2 below illustrate the effect of information exposure
on participant’s perceptions of Chambliss’ competency. Specifically, Figure 5.1 presents mean
competency evaluations of Chambliss across levels of traditionalism (10th to 90th percentile) in
the no-information conditions, while Figure 5.2 presents the same data for participants in the
prior information conditions. As represented in Figure 5.1 by the solid cues line, the effect of
traditionalism is pronounced upon exposure to the ad incorporating subtle religious cues. Mean
competency evaluations of Chambliss rise from .50 among progressives to .77 for traditionalists.
Interestingly, although not significant, a modest decline in competency of Chambliss across
levels of traditionalism emerges in the no-cue condition as illustrated by the dashed line.
Evaluations of Chambliss’ competency fall from .80 among progressives to .68 for traditionalists
exposed to the Values ad absent religious cues. As noted in the previous chapter, however,
favorable evaluations for Chambliss among religious progressives in the no-cue condition are
largely a function of politically conservative, yet religiously progressive participants in the nocue condition – a situation reflecting the conservative nature of the student population from
which participants were obtained.
The pronounced religious priming effects depicted in Figure 5.1, however, are reduced
among participants exposed to Chambliss’ web site prior to viewing the religious ad as illustrated
in Figure 5.2. Mean evaluations of competency vary far less across levels of traditionalism for
subjects first exposed to Chambliss’ web site as evidenced by the flatter cues line in Figure 5.2
when compared to the steeper cues line presented in Figure 5.1. Whereas in the no-information
condition competency varied from .50 to .77 across levels of traditionalism among those exposed
to the religious ad, competency only varies from .65 to .75 across levels of traditionalism for
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viewers of the religious ad when first exposed to the Chambliss web site. In essence, the effect of
traditionalism as a criterion for evaluating Chambliss is attenuated for those first exposed to
diverse secular campaign information.
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Figure 5.1 – Competency by traditionalism among self-identified Christian
students in the no-information conditions
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Figure 5.2 – Competency by traditionalism among self-identified Christian
students in the prior-information conditions
Moreover, when comparing Figures 5.1 and 5.2, it is evident that the reduction in priming
effects is driven by changes at lower levels of traditionalism. Exposure to prior information does
not result in a substantive reduction in competency evaluations of Chambliss among
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traditionalists primed with the religious ad; rather, progressives become modestly more favorable
toward Chambliss when first presented his issue positions prior to viewing the ad with religious
cues. While evaluations of Chambliss remain stable when comparing traditionalists exposed to
the cues in the no-information condition (.77) and information condition (.75), evaluations for
Chambliss among progressives exposed to the religious cues across information environments
actually rise from .50 (no-information) to .65 (information). At the same time, competency
evaluations among progressives exposed to the candidate web site in the no-cue condition are
much lower (.53) than progressives in the no-cue condition not viewing the web site (.80).
Measures of competency thus illustrate relative stability of perceptions for Chambliss
among more traditional participants regardless of condition or information environment and
marked variability among relative progressives across conditions. The stability displayed of
religious traditionalists’ views of Chambliss across conditions speaks to stronger correlation
between ideological conservatives and religious traditionalists such that the ad regardless of the
presence of cues resonates with traditionalists. As Chambliss espouses a litany of politically
conservative issue positions throughout the ad, the ad likely resonates among traditionalists
based on their politically conservative predispositions as well. From this perspective, and as
noted in the previous chapter, the incorporation of religious cues is not particularly effective in
that the cues do not result in consistently improved evaluations for Chambliss among religiously
traditional students beyond what the ad produces absent the religious cues.
In contrast to traditionalists, the consequential nature of the religious cues and the
information manipulation are much more evident for progressives as evidenced by variability in
evaluations of Chambliss across conditions. Exposure to the ad with religious cues results in
significantly lower perceptions of Chambliss relative to traditionalists as expected. The presence
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of additional secular information, however, serves to reduce the importance of religious beliefs
among progressives as evaluations also hinge on the additional candidate information resulting in
modestly more favorable perceptions of Chambliss. Exposure to the web site likewise provides
progressive participants in the no-cue condition more diverse information with which to evaluate
Chambliss resulting in less favorable perceptions of Chambliss. Evaluations among progressives
thus reflect changes in one’s information environment, with additional information reducing the
impact of religious considerations on perceptions held of Chambliss.
In an effort to further explicate how one’s information environment influences religious
priming effects, Table 5.2 below provides the conditional effect of traditionalism for all
continuous dependent measures across information conditions. Cell entries provide the effect of
traditionalism between the cue and no-cue conditions for student participants exposed to the web
site (Info) and those not exposed to the information manipulation (No Info). As discussed in the
previous chapter, negative effects emerge at low levels of traditionalism in the no-information
conditions across all continuous dependent variables. In essence, priming effects in the noinformation condition are driven primarily by a negative effect among progressives exposed to
religious cues as opposed to a robust positive effect for relative traditionalists exposed to the
religious cues. The notable exception again is candidate proximity, which yields significant,
positive effects at the 75th and 90th percentiles of traditionalism.
In contrast to the negative effects at lower levels of traditionalism in the no-information
condition, exposure to additional secular information of Chambliss results in positive effects at
lower levels of traditionalism, thus implying exposure to additional candidate information to
moderate religious priming effects observed in the no-information condition. Consider the effect
of traditionalism on trait evaluations at the 25th percentile. While a significant negative effect
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emerges in the no-information condition, (β= -.10, SE= .04, p<.05), a significant positive effect
emerges among participants first exposed to Chambliss’ web site, (β= .09, SE= .04, p<.05). In
fact, with the exception of small negative effects on competency at high levels of traditionalism,
positive effects of the information manipulation emerge for all levels of traditionalism across all
variables. Indeed, across virtually all measures, exposure to additional candidate information
reduces religious priming effects, and these moderating effects primarily result from the
attenuation of relatively pronounced negative effects at lower levels of traditionalism.
Table 5.2 – Conditional effect of traditionalism on candidate evaluations by information
environment for self-identified Christian students
Conditional Effect of Traditionalism by Information Environment
Tradition
Level
th

10

25th
50th
75th
90th

Trait
Evaluations
No Info
Info
.11
-.17
(.06)
(.06)
-.10
.09
(.04)
(.04)
-.05
.09
(.04)
(.04)
-.01
.08
(.04)
(.04)
.003
.08
(.05)
(.05)

General
Evaluations
No Info
Info
.006
-.23
(.07)
(.07)
.04
-.10
(.05)
(.05)
-.001
.07
(.04)
(.04)
.07
.08
(.05)
(.05)
.09
.09
(.06)
(.06)

Competency
No Info
-.30
(.08)
-.15
(.05)
-.03
(.05)
.05
(.06)
.09
(.06)

Info
.13
(.08)
.07
(.05)
.02
(.05)
-.005
(.06)
-.02
(.06)

Affect
No Info
-.11
(.07)
-.04
(.04)
.01
(.04)
.05
(.05)
.07
(.05)

Info
.04
(.07)
.06
(.04)
.08
(.04)
.09
(.05)
.09
(.05)

Candidate
Proximity
No Info
Info
-.12
.06
(.08)
(.07)
-.02
.10
(.05)
(.05)
.05
.13
(.04)
(.05)
.10
.16
(.05)
(.05)
.13
.17
(.06)
(.06)

Note: Cell entries provide the effect of traditionalism between cue and no-cue conditions at different levels of
traditionalism for participants in each information environment. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. Bold
entries indicate statistically significant effects at p<.05.

To examine the effect of added information on the ordinal vote preference variable,
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 below present the predicted probability of being in the most extreme
category “very likely” to vote for Chambliss across levels of traditionalism for both information
conditions. Figure 5.3 presents the predicted probabilities for the no-information condition,
while Figure 5.4 illustrates probabilities among participants exposed to the prior information
manipulation. In the no-information condition, exposure to the religious cues results in marked
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priming effects as indicated by the solid cues line. The probability of subjects responding they
would be “very likely” to vote for Chambliss climbs from essentially 0 among extreme
progressives to 51% among deeply traditional respondents. At the same time, however, and as
discussed in the previous chapter, there is a notable decline in evaluations for Chambliss across
traditionalism for participants in the no-information condition exposed to the ad without religious
cues. Owing to a larger presence of religiously progressive political conservatives in the no-cue
conditions, the probability of voting for Chambliss is actually higher among progressives relative
to traditionalists; the probability of being very likely to vote for Chambliss declines from 71% at
low levels of traditionalism to 34% for very orthodox participants.
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Figure 5.3 – Vote preference by traditionalism among self-identified
Christian students in the no-information conditions
Exposure to prior information in the form of Chambliss’ web site, however, significantly
influences priming effects initially observed among participants in the no-information condition.
The solid (cues) line in Figure 5.4, for example, illustrates that the effect of religiosity is
dramatically reduced across traditionalism for those exposed to the “Values” appeal with
religious cues. Once again, the moderating effect of prior information exposure in the cue
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condition is more pronounced at lower levels of traditionalism. While the probability of
likelihood in voting for Chambliss at high levels of traditionalism remains stable across
information conditions – 51% in the no-information condition and 50% in the information
condition – the likelihood in voting for Chambliss at very low levels of traditionalism
dramatically increases from effectively 0% among non-information participants to 28% among
those first exposed to Chambliss’ web site.
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Figure 5.4 – Vote preference by traditionalism among self-identified
Christian students in the prior information conditions
At the same time progressive participants exposed to both the Chambliss web site and
religious cues become more likely to vote for Chambliss, respondents viewing the web site but
presented the ad without religious cues become much less likely to vote for Chambliss. The
probability of extreme progressives being very likely to vote for Chambliss falls from 70% in the
no-information condition to 5% at identical traditionalism levels among participants exposed to
the prior information manipulation. The magnitude of that decline, however, is in large part a
function of the unusually high probabilities of voting for Chambliss initially observed among
progressives in the no-information condition.
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Aside from the artifact of favorable evaluations among progressives in the noinformation condition, when observed in the aggregate, student study results provide persuasive
evidence that exposure to non-religious information about a candidate significantly attenuates
priming effects resulting from exposure to religious appeals. Across six distinct evaluations of
Chambliss, the presence of added information is associated with a reduction in priming effects.
Moreover, the reduction in priming is statistically significant for four of six dependent measures.
The moderating effect of additional secular information suggests religious beliefs activated by
exposure to religious cues become less applicable as an evaluative standard for participants in
relatively complex information environments. Faced with diverse political information of a
candidate, individuals become less reliant on their religious beliefs in formulating their political
opinions. Moreover, for students, the moderating effects of secular political information are
more evident at lower levels of traditionalism in offsetting pronounced negative priming effects
in the no-information condition. In this vein, among those viewing the religious cues, additional
political information tends to improve progressives’ evaluations of Chambliss rather than
lowering evaluations of Chambliss among the religiously traditional.
Variable Information Effects on Religious Priming among a National Sample
Having demonstrated that exposure to secular political information attenuates religious
priming effects among a sample of college students, I turn to the moderating effects of
information among the nationally representative sample of adults in the second Saxby Chambliss
study. Consistent with the process used to model effects among the student sample, I estimated
a regression model for each of the four dependent measures created from the posttest
questionnaire employed in the second Chambliss experiment – trait evaluations, general
evaluations, candidate proximity and vote preference. Each dependent variable was regressed on
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traditionalism, a dummy variable corresponding to the religious cue manipulation (coded 1 for
exposure and 0 for non-exposure) and a dummy variable corresponding to participant exposure
(1) or non exposure (0) to the information manipulation. Likewise, all subsequent two and three
way interactions were modeled (Cohen et al., 2003). Results from these models are presented in
Table 5.3 below. Cell entries provide unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors
for each outcome measure.
Consistent with the effects observed for student participants and as detailed in the
previous chapter, exposure to the campaign appeal with religious cues produces similar priming
effects among adult participants as evidenced by significant two-way, cue x traditionalism
estimates. For measures of general evaluations (β= .48, SE= .17, p<.01), candidate proximity
(β= .39, SE= .14, p<.01) and vote preference (β= .53, SE= .19, p<.01), a significant, positive
effect emerges among adult participants exposed to the advertisement with religious cues, thus
suggesting cue exposure to activate individual religious beliefs resulting in significantly more
favorable evaluations of Chambliss among traditionalists. Likewise, the priming effect on trait
evaluations (β= .19, SE= .12, p<.11) is also positive and approaches statistical significance. As
originally hypothesized (H1), the two-way estimates confirm pronounced religious priming
effects among adult participants exposed to religious cues absent additional political information.
Exposure to the information manipulation, however, should reduce religious priming
effects according to the second hypothesis (H2). Presentation of added candidate information
should promote less reliance on religious considerations and greater reliance on the additional
secular policy positions provided of Chambliss’ modified web site. Evidence of the information
manipulation to moderate religious priming effects comes in the form of negatively signed threeway, cue x information x traditionalism estimates.
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Table 5.3 - Information effects on religious priming among self-identified Christian adults
Variable Information Effects on Religious Priming among U.S. Adult Participants
Trait
General
Candidate
Vote
Evaluations
Evaluations
Proximity
Religious Cue
-08
-.32*
-.23*
-.35*
(.09)
(.13)
(.11)
(.14)
Traditionalism

.25**
(.08)

.26*
(.12)

.35**
(.10)

.24^
(.13)

Information

-.08
(.09)

-.15
(.13)

-.12
(.10)

-.25^
(.14)

Cue x Traditionalism

.19
(.12)

.48**
(.17)

.39**
(.14)

.53**
(.19)

Cue x Information

.28*
(.13)

.62**
(.19)

.37*
(.16)

.67**
(.21)

Traditionalism x
Information

.12
(.11)

.20
(.17)

.15
(.14)

.35^
(.18)

Cue x Information x
Traditionalism

-.42*
(.17)

-.78**
(.25)

-.47*
(.21)

-.91**
(.27)

Constant

.46**
(.06)

.41**
(.09)

.35**
(.07)

.39**
(.10)

415
.14

418
.13

409
.22

420
.13

N
R²

Note: Models predicting trait evaluations, general evaluations, candidate proximity and vote choice among a
nationally representative adult sample. Cell entries provide unstandardized regression coefficients and
standard errors in parentheses. ^p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01.

As anticipated, the three-way interaction is negatively signed across all four evaluative
measures, thus indicating exposure to the secular web site to reduce religious priming effects
initially activated by exposure to the campaign appeal incorporating subtle religious cues.
Moreover, all four three-way estimates prove statistically significant – trait evaluations (β= -.42,
SE= .17, p<.05), general evaluations (β= -.78, SE= .25, p<.01), candidate proximity (β= -.47,
SE= .21, p<.01) and vote preference (β= -.91, SE= .27, p<.01). It is consistently the case that
exposure to prior information effectively reduces the extent to which individuals rely on their
religious beliefs in forming political opinions of Chambliss. Results lend persuasive evidence
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that religion becomes a less prominent consideration among potential voters faced with an array
of politically relevant religious and non-religious information. Simply put, increasingly complex
information environments appear to attenuate priming effects of exposure to religious appeals.
To further illustrate these effects, Figures 5.5 and 5.6 present mean general evaluations of
Chambliss across traditionalism among participants not exposed to Chambliss’ web site (Figure
5.5) and those participants presented the prior information manipulation (Figure 5.6). As
indicated by the steeper solid (cues) line in Figure 5.5, traditionalism plays a more pronounced
role once participants are exposed to the ad with religious cues. Although one’s religiosity plays
a significant role among viewers of the advertisement without religious cues as evidenced by
mean valuations rising from .53 to .65 across levels of traditionalism, the effect for traditionalism
becomes magnified once individuals are presented the ad with religious cues – mean general
evaluations rise from .43 to .77 among participants in the cue condition.

General Evaluations

General Evaluations by Religious Traditionalism
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Figure 5.5 – General evaluations by traditionalism among self-identified
Christian adults in the no-information conditions
Once individuals are exposed to the prior information manipulation presenting
Chambliss’ policy positions, however, the pronounced priming effect for traditionalism among
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cue participants illustrated in Figure 5.5 is significantly reduced as evidenced by the much flatter
cues line presented in Figure 5.6 below. Indeed, there is little effect of traditionalism among
viewers of the religious appeal when they are initially presented Chambliss’ web site; mean
general evaluations are relatively stable across levels of traditionalism, ranging from .64 at the
10th percentile of traditionalism to .71 at the 90th percentile.
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Figure 5.6 – General evaluations by traditionalism among self-identified
Christian adults in the prior-information conditions
As with effects observed in the initial student experiment, the moderating effect of the
additional information is more pronounced at lower levels of traditionalism. Exposure to
Chambliss’ policy statements prior to watching the religious appeal has the disproportional effect
of raising evaluations among progressives, rather than lowering evaluations among
traditionalists. While mean general evaluations rise from .42 to .64 across information
conditions among progressives at the 10th percentile exposed to the religious cue, mean general
evaluations only fall from .78 to .71 across information conditions among traditionalists at the
90th percentile. In essence, additional information tends to have greater effects among relative
progressives in the cue condition. For viewers of the campaign advertisement without religious
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cues, exposure to the information factor results in lower evaluations among progressives and
higher evaluations among deeply traditional participants. Mean general evaluations drop from
.53 to .48 for progressives at the 10th percentile of traditionalism and rise from .64 to .69 among
participants at the 90th percentile of traditionalism.
In keeping with the student analysis, I further explicate the effects of the information
manipulation by deriving the conditional effect of traditionalism for each dependent variable
across information environments at multiple levels of traditionalism. Cell entries in Table 5.4
below provide the effect size of traditionalism and standard errors corresponding to levels of
traditionalism identified in the left-hand column. As noted with the effect on general evaluations
above, moderating effects of the information manipulation are more pronounced at lower levels
at traditionalism (i.e. the 10th and 25th percentiles). In essence, the presence of additional
information alters the effect of religiosity on evaluations of Chambliss. Absent information, the
effect of traditionalism is greater at higher levels of religiosity, which, as mentioned runs counter
to the effects observed of the student sample. The presence of information, however, results in
the effect of traditionalism more prominent at lower levels of religiosity.
The net effect of the information manipulation among adults, then, is to
disproportionately raise evaluations of Chambliss at relatively lower levels of religiosity as
opposed to dramatically reduce evaluations at higher levels of traditionalism. As illustrated of
general evaluations in Figure 5.6 above, perceptions of Chambliss among progressives exposed
to his web site – on average – rate him more favorably, especially among progressives that were
exposed to the Chambliss ad with religious cues. The tendency for the information manipulation
to offset lower evaluations among progressives is consistent for both student and adults. The
primary difference between the samples, however, lies in observed effects among those in the
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no-information condition. Whereas among students a more pronounced negative effect of
traditionalism emerges at lower levels of religiosity, a pronounced positive effect at higher levels
of traditionalism is observed for adults across all dependent measures of Chambliss.
Table 5.4 – Conditional effect of traditionalism on candidate evaluations by information
environment for self-identified Christian adults
Conditional Effect of Traditionalism on Candidate Evaluations by Information Environment
Tradition
Trait
General
Candidate
Vote
Level
Evaluations
Evaluations
Proximity
No Info
Info
No Info
Info
No Info
Info
No Info
Info
.002
-.10
-.06
.09
-.10
10th
.09
.16
.15
(.04)
(.06)
(.05)
(.05)
(.07)
(.04)
(.06)
(.07)
.03
-.03
.003
-.02
25th
.06
.11
.08
.09
(.03)
(.04)
(.04)
(.05)
(.03)
(.04)
(.04)
(.05)
.02
.05
.07
.06
.03
50th
.06
.06
.07
(.03)
(.04)
(.04)
(.04)
(.04)
(.03)
(.03)
(.03)
.01
.04
.06
.005
75th
.07
.08
.09
.10
(.03)
(.04)
(.04)
(.05)
(.03)
(.04)
(.03)
(.05)
-.01
.02
.05
-.02
90th
.09
.12
.12
.14
(.04)
(.05)
(.04)
(.06)
(.03)
(.05)
(.04)
(.05)
Note: Cell entries provide the effect of traditionalism between cue and no-cue conditions at different levels of
traditionalism for participants in each information environment. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. Bold
entries indicate statistically significant effects at p<.05.

The observed differences in effects born of student and adult subjects in the noinformation condition aside, the results of the information manipulation for both samples
demonstrates the ability of secular, non-partisan political information to significantly moderate
religious priming effects. Among student and adult subjects alike, exposure to additional nonreligious candidate information reduces the impact of religiosity on subsequent candidate
evaluations among experimental participants. More specifically, and as demonstrated, the
moderating effect of information tends to be pronounced at lower levels of religiosity. Given this
observation, the net result of the information manipulation for both student and adult participants
exposed to religious cues tends to be modestly more favorable evaluations of Chambliss among
progressives as opposed to a notable decline in attitudes held of more orthodox individuals.
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The Role of Traditionalism in Complex Information Environments
While it is clear exposure to additional secular political information reduces the impact of
religious cues on candidate evaluations as demonstrated for both student and adult participants, it
is less clear if individuals faced with diverse information environments completely dismiss
religion as a relevant evaluative consideration or if one’s religiosity continues to serve as a
significant predictor of political attitudes. The results in Chapter 4 clearly illustrate the pivotal
role one’s religiosity, and in particular their degree of traditionalism, plays in evaluating
candidates. Expanded models accounting for exposure to the information manipulation,
however, demonstrate that the presence of additional secular political information renders
religious considerations less consequential in formulating political perceptions of Saxby
Chambliss. To explore the extent to which religiosity remains consequential for voters faced
with increasingly complex information environments, I conducted simple slopes analyses
examining the predictive capability of traditionalism for participants in the nationally
representative adult study in the high information conditions.
Results provide persuasive evidence that religiosity remains an important evaluative
consideration even in complex information environments, especially for participants not
presented religious cues. Among individuals in the no-cue condition, traditionalism consistently
predicts evaluations of Chambliss in spite of the additional secular information. Indeed,
traditionalism significantly predicts trait evaluations (β=.37, SE= .07, p<.01), general evaluations
(β= .46, SE = .11, p<.01), candidate proximity (β= .50, SE= .09, p<.01) and vote preference
(β=.58, SE= .12, p<.01) for Chambliss. For participants in the complex information condition
exposed to the ad with religious cues, traditionalism also significantly predicts candidate
proximity (β=.41, SE= .12, p<.01). Traditionalism, however, fails to significantly predict trait
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evaluations (β=.14, SE= .12, ns), general evaluations (β= .16, SE= .15, ns) and vote preference
(β= .21, SE = .17,ns) among subjects presented the information factor and religious cues.
It is worth noting, though, even the non-significant estimates are positively signed and
larger than the standard errors in keeping with the general trend that traditionalism remains a
positive predictor of candidate evaluations. Indeed, the results from the simple slopes analyses,
in sum, suggest religiosity continues to serve as a substantive, often significant, consideration
among potential voters navigating diverse information environments. The fact that religiosity
plays a less consequential role among relatively informed voters, however, simultaneously
illustrates priming effects to be more pronounced among those less informed. Hence, to the
degree candidates seek to prime religiosity, such appeals would be more effective if presented to
the relatively uninformed – for example, in relatively non competitive elections.
Beyond strategic considerations, however, the results of the information models clearly
demonstrate exposure to diverse information environments to blunt religious priming effects as
religious considerations become less consequential as a standard to evaluate political candidates.
Although religiosity remains an important consideration regardless of information environment,
the presence of secular, non-partisan political information nonetheless reduces the impact of
individual religious beliefs in the formation of political attitudes.
Conclusion
The present chapter sought to further explicate religious priming effects by examining
how complex information environments influence the effects of religious cues on potential
voters. Specifically, the chapter expanded the initial Saxby Chambliss experimental models first
presented in Chapter 4 by incorporating an information manipulation. The information
manipulation presented some participants Chambliss’ positions on various non-religious political
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issues prior to viewing a religious or non-religious version of his “Values” campaign
advertisement. Manipulating the relative complexity of a subject’s information environment visà-vis the presence or absence of additional candidate issue positions provided the ability to
simulate the potential effect of exposure to religious appeals in an actual campaign environment
wherein voters are often faced with competing information flows.
Across both a student and nationally representative adult sample, results confirm that
exposure to religious cues, absent prior information, activates traditionalism, which significantly
influences posttest evaluations of Chambliss. Consistent with the initial priming-traditionalism
hypothesis (H1), exposure to religious cues results in orthodox individuals holding much more
favorable opinions of Chambliss. These priming effects, however, are attenuated among
participants exposed to additional secular candidate information. Consistent with the
information-environment hypothesis (H2), across students and adults alike, religious priming
effects are significantly reduced in a relatively complex, non-partisan information environment
presenting individuals Chambliss’ secular issue positions prior to ad exposure. Participants
become less reliant on religious considerations to formulate their political evaluations to the
extent they possess more diverse knowledge of Chambliss. In essence, one’s religious beliefs
appear to become less applicable as an evaluative standard in an increasingly diverse political
information environment.
Further conditional effects analyses conducted on the student and adult data demonstrate
that the moderating effect of non-partisan, non-religious political information is more
pronounced at lower levels of traditionalism. The effect of information exposure to reduce
religious priming is greater among relatively progressive individuals as additional information
results in progressives responding more favorably toward Chambliss. Simply put, additional
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information about Chambliss tends to offset much lower evaluations of Chambliss among
progressives as opposed to additional candidate information substantively reducing far more
favorable evaluations of Chambliss among religiously orthodox participants. From a practical
standpoint, then, once primed with religious cues, additional secular information produces a
modest beneficial effect for Chambliss in that it heightens political evaluations among the
religiously liberal.
In spite of findings that information environments alter the manner in which individuals
draw on religious beliefs in the formation of political attitudes, additional analysis demonstrates
religion to nonetheless significantly influence political evaluations regardless of exposure to
extraneous partisan or non-partisan information. Results of simple slopes analyses conducted on
data of adult participants exposed to additional non-partisan information about Saxby Chambliss
confirm traditionalism to exert a significant effect on five of eight evaluative dimensions across
cue conditions. Even in a relatively diverse information environment, religiosity remains a
consequential consideration for prospective voters.
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CHAPTER 6
PRIMING IN A PARTISAN INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Overview
Given the ability of non-partisan political information to attenuate religious priming
effects, I now turn to the influence of partisan environments on religious priming, specifically
exploring effects emerging from the presence or absence of partisan cues in religious appeals.
Much like exposure to non-partisan information attenuates priming effects, the presence of
partisan cues in religious appeals is expected to similarly moderate priming effects, as viewers
become less reliant on religious beliefs and alternatively evaluate on the basis of their partisan
predispositions. Owing to the strength of partisan predispositions to influence political behavior
(e.g. Downs 1957; Kam, 2007; Mondak, 1993; Popkin, 1991; Rahn, 1993), exposure to religious
appeals incorporating identifiable partisan cues should attenuate the relationship between
religious considerations and evaluations, while simultaneously promoting evaluation based on
partisan preferences.
To test whether exposure to partisan cues blunts religious priming effects while
simultaneously promoting partisan priming, the chapter begins with a review of an experiment
administered to a sample of LSU undergraduate students that relies on an actual campaign
advertisement originally broadcast in a 2008 U.S. Congressional campaign. As described below,
the religious advertisement is manipulated to specifically test the effects emerging from the
presence or absence of partisan cues. A series of statistical models based on experimental data
are then presented, with results confirming expectations, namely that the presence of partisan
cues alters religious priming by promoting increased reliance on partisan predispositions in
formulating political judgments.
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Partisan Information Effects – Experimental Procedures Overview
To examine the potential for partisan cues in religious appeals to alter religious priming
effects, I rely on a three-condition (Partisan Cues: Absent, GOP, Democratic), pretest-posttest
experiment administered to a sample of Louisiana State University undergraduate students drawn
from the Manship School of Mass Communication experimental subject pool (N=269).31 Recall,
the partisan-influence hypothesis (H3) argues the relationship between evaluations and
traditionalism (i.e. religious priming) will be strengthened among viewers of non-partisan
religious appeals and reduced among those exposed to partisan religious appeals, while the
relationship between evaluations and partisan predispositions (i.e. partisan priming) will be
heightened among viewers of partisan religious appeals.
To test whether exposure to partisan cues promotes partisan evaluation at the expense of
religious priming, I administered an online experiment wherein participants completed a pretest,
then were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions that exposed subjects to a
religious campaign advertisement presenting a candidate as either a Democrat, Republican or
unaffiliated with a specific political party. Once participants finished viewing the political
appeal, they completed a posttest survey gauging their opinions of the ad-sponsored candidate.
Pretest
Student participants in the current partisan-influence experiment (Experiment #3)
completed a pretest functionally equivalent to the pretest presented students in the original
priming study (Experiment #1), with the only exception of subtle differences in question wording
and response options.32 Although the pretest included a battery of religious measures tapping
multiple dimensions of religiosity, for parsimony, I limit discussion to measures tapping
31

The experiment was fielded from November 20-December 2, 2011 using the online survey provider Qualtrics.
See Appendix Survey Instrument #3 for review and specific question wording. Survey Instrument #3 also serves
as the instrument for experiments discussed in the following chapter.
32

96

traditionalism, which I employ in all subsequent models owing to the predictive power of one’s
religious beliefs relative to commitment or affiliation.33
Specifically, I sum the eight religious belief questions identified on the initial factor
analysis (see Table 4.1) to create an index measure of traditionalism. In keeping with earlier
analyses, I include a fundamentalist to liberal orientation question as well as a question tapping
participant’ views of religious tradition and practices, both measures consistent with previous
religious research (Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, 2004). Additionally, I
include questions asking views on Biblical literalism as well as belief certainty in God, heaven,
hell, the devil and whether Jesus Christ is the Son of God. As with earlier analyses, the eightitem traditionalism index measure proved highly reliable (α =.92). In addition to the religious
questions, participants were asked to describe their political ideology and partisan affiliation on
traditional 7-point scales ranging from “Very liberal” to Very conservative” and “Strong
Democrat” to “Strong Republican” respectively.
Stimuli
After completing the pretest, participants were instructed they would view a brief
political campaign advertisement followed by some questions asking their opinion about the
candidate. All participants were presented an advertisement that aired by Gregg Harper, a 2008
Republican candidate for Mississippi’s 3rd U.S. Congressional district. Specifically, participants
viewed Harper’s “Hope” advertisement. The ad was selected for its explicit religious appeals, its
general lack of divisive issue-oriented content and its subtle inclusion of a textual partisan cue,
which provided for relatively simple edits between conditions. The ad focuses on Harper
discussing the lessons he has learned in how to treat others from his son Livingston, a special
33

The pretest also includes a battery of political interest and knowledge questions designed to tap political
sophistication. As sophistication is not modeled in the current examination, but rather in subsequent models
presented in the next chapter, discussion of political sophistication is included in Chapter 7.
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needs child. During the ad, Harper notes that “He (Livingston) is a blessing,” and “He’s brought
to life what we read in the Bible.”34 The ad goes on to state Harper’s desire to take those values
to Congress and carry what he “believes is a servant’s heart.”
In addition to the explicit religious cues, the
advertisement opens with Gregg Harper’s name
appearing on the screen and ends with a visual of
Harper walking hand-in-hand with his wife while the
screen presents the words “Gregg Harper Republican
Figure 6.1 – Harper “Republican” ad
for Congress” coupled with Harper stating, “I’m
Gregg Harper, and I approve this message.” At no
point are there verbal partisan cues in the ad, only the
visual “Republican” cue ending the ad. To test the
effects of variable partisan environments on religious
priming, three different versions of the ad were created

Figure 6.2 – Harper “Democrat” ad

– a non-partisan version as well as Republican and
Democratic versions. In the Republican version, the
ad opens with the words “Republican Gregg Harper”
appearing on the screen (see Figure 6.1) and closes
with the original visual identifying Harper as a
Republican. In the Democratic version, the word

Figure 6.3 – Harper “Non-partisan” ad

Democrat is substituted for the word Republican in the opening and closing of the ad (see Figure
6.2). Likewise, in the non-partisan version, the ad opens and closes with only Gregg Harper’s
34

Harper’s “Hope” ad copy is provided in the appendix. Likewise, the ad is available for viewing in its original
form at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eaCUfEv9YTE.
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name without any specific political identification (see Figure 6.3). Other than the manipulation
of the subtle change in partisan identification, the ads were identical.
Thus, depending on the condition participants were randomly assigned to, subjects were
presented Gregg Harper as Democrat, Republican or simply Gregg Harper absent partisan
identification. As the partisan affiliation of Harper is the only thing that changes in the ad while
the religious cues are held constant, the manipulations provide the ability to examine how one’s
partisan attachments influence candidate evaluations relative to viewer religiosity. If H3 is
correct, there should be a stronger relationship between religiosity and posttest candidate
evaluations in the non-partisan condition and a stronger partisan relationship within the partisan
cue conditions. In essence, the partisan cues should activate partisan predispositions thereby
moderating evaluations based on religious considerations.
Posttest
Upon viewing the campaign advertisement, participants were presented a posttest survey
eliciting responses to evaluations of Gregg Harper.35 Much like the posttest administered
students in the initial priming experiment, the current posttest tapped multiple evaluative
dimensions of Harper including trait evaluations, general evaluations, competency, affect,
candidate proximity and vote preference. In addition, the posttest included measures designed to
gauge motivation in an effort to examine the extent to which religious appeals or partisan cues
motivate prospective voters. Consistent with previous analyses, all dependent measures were
recoded and scaled from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating more favorable evaluations.
Trait evaluations were measured with 10 questions asking participants how well various
adjectives (e.g. wise, friendly, sincere, etc.) describe Gregg Harper with four response options
ranging from “Not well at all” to “Extremely well.” The measures were then summed to create
35

See Appendix Survey Instrument #3 for review and specific question wording.
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an internally consistent composite trait evaluation variable (α=.90). Two traditional 100-point
thermometer questions asking participants to describe their feelings toward Harper and how
much they liked Harper were summed to create a measure of general evaluations (r=.82).
Competency was measured with a battery of five questions asking subjects how competent
Harper would be in dealing with (economic, health care, foreign policy, education and social)
issues (α=.84).
As with the initial student posttest, four questions were combined to gauge affect toward
Gregg Harper (α = .80). Specifically, participants were asked to what extent Harper made them
feel (hopeful, angry, proud and disappointed). Two questions tapped candidate proximity, one
question asking participants how much they agreed Gregg Harper shared their political views
and a second question asking how much they agreed Gregg Harper shared their religious views.
In addition to candidate proximity, vote preference was ascertained with a single question, “If
you could, how likely would you be to vote for Gregg Harper?”. Participants selected among
five possible response options ranging from “very unlikely” to “very likely.” As noted above,
the posttest included two measures to gauge motivation for Harper. Specifically, one question
asked subjects how motivated they would be to actively campaign for Harper, while a second
question asked participants how likely they would be to put a Gregg Harper bumper sticker on
their car or place a Gregg Harper sign in their yard. Responses to the two question were summed
(r = .68) to create a composite measure of campaign motivation.
Examining Partisan and Religious Evaluations in Variable Information Environments
To test whether partisan cues alter the relationship between one’s religiosity and
subsequent candidate evaluations, I begin by modeling the effect of traditionalism across
dependent variables among non-partisan and partisan appeal viewers. Specifically, I regressed
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each dependent variable on a dummy variable corresponding to the ad condition (coded “1” for
inclusion in either partisan condition and “0” for exposure to the non-partisan appeal), religious
traditionalism and the interaction of ad exposure and traditionalism. The results of these models
are presented in Table 6.1 below with cell entries providing OLS estimates for continuous
measures and ordinal regression estimates for the vote preference and proximity measures.36
Based on variable coding, traditionalism estimates represent the effect of religiosity
among non-partisan appeal viewers, while the two-way, ad x traditionalism estimates represent
the effect of religiosity among participants exposed to one of the partisan appeals. If H3 is
correct and the presence of partisan appeals attenuates religious priming effects, we should
observe positively signed traditionalism estimates across the outcome measures – thus indicating
reliance on religious beliefs in evaluations – and negatively signed estimates of the interaction
variable – thus indicating a reduction of religious priming upon exposure to a partisan appeal.
Table 6.1 – Religious priming by ad condition among self-identified Christian students
Religious Priming by Ad Condition
Ad (Partisan)
Traditionalism
Ad x
Traditionalism
Constant
Threshold 1
Threshold 2
Threshold 3
Threshold 4

Trait
Eval’s
-.05
(.11)
.30
(.10)
.01
(.13)

General
Eval’s
-.10
(.15)
.42
(.14)
.07
(.18)

Competency

Affect

-.004
(.12)
.32
(.12)
-.04
(.15)

-.19
(.12)
.29
(.12)
.18
(.15)

Campaign
Motivation
.08
(.19)
.68
(.18)
-.14
(.23)

.55
(.08)
-

.41
(.11)
-

.38
(.10)
-

.52
(.10)
-

-.09
(.14)
-

Vote
1.61
(1.34)
5.47
(1.30)
-2.60
(1.64)

Political
Proximity
.41
(1.37)
3.87
(1.31)
-1.15
(1.67)

Religious
Proximity
1.49
(1.35)
7.30
(1.35)
-2.37
(1.66)

-

-

-

1.70
2.66
4.79
6.32

.04
1.33
3.81
5.83

1.80
3.13
5.35
7.38

N
234
234
234
234
234
234
234
234
R²
.11
.11
.08
.13
.11
Note: Models predicting trait and general evaluations, competency, affect, motivation, vote, political proximity and
religious proximity among a student sample. Ad variable is dummy coded with “1” indicating exposure to either
partisan condition and “0” indicating exposure to the non-partisan appeal. Bold entries significant p<.05.
36

As the current experiment examines the influence of both religiosity and partisan attachments on candidate
evaluations, political and religious proximity measures are analyzed individually.
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As expected, exposure to the non-partisan ad results in a significant effect of religiosity
on subsequent evaluations of Gregg Harper. Across every dependent measure, the traditionalism
estimate is positively signed and statistically significant as indicated in bold. Consistent with
previous experimental findings, exposure to the non-partisan religious appeal activates one’s
religious beliefs thereby influencing the perceptions individuals hold of Gregg Harper. Once
again, those adhering to more orthodox religious beliefs respond much more favorably after
exposure to the non-partisan religious campaign advertisement.
In contrast, the presence of partisan cues in the campaign appeal should dampen the
effect of religious priming as individual evaluations hinge on partisan predispositions activated
by the partisan cues. Review of the two-way, ad x traditionalism estimates, however, provides
weak evidence that religious priming is reduced upon exposure to the partisan ads. Five of the
eight estimates are negatively signed as anticipated, which indicates reduced reliance on
religiosity – i.e. competency, motivation, vote, political and religious proximity. None of the
five measures, however, achieves statistical significance. Moreover, three evaluative dimensions
– trait evaluations, general evaluations and affect – demonstrate a small positive relationship
upon exposure to a partisan appeal. Thus, initial analysis confirms reliance on religious beliefs
among non-partisan appeal viewers in evaluating Gregg Harper, but little evidence that exposure
to partisan cues dampens reliance on religiosity. Indeed, initial analysis suggests viewers of both
partisan and non-partisan appeals to rely on traditionalism in forming opinions of Gregg Harper.
To further examine whether exposure to partisan cues activates one’s partisan
attachments thereby influencing reliance on religious beliefs in evaluating Gregg Harper, I
additionally conduct an analysis of correlations across experimental conditions. Specifically, I
compare the correlation between partisan identification (PID) and dependent evaluations across
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ad conditions with equivalent correlations drawn between traditionalism and candidate
evaluations. While the regression analysis above combines Republican and Democratic ad
viewers, analysis of correlations explores the relationships between religiosity and PID with
corresponding evaluations within each ad condition. Moreover, as the current experiment
explores the influence of partisan attachments on religious priming across two distinct partisan
conditions and one non-partisan environment, analysis of correlations provides a parsimonious
presentation of the three-way interactions. The degree to which traditionalism and PID are
associated with evaluations of Harper effectively represent religious and partisan priming
respectively. As each type of priming likely varies across conditions, the effect of cue exposure
is readily understood through review of the correlations within each experimental condition.
To that end, Table 6.2 below presents the correlation of PID and traditionalism for each
evaluative dimension in the three experimental conditions. If the partisan-influence hypothesis
(H3) is correct that partisan cues promote partisan evaluation over religious evaluation, we
should observe a stronger relationship between traditionalism and corresponding outcome
measures in the non-partisan condition. Conversely, we should observe more pronounced
correlations between PID and dependent evaluations in the partisan ad conditions. Such a
pattern would indicate candidate evaluation occurring based on partisan predispositions when
presented an identifiable partisan cue. Absent partisan cues, however, viewers should respond to
the religious cues, thus evaluation should hinge on one’s religiosity in the non-partisan appeals.
Among viewers of the non-partisan appeal, the correlation between religiosity
(traditionalism) and evaluations of candidate Harper is significant across all eight dependent
measures. Consistent with the regression analysis above, there is clear evidence of a marked
relationship between one’s religious beliefs and subsequent perceptions of Harper for viewers of

103

the non-partisan appeal. The consistency in correlations between traditionalism and evaluations
within the non-partisan ad condition suggests viewers to key on the religious cues in forming
their opinions of Harper. At the same time, a consistent relationship between PID and evaluative
dimensions of Harper also emerges among participants presented the non-partisan appeal. As
with traditionalism, the correlation between PID and individual evaluations is significant for all
measures of Harper, thus indicating viewers likewise draw on their partisan predispositions in
formulating opinions of Harper even when not presented an explicit partisan cue.
Table 6.2 – Partisan and religious correlations across ad conditions among self-identified
Christian students

Trait Evaluations

Correlations within Ad Conditions
Non-Partisan
Democratic
PID
Traditionalism
PID
Traditionalism
.28**
.35**
.27*
.26*

General Evaluations

.32**

.32**

.30*

.34**

.35**

.33**

Competency

.25*

.30**

-.05

.29*

.23*

.19

Affect

.21*

.27*

.27*

.36**

.23*

.40**

Motivation

.37**

.39**

.13

.36**

.33**

.24*

Vote

.37**

.44**

.05

.23

.46**

.28*

Political Proximity

.34**

.33**

-.09

.14

.41**

.32**

Religious Proximity

.37**

.53**

.30*

.50**

.30**

.26*

PID
.21

Republican
Traditionalism
.31**

Average Correlation
.31
.37
.15
.31
.32
.29
N
87
67
80
Note: Cell entries provide the correlation of PID and Traditionalism with candidate evaluative measures
across ad conditions. *p<.05, **p<.01.

Consider general evaluations of Harper in the non-partisan condition. The strength of
relationship between both PID and traditionalism with general evaluations is identical (r=.32). In
spite of the strength in association of PID with outcome evaluations among viewers of the non-
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partisan appeal, there is some evidence that a stronger relationship exists between traditionalism
and evaluations absent partisan cues. Measures of religious proximity, for example, demonstrate
a stronger association with traditionalism (r=.53) relative to PID (r=.37). Likewise, vote
preference (r=.44) and affect (r=.27) are more wedded to traditionalism in the non-partisan
condition relative to PID (r=.37; r=.21, respectively). In general, there is a modestly stronger
relationship between religiosity and perceptions of Harper (average r=.37) when compared to
equivalent relationships between PID and evaluations (average r=.31). Nonetheless, partisan
predispositions appear to serve as a relevant consideration for individuals in formulating
opinions of political candidates, even absent candidate partisan identification. As will become
evident in subsequent analyses, however, the strength of PID as an evaluative standard in the
non-partisan condition is likely overstated given the lack of partisan diversity across
experimental conditions. All ad conditions are disproportionately populated with self-identified
Republicans, who happen to display higher levels of religious traditionalism.37
Given this situation, a better indicator is to examine the relationships between PID and
traditionalism with candidate evaluations in the partisan conditions. If partisanship becomes
more consequential upon exposure to an explicit partisan cue, we should observe waning
associations between religiosity and evaluations in the partisan ad conditions. Indeed, whereas
traditionalism proved significant across all dependent measures in the non-partisan appeal, the
relationship between religiosity and evaluations becomes less pronounced and more inconsistent
in the partisan conditions. The relationship between traditionalism and the overtly political vote
and political proximity variables, for example, fails to achieve statistical significance for viewers
of the Democratic appeal. Likewise, in multiple instances, correlations between religiosity and

37

Mean Republican traditionalism in conditions (Democratic = .86; Non-partisan = .84; Republican = .83).
Mean Democratic traditionalism in conditions (Democratic = .82; Non-partisan = .73; Republican = .71).
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candidate evaluations of Harper decline in the Republican condition when compared to identical
dependent measures of Harper among non-partisan condition participants.
As traditionalism wanes in the partisan conditions, partisan predispositions become more
tightly bound to evaluations for viewers of the partisan appeals, especially those assigned to the
Republican ad condition. The lack of significance emerging for PID in the Democratic ad
condition once again reflects too few self-identified Democrats in the sample. Among viewers
of the Republican appeal, however, partisan predispositions play a more prominent role in
candidate evaluations as evidenced by heightened levels of significance for PID, especially in
terms of vote preference and political proximity. As expected, when exposed to explicit partisan
cues, viewers respond by increasingly evaluating on the basis of preexisting partisan
attachments; absent partisan cues, evaluations hinge, to a greater degree, on one’s degree of
religious traditionalism. Much like the presence of secular information detailed earlier in the
chapter, exposure to additional information in the form of partisan cues tends to reduce reliance
on religious constructs in formulating evaluations of political figures. It should be noted,
however, that religion remains an important consideration even in the face of explicit partisan
cues as evidenced by significant associations between traditionalism and various evaluative
measures within both partisan conditions.
Promoting Partisan Evaluations in Variable Information Environments
Having examined correlations between PID and traditionalism with candidate evaluations
across ad conditions, I pivot to examining informational effects within partisan conditions. To do
so, I rely on an analysis of mean valuations for dependent measures by partisan identification
across Democratic and Republican ad viewers. If the presence of a partisan cue activates
preexisting attachments and therefore promotes partisan priming as proposed by the partisan-

106

influence hypothesis, we should observe notable differences in mean valuations for selfidentified partisan viewers of the Democratic and Republican advertisements. Democrats should
evaluate a self-identified Democratic candidate more favorably relative to a Republican
candidate. Conversely, Republican participants should respond more favorably toward a
Republican candidate. Table 6.3 below presents the results of the partisan analysis. Cell entries
provide mean valuations with corresponding standard deviations for each dependent variable.
Table 6.3 – Mean valuations by PID across partisan ad conditions

Trait Evaluations
General Evaluations
Competency
Affect
Motivation
Vote
Political Proximity
Religious Proximity

N

Means by PID within Democratic and Republican Appeals
Democrats
Republicans
Democratic Ad
GOP Ad
Democratic Ad
GOP Ad
.67
.65
.74
.79
(.11)
(.24)
(.18)
(.14)
.57
.54
.70
.79
(.19)
(.23)
(.22)
(.18)
.61
.49
.57
.66
(.15)
(.25)
(.20)
(.15)
.63
.59
.73
.76
(.16)
(.15)
(.20)
(.17)
.29
.27
.43
.50
(.32)
(.19)
(.29)
(.23)
.38
.34
.47
.63
(.26)
(.23)
(.30)
(.19)
.46
.31
.40
.60
(.19)
(.22)
(.28)
(.18)
.50
.44
.64
.70
(.16)
(.26)
(.27)
(.20)
6

8

47

58

Note: Cell entries provide mean values for trait evaluations, general evaluations, competency, affect, motivation,
vote, political and religious proximity among Democratic and Republican self identifiers within each partisan
appeal. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Bold values indicate significant differences (p<.05) between ad
condition evaluative measures among self-identified Democrats and Republicans.

Similar to the correlation analysis presented above, there are too few self-identified
Democrats viewing the Democratic appeal to make definitive statements regarding the effect of
partisan exposure among Democrats. Having stated that, it is worthwhile to note Democrats
consistently rate Harper more favorably when presented as a Democrat than a Republican.
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Moreover, differences among Democrats in terms of competency and political proximity are
substantively large in spite of a lack of significance.
The Republican condition, however, provides a much clearer picture of the effects of
partisan cues on candidate evaluations. Consistent with Democrats rating “Democratic” Harper
more favorably, Republicans hold more positive attitudes toward Gregg Harper when he is
presented as a Republican. Across every dimension, self-identified Republicans rate
“Republican” Gregg Harper more favorably. Moreover, a statistically significant increase in
ratings emerges for measures of general evaluations, competency, vote preference and political
proximity. Republicans view Harper as significantly more likable when presented as a
Republican (.79 to .70, general evaluations). Similarly, Republicans are significantly more likely
to vote for “Republican” Gregg Harper (.63) than “Democratic” Gregg Harper (.47).
Recall, the only thing that varies between partisan conditions is the word “Republican” or
“Democrat” appearing at the beginning and end of the ad. The consistency of more favorable
evaluations of congruent candidates among partisan viewers coupled with the significant effects
emerging in the Republican ad condition provide compelling evidence that the mere presence of
a partisan cue materially changes the manner in which individuals evaluate political candidates.
The presence of a partisan cue serves to activate preexisting partisan attachments that are then
drawn on in formulating opinions about prospective candidates. Consistent with the partisaninfluence hypothesis as well as previous research (e.g. Popkin, 1991; Rahn, 1993), the presence
of partisan cues promotes evaluation on the basis of one’s established political preferences.
The Role of Religious and Partisan Considerations in Political Evaluations
In addition to confirming that exposure to political cues promotes partisan priming, the
results of the means analysis shed light on the relationship between partisan attachments and
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religiosity. Consider, although not statistically significant, Democrats and Republicans both
respond more favorably in terms of religious proximity when Gregg Harper is presented as
congruent with their own partisan identification. Democrats are more likely to respond that
Harper shares their religious views when presented as a Democrat, while Republicans view
Harper as religiously proximate when presented as a Republican. Such effects speak to the
integration of religious and political constructs in the minds of potential voters. For many
individuals, religion and politics are not mutually exclusive; rather, each informs the other.
It is likewise interesting to note the rather favorable evaluations self-identified
Republicans offer of Gregg Harper when presented as an explicit Democrat. Although the
means analysis presented in Table 6.3 clearly demonstrates the importance of partisan
congruence in informing political evaluations, the fact Republicans rate “Democratic” Gregg
Harper more favorable than self-identified Democrats across multiple variables similarly
suggests the importance of one’s religiosity in shaping opinions of political figures. Just as
religiosity was shown to predict political evaluations in spite of additional secular information as
detailed in the previous chapter, traditionalism continues to exert influence over political
evaluations in partisan environments as well.
To illustrate the influence religiosity exerts in shaping political evaluations, I plot
evaluations of Gregg Harper across levels of traditionalism among self-identified Republicans
exposed to the Democratic ad condition. Specifically, I present the effect of traditionalism on
trait evaluations, a rather benign personality based dimension, and motivation, an explicitly
political evaluation. Theoretically, Republicans, to the extent they evaluate based on partisan
attachments to the explicit cue, should evaluate a Democratic candidate less favorably than
equivalent Democrats. If, however, evaluation hinges on the religious cues in the political ad,
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we should observe a positive effect on trait evaluations among Republicans across traditionalism
irrespective of the partisan cue. Figure 6.4 below presents the effect of traditionalism on trait
evaluations, while Figure 6.5 depicts the effect of traditionalism on campaign motivation.

Traits

Trait Evaluations among Republican Viewers of a Democratic
Appeal
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
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Republicans
Republican Mean
Democratic Mean
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Hi
Traditionalism

Figure 6.4 - Trait evaluations by traditionalism among self-identified Republicans
The effect of traditionalism on Republicans is illustrated by the solid line. The dashed
lines provide the Republican and Democratic means for reference. As evident by the slope of the
solid line, Republicans at low levels of traditionalism rate Harper less favorably (.61) than the
mean level of Democratic viewers (.67). At high levels of traditionalism, however, Republicans
rate Harper much more favorably in terms of trait evaluations (.85). Moreover, this effect is
statistically significant (β= .58, SE= .25, p<.05). The effect of traditionalism on trait evaluations
among Republicans suggests religiosity continues to exert a powerful influence on the formation
of political attitudes in spite of the presence of a potent, incongruent partisan cue. From this
perspective, appeals to religiosity offer the ability for candidates to favorably influence
oppositional voters.
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This point is reflected in Figure 6.5, which looks at the effect of traditionalism of
campaign motivation. Recall, the motivation variable is composed of questions asking
participants how amenable they would be to actively campaign for the candidate as well as place
signage on their car or in their yard. Not surprisingly, self-identified Republican progressives are
unenthusiastic about campaigning for “Democratic” Gregg Harper (.18). Religiously traditional
Republicans, however, become far more motivated upon exposure to the Harper ad (.63).
Indeed, the effect of traditionalism on campaign motivation for Republican viewers of the
Democratic Harper appeal is statistically significant (β=1.06, SE= .41, p<.05). Regardless of the
incongruent partisan cue, religiously traditional Republicans become much more favorable
toward Harper – to the point of potentially actively campaigning on his behalf.

Motivation

Campaign Motivation among Republican viewers of a
Democratic Appeal
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Figure 6.5 – Campaign motivation by traditionalism among self-identified Republicans
As the effects illustrated in Figures 6.4 and 6.5 demonstrate, religiosity continues to serve
as an influential consideration in evaluating political figures. The religious cues in the Harper ad
resonate with individuals based on their level of traditionalism, which subsequently alters
perceptions of the prospective candidate. When exposed to the Democratic appeal, progressive
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Republicans respond less favorably, while religiously orthodox Republicans perceive Harper in
much more positive terms, and this in spite of explicit partisan cues that have been shown to
powerfully influence political behavior (e.g. Kam, 2007; Rahn, 1993).
It is consistently the case that informational environments alter the manner in which
religious cues resonate with prospective voters. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, exposure to
additional non-partisan, secular political information reduces religious priming effects.
Likewise, the presence of partisan cues in religious appeals attenuates the association between
traditionalism and political perceptions as individual evaluations become shaped by longstanding partisan attachments. However, even when faced with relatively complex information
environments presenting additional political information, be it partisan or non-partisan, voters
continue to rely on religiosity in generating opinions of political candidates. In spite of a clear
reduction in religious priming effects when exposed to increasingly complex environments,
religious cues nonetheless resonate with voters based on their level of traditionalism.
Conclusion
Just as exposure to non-religious, non-partisan political information alters religious
priming effects, so too does the presence of partisan cues in religious campaign appeals. While
the previous chapter focused on the effect of non-partisan information environments on religious
priming, the present chapter examined variability in partisan cue exposure on religious priming.
Consistent with hypothesized expectations (H3), experimental results confirm the relationship
between religiosity and candidate evaluations to be stronger among viewers of a religious appeal
absent an identifiable partisan cue. At the same time, the introduction of a partisan cue in a
religious appeal reduces the association between religiosity and subsequent evaluations and
heightens the impact of partisan predispositions on political evaluations. The pattern of results
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thus suggests exposure to partisan cues to attenuate the effect of religious cues on the perceptions
individuals form of prospective candidates. In essence, partisan cues activate one’s partisan
attachments, which then influence the extent to which individuals draw on religious
considerations in formulating political attitudes. Such results dovetail with research that has
consistently shown partisan identification to exert powerful influences on a voter’s political
calculus (e.g. Goren et al., 2009; Kam, 2007; Popkin, 1991; Rahn, 1993).
In spite of findings that exposure to partisan cues alters the manner in which individuals
draw of religious beliefs in the formation of political attitudes, additional analysis continues to
reaffirm the influence of one’s religious beliefs on political evaluations regardless of exposure to
extraneous partisan information. As illustrated, one’s religiosity powerfully shapes evaluations
self-identified Republicans express of an explicitly identified Democratic candidate. Indeed,
across multiple measures, Republicans demonstrated higher mean evaluations of an openly
religious Democratic candidate when compared to equivalent Democratic evaluations – a
tendency driven by higher levels of traditionalism among self-identified Republicans.
Traditionalism significantly influenced evaluations among Republicans of a Democratic
candidate, with Republican progressives holding extremely unfavorable views and deeply
orthodox adherents expressing remarkably positive perceptions of the self-identified Democratic
candidate – even expressing marked motivation to actively campaign for him. Such findings
speak to the persuasive power of religious appeals and the potential benefit of candidates
considering the use of religious appeals to court oppositional segments of the electorate.
Taken together, the results of Chapter 5 and the present chapter demonstrate the
influential effect information environments have on religious priming effects. While exposure to
religious appeals examined in isolation yield pronounced priming effects based on the extent to
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which one adheres to traditional religious beliefs, these effects become muted in increasingly
complex information environments, be they partisan or non-partisan in nature. Nevertheless,
experimental results strongly suggest one’s religiosity continues to exert significant influences
on political evaluations even in the face of complex information environments. Indeed,
religiosity remains a consequential consideration in a voter’s calculus of prospective candidates
regardless of information environment.
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CHAPTER 7
IMPLICIT, EXPLICIT AND BACKLASH EFFECTS
Chapter Overview
If individual religiosity is indeed consequential to the formation of political attitudes and
exposure to religious appeals has the ability to powerfully influence evaluations of prospective
candidates as evidenced in the previous three chapters, does the manner in which appeals draw
on religion matter? That is, must a campaign advertisement overtly reference religion to be
effective or can traditionalism be activated through more subtle methods? At the same time, is it
possible for candidates to experience backlash effects for mounting explicit religious campaigns?
In an effort to answer these questions, I transition to the examination of possible differences in
the effectiveness of religious appeals as a function of the degree to which advertisements draw
on religion. In so doing, I draw heavily from racial priming literature on theories of implicit and
explicit racial appeals (Mendelberg, 1997, 2001) to develop a framework for analyzing
differential effects of religious appeals as well as the potential for candidates to suffer backlash
effects for employing religious appeals.
The chapter begins with a review of experimental procedures designed to test differential
effects of religious appeals, specifically the effectiveness of subtle, implicit appeals to activate
traditionalism versus overt, explicit ads. Statistical analyses yield mixed results. Consistent with
hypothesized expectations, implicit religious appeals produce priming effects similar to the
effects observed of more religiously explicit campaign spots. Further analysis, however,
suggests priming effects to be moderated by political sophistication. While explicit appeals
appear to resonate for relative novices, implicit appeals effectively speak to sophisticates.
Following exploration of differential effects arising from implicit vs. explicit religious
appeals, the second half of the chapter focuses on the potential for candidates mounting religious
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campaigns to be “called out” for their use of religion and thus suffer declining favorability
ratings. Once again, experimental procedures undertaken to explicate possible backlash effects
are detailed, followed by a discussion of results based on a series of statistical analyses
conducted on experimental data. As anticipated, model results suggest little adverse effects of
candidates embracing explicit religious messaging. The chapter then concludes with a
discussion of study implications for political discourse and campaign strategy.
Testing Implicit and Explicit Religious Effects – Experimental Procedures
To examine possible differences in the effectiveness of implicit and explicit appeals to
activate potential voter’s religious beliefs, I rely on a simple two-condition (Religious Appeal:
Implicit, Explicit), pretest-posttest experiment administered to a sample of undergraduate LSU
students drawn from the Manship School of Mass Communication Experimental Subject Pool
(N=199).38 Specifically, all participants were presented the identical socio-political pretest
administered to subjects in Experiment #3. Participants were then randomly assigned to an
experimental condition and instructed they would be viewing a brief political advertisement
followed by a questionnaire asking their opinions about the advertisement. Subjects assigned to
the implicit condition viewed a political advertisement promoting the “pro-life” position and
appealing to “traditional family values,” while participants in the explicit condition viewed the
same ad with the addition of explicit religious references as described below.
Recall, the implicit-explicit appeals hypothesis proposes implicit and explicit appeals to
be equally effective in promoting religious priming. The design of the experiment thus permits
testing whether an implicit appeal that does not specifically reference religion but contains issue
positions that have become systematically wedded to religion in modern American politics (i.e.
abortion and gay marriage) can nonetheless effectively activate religious beliefs akin to explicit
38

The experiment was fielded from November 20-December 2, 2011, using the online survey provider Qualtrics.
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religious appeals. If this is the case, candidates would have the ability to “speak” to religious
voters without formally mentioning religion.
Pretest
Student participants in the current experiment completed an identical pretest to that used
in Experiment #3 and as detailed in the previous chapter.39 The pretest began with a battery of
political interest and knowledge questions tapping political sophistication consistent with
approaches used in previous research (e.g. Zaller, 1992). Specifically, two questions tapping
interest and attention in politics were combined with five political knowledge questions to form a
political sophistication index measure (α=.64), which was rescaled from 0 (novice) to 1
(sophisticate). As with earlier analyses, I computed the same eight-item index measure of
traditionalism to operationalize religiosity (α =.94).
Stimuli
After reading the consent form and completing the pretest survey, participants were
instructed they would be viewing a brief political advertisement and completing a follow-up
questionnaire. Subjects were then randomly assigned to one of two conditions presenting them
either an implicit or explicit religious campaign appeal. Following an extensive review of
candidate ads in the last two election cycles, an advertisement aired by Kenny Hulshof, a 2008
Missouri gubernatorial candidate, was selected for its characteristics as an implicit appeal
consistent with criteria cited in racial priming literature (Mendelberg, 2001). In differentiating
explicit and implicit racial appeals, Mendelberg (2001) argues explicit appeals employ overt
racial nouns or adjectives (e.g. “blacks,” “race”) to “express anti-black sentiment, to represent
racial stereotypes, or to portray a threat from African Americans,” while implicit racial appeals
convey the same message through “oblique references to race” in the context of nonracial issues
39

See Appendix Survey Instrument #3 for complete questionnaires and precise question wording.
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(p. 8). Although implicit racial appeals may employ words or symbols, they are most often
achieved through visual imagery as exemplified by the “Willie Horton” ad (Mendelberg, 2001).
By linking a visual image of a black man with violent crime, the Horton ad submerged anti-black
sentiment in a nonracial context while simultaneously playing off stereotypic portrayals of
“violent” African American men (Entman & Rojecki, 2000; Gilliam & Iyengar, 2000).
In the same way racial attitudes may be activated through subtle appeals to issues that
have become racialized (e.g. crime, welfare), religious considerations are likely to be activated
through subtle appeals to non-religious issues that have become wedded to religion (i.e. abortion,
same-sex marriage). Although non-religious in nature, scholars and pundits have long noted the
bond forged between the Christian Right and divisive social issues such as abortion and
traditional marriage over the past three decades such that socially conservative positions on these
issues have become effectively systematized with religion (Dionne, 1991; Hunter, 1991; Thomas
& Dobson, 1999). Indeed, Putnam and Campbell (2010) note abortion and traditional marriage
are the two most salient issues dividing religious conservatives and liberals in modern American
politics. To the extent a candidate can tap these issues, he or she need not explicitly appeal to
religion to nonetheless “speak” to religious voters.
Congressman Kenny Hulshof’s “Values” ad represents just such an implicit appeal.
Aired in the 2008 Missouri gubernatorial race, Hulshof’s ad extols the virtue of certain values
such as hard work and “doing what’s right.” Consistent with Mendelberg’s (2001) criteria, the
ad contains no explicit religious nouns or adjectives and is an ostensibly religion-free
advertisement. Yet, the ad draws on the powerful “pro-life” position through on-screen text
while verbally promoting “the value of life and the traditional family.”40 The pro-life and

40

Ad copy with highlighted appeals is provided in the appendix. Hulshof’s “Values” ad is available for viewing in
its original form at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QJ4Rc0aHStg.
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traditional family appeals are set against compelling visual imagery of Hulshof playing with his
wife and two young daughters, thereby reinforcing the value of life and the conception of
traditional family (see Figure 7.1). The pro-life and traditional family appeals are immediately
followed by a verbal appeal extolling the “value of moral clarity.” Although the moral clarity
appeal speaks to Hulshof’s condemnation of fellow
Republican and former House Majority Leader
Tom DeLay, the moral clarity reference
nonetheless serves to reinforce the pro-life and
traditional family appeals in moral terms.

Figure 7.1 – Hulshof Implicit “Values” ad

The pro-life – traditional family – moral clarity trifecta speaks to positions long
advocated by the Christian Right. In so doing, the ad appeals to religion, but does so by avoiding
explicit references to religion. Simply put, the ad represents an implicit religious appeal by
submerging religious content in ostensibly non-religious issues (i.e. abortion and traditional
family values). Additionally, for the purposes of this experiment, the Hulshof “Values” ad,
much like the Chambliss “Values” discussed earlier, is ideal precisely because it contains no
explicit partisan cues that may serve to influence candidate evaluation.
Participants randomly assigned to the implicit condition viewed the “Values” ad in its
original form with the minor addition of the ending from Hulshof’s “Blessed” ad edited on to the
end of the “Values” ad. The ending simply includes a picture of Hulshof’s logo with the voice
over “For Governor, the candidate is Kenny Hulshof.” The ending was added to the original
version of the “Values” ad to permit subtle inclusion of a verbal religious cue as detailed below.
Participants in the explicit condition viewed the same ad with the subtle inclusion of three
religious cues: the first, a brief textual cue presenting the words “Christian Values” in the frame
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immediately preceding Hulshof stating his belief in “The value of life and the traditional family”
(see Figure 7.2); a second textual cue with the phrase “A Christian leader for Christian people”
appearing next to Hulshof as he is stating he is
running for governor because, “I believe Missouri’s
government ought to be as good as its people” (see
Figure 7.3); and a third, verbal cue including the
word “Christian” in the closing wherein a female

Figure 7.2 – Hulshof Explicit “Values” ad

voice is heard saying “For governor, the Christian
candidate is Kenny Hulshof.” Except for the brief
on-screen words and the verbal addition of the word
“Christian” in the closing, the two ads were
identical. Hence, the experimental design permits
the examination of whether an implicit appeal that

Figure 7.3 – Hulshof Explicit “Values” ad

does not explicitly mention religion is any more or less effective in activating religious
considerations relative to an appeal that explicitly references Christianity.
Posttest
As noted above, I administered the same survey instruments used in Experiment #3 to
participants in the current experiment.41 Likewise, I employed the same procedures as detailed
in Chapter 6 to create additive indices for the posttest evaluative dimensions of trait evaluations
(α=.89), general evaluations (r=.66), competency (α=.83), affect (α=.78), motivation (r=.66) and
candidate proximity (r= .66).42 In addition, the categorical vote preference measure is modeled.
All variables were coded to indicate more favorable evaluations of Congressman Hulshof.

41
42

See Appendix Survey Instrument #3 for complete posttest questionnaire and question wording.
See Chapter 6 – Posttest for more detail on the creation of posttest index variables.
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Modeling Implicit and Explicit Religious Priming Effects
To test differences in the priming potential of implicit and explicit religious appeals, I
performed a series of basic regression models. Specifically, I regressed each dependent variable
on a dummy variable corresponding to ad condition exposure (0 for implicit, 1 for explicit),
religious traditionalism and the interaction of the ad condition and traditionalism, ad x
traditionalism. Table 7.1 below presents the regression estimates for these models. Cell entries
for the first six variables provide OLS estimates, while the final vote model provides ordinal
regression estimates. Standard errors are provided in parentheses.
The implicit-explicit appeals hypothesis (H4) suggests implicit and explicit appeals to be
equally effective in promoting religious priming. If this is the case, the two-way ad x
traditionalism variable should be relatively small and insignificant across evaluative measures of
Congressman Hulshof, which would indicate that neither the explicit or implicit appeal results in
a significant priming effect over the alternative appeal. As the ad condition is coded 1 for
exposure to the explicit appeal, positively signed ad x traditionalism estimates indicate greater
effects for exposure to the explicit appeal, while negatively signed estimates suggest substantive
effects of exposure to the implicit appeal.
Consistent with hypothesized expectations, no significant differences emerge in terms of
priming effects between exposure to explicit and implicit appeals. None of the two-way, ad x
traditionalism estimates achieves statistical significance. Moreover, exposure to the appeals
produces inconsistent effects as evidenced by the appearance of both negative and positive
estimates across the seven measures of the two-way interaction. Simply put, results suggest no
discernible difference between the implicit and explicit appeal to promote religious priming. But
is priming occurring at all? Perhaps the lack of significant findings between the two types of

121

appeals reflects that neither ad activates traditionalism, rather than both appeals promote priming
equally.
Table 7.1 – Evaluations by type of religious appeal among self-identified Christian students
Implicit and Explicit Religious Priming
Ad (Explicit)
Traditionalism
Ad x
Traditionalism
Constant
Threshold 1
Threshold 2
Threshold 3
Threshold 4

Trait
Evaluations
.04
(.14)
.05
(.11)
-.05
(.17)

General
Evaluations
-.15
(.17)
.20
(.12)
.17
(.21)

Competency

Affect
-.18
(.16)
-.08
(.13)
.24
(.20)

Campaign
Motivation
.47*
(.22)
.61**
(.18)
-.50
(.27)

Candidate
Proximity
.01
(.17)
.60**
(.14)
.04
(.21)

.07
(.15)
.28*
(.12)
-.04
(.18)

.69**
(.09)
-

.55**
(.12)
-

.36**
(.10)
-

.64**
(.11)
-

-.08
(.15)
-

.10
(.11)
-

Vote
.67
(1.66)
3.77**
(1.37)
-.43
(2.02)
.26
1.46
3.50
5.30

N
172
172
172
172
172
172
172
R²
.00
.05
.06
.03
.08
.18
Note: Models predicting trait evaluations, general evaluations, competency, affect, motivation, candidate proximity
and vote choice among a student sample. Ad variable is dummy coded with “1” corresponding to the explicit
religious appeal and “0” indicating implicit appeal. Cell entries provide unstandardized regression coefficients and
standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05, **p<.01.

The significant traditionalism estimates for competency (β= .28, SE= .12, p<.05),
campaign motivation (β=.61, SE= .18, p<.01), candidate proximity (β= .60, SE= .14, p<.01) and
vote preference (β= 3.77, SE= 1.37, p<.01), which represent the effect of religiosity in the
implicit condition, however, suggests that the implicit appeal resonates with viewers’ religiosity.
Likewise, the effect of traditionalism for general evaluations (β=.20, SE=.12, p<.11) approaches
statistical significance. Thus, for five of seven measures, a marked religious effect emerges for
viewers exposed to the implicit Hulshof appeal.
To determine if exposure to the explicit appeal similarly resonates with viewers based on
religiosity, I conducted a simple slopes analysis within the explicit appeal condition. Consistent
with effects of exposure to the implicit appeal, results provide persuasive evidence that viewing
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the explicit appeal likewise activates religious traditionalism. Among those exposed to the
explicit appeal, a significant effect of religiosity emerges for general evaluations (β=.37, SE=.18,
p<.05), competency (β=.24, SE= .14, p<.10), affect (β=.33, SE=.15, p<.05), candidate proximity
(β= .64, SE = .17, p<.01) and vote preference (β=3.14, SE=1.55, p<.05) for Hulshof. In essence,
exposure to either appeal appears to promote evaluations on religious terms, with more
traditional viewers holding significantly more favorable views of Hulshof across a host of
evaluative qualities. Moreover, it appears candidates can activate religious considerations
among potential voters without formally communicating religious statements or symbols as
evidenced by effects among implicit appeal viewers. Advocating a pro-life position and
traditional family values seemingly primes religiosity in lieu of more explicit statements.
The Moderating Effect of Political Sophistication on Implicit and Explicit Priming
The ability of implicit religious appeals to activate individual religious considerations is
congruent with the research of racial priming scholars (Huber & Lapinski, 2006; Mendelberg,
2001). In her seminal work on racial appeals, Mendelberg (2001) argues candidates have
increasingly turned away from explicit appeals and toward implicit racial appeals owing to the
effectiveness of implicit appeals in activating latent racial attitudes. More recent research,
however, has qualified Mendelberg’s thesis in noting the priming effect of racial appeals to be
moderated by education (Huber & Lapinski, 2006). While highly educated individuals dismiss
both explicit and implicit racial appeals as a violation of egalitarian norms, the uneducated fail to
distinguish appeal type and are thus primed by both types of appeals.
Owing to the significant moderating effect of education in the domain of implicit and
explicit racial priming, I further analyze the current experimental data for moderators of religious
priming. As the use of a homogenous college sample prevents examination of moderation by
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education, I turn to political sophistication given its status as a significant moderator of priming
effects noted by other scholars (e.g. Zaller, 1992). To test for the possible moderating effect of
political sophistication on religious priming, I expand the regression models presented in Table
7.1 to include the measure of sophistication constructed from pretest questions. Specifically, I
regress each dependent variable on a dummy variable corresponding to ad condition exposure (0
for implicit, 1 for explicit), religious traditionalism and the sophistication measure. Additionally,
I model the three-way, ad x tradition x sophistication interaction and control for all lower order
interactions (Cohen et al., 2003). The results of these models are presented in Table 7.2 below,
with cell entries providing OLS estimates and standard errors for the first six outcome variables
and ordinal estimates for the categorical vote preference measure.
Interestingly, the inclusion of sophistication in regression models results in significant ad
x traditionalism estimates for trait evaluations (β= 1.46, SE= .63, p<.05) and general evaluations
(β= 1.98, SE= .80, p<.05), while affect (β= 1.50, SE= .76, p<.10) demonstrates modest
significance. The two-way, ad x traditionalism interaction in the current model denotes the
effect of traditionalism among explicit appeal viewers when political sophistication is zero.
While the earlier analysis produced no significant differences between the two types of appeals
in activating traditionalism, accounting for sophistication alters that relationship. Indeed, a
significant priming effect emerges for political novices exposed to the explicit appeal. The
positively signed estimates indicate more favorable evaluations of Hulshof among politically
inattentive explicit ad viewers compared to novice implicit appeal viewers. Although the twoway interaction fails to achieve significance for four evaluations of Hulshof, and in fact
demonstrates a negative relationship for campaign motivation and vote preference, there is
nonetheless suggestive evidence that one’s political sophistication influences religious priming.
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Table 7.2 – Moderating effect of political sophistication on implicit and explicit religious
priming among self-identified Christian students
Effects of Political Sophistication on Implicit and Explicit Religious Priming
Trait
Eval’s
-1.34*
(.52)

General
Eval’s
-1.65*
(.66)

Competency

Affect
-1.20^
(.63)

Campaign
Motivation
.12
(.86)

Candidate
Proximity
-.99
(.66)

-.67
(.56)

-5.15
(6.42)

Traditionalism

-.43
(.43)

-.75
(.55)

-.17
(47)

-.31
(.52)

.04
(.71)

.14
(.54)

-1.43
(5.39)

Sophistication

-.63
(.51)

-1.10^
(.65)

-.54
(.55)

-.37
(.62)

-.56
(.84)

-.45
(.65)

5.30
(7.79)

Ad x
Traditionalism

1.46*
(.63)

1.98*
(.80)

.78
(.69)

1.50^
(.76)

-.18
(1.04)

1.18
(.80)

-7.07
(6.31)

Ad x
Sophistication

1.93**
(.72)

2.14*
(.92)

1.03
(.78)

1.43
(.87)

.47
(1.19)

1.38
(.91)

8.37
(8.90)

Traditionalism x
Sophistication

.71
(.62)

1.44^
(.79)

.68
(.68)

.61
(.75)

.88
(1.03)

.71
(.79)

7.58
(7.68)

Ad x Tradition
x Sophistication

-2.09*
(.88)

-2.60*
(1.12)

-1.15
(.96)

-1.77^
(1.07)

-.42
(1.46)

-1.57
(1.12)

-8.07
(10.91)

Constant

1.11**
(.35)
-

1.29**
(.45)
-

.72^
(.38)
-

88*
(.43)
-

.29
(.59)
-

.40
(.45)
-

-

Ad (Explicit)

Threshold 1
Threshold 2
Threshold 3
Threshold 4

Vote

-4.59
-3.38
-1.32
.50

N
172
172
172
172
172
172
172
R²
.07
.08
.08
.07
.11
.22
Note: Models predicting trait evaluations, general evaluations, competency, affect, motivation, candidate proximity
and vote choice among a student sample. Ad variable is dummy coded with “1” corresponding to the explicit appeal
and “0” indicating the implicit appeal. Cell entries provide unstandardized regression coefficients and standard
errors in parentheses. *p<.05, **p<.01.

Indeed, of particular interest is the three-way, ad x tradition x sophistication interaction,
which speaks to the moderating effects of political sophistication on religious priming. Coding of
the variables dictates that negatively signed estimates indicate sophistication to attenuate
religious priming effects. As is evident, all three-way estimates are negatively signed with three
variables achieving at least modest statistical significance – trait evaluations (β=-2.09, SE= .88,
p<.05), general evaluations (β=-2.60, SE=1.02, p<.05) and affect (β=-1.77, SE= 1.07, p<.10).
125

The consistent pattern of negative findings coupled with significance across three dependent
measures suggests one’s level of political sophistication to attenuate religious priming effects.
Much like exposure to additional secular political information was shown to reduce religious
priming effects in earlier experiments, sophistication appears to produce similar moderating
effects, with greater sophistication associated with less pronounced priming effects.
Moreover, it is important to note significant three-way effects emerge in spite of the
regression models suffering from marked collinearity owing to inclusion of the interaction
variables.43 As collinearity inflates standard errors thereby reducing the likelihood of significant
findings, estimates potentially understate the moderating effects of sophistication on religious
priming. Having stated that, model results nonetheless point toward one’s level of political
sophistication as a consequential factor influencing the extent to which religiosity is drawn on in
the formation of political opinions.
Visualizing the Moderating Effects of Political Sophistication
To further explicate the moderating influence individual political sophistication has on
religious priming effects, Figures 7.4 and 7.5 illustrate the significant effects of sophistication on
trait evaluations of Hulshof. Figure 7.4 presents the effect on trait evaluations across levels of
traditionalism among political novices, while Figure 7.5 illustrates the same effect for political
sophisticates.44 As indicated by the solid “explicit” line in Figure 7.4, traditionalism plays a
pronounced role among political novices exposed to the explicit Hulshof ad. Consistent with
findings of the Saxby Chambliss experiments, exposure to the overt religious appeal activates

43

The three-way interaction for all continuous variables yield tolerance levels of .002 and VIF statistics exceeding
473. VIF values exceeding 10 are commonly recognized as cause for concern regarding multi-collinearity (e.g.
Mason, Guntz & Hest, 1989; Neter, Wasserman & Kutner, 1989).
44
“Novice” effects are based on effects at the 10 th percentile of political sophistication, while “sophisticates” are
effects occurring at the 90th percentile of sophistication. Similarly, traditionalism is noted at the 10 th and 90th
percentile (i.e. Lo and Hi). Both figures represent effects for self-identified Christian students.

126

traditionalism among novices, which subsequently influences evaluations of Hulshof. While
progressive novices rate Hulshof significantly lower in terms of trait evaluations (.54), highly
orthodox novices rate Hulshof much more favorably (.75). Evaluations among novice viewers of
the implicit appeal, however, remain largely stable across levels of traditionalism – slightly
declining from .79 for progressives to .73 for relative fundamentalists.

Trait Evaluation

Trait Evaluations by Traditionalism among Novices
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

Explicit
Implicit

Lo

Hi
Traditionalism

Figure 7.4 – Trait evaluations by traditionalism among political novices
The significant religious priming effects observed among political novices in Figure 7.4,
however, effectively disappear for more politically sophisticated viewers as illustrated in Figure
7.5. Indeed, the effect across ad conditions is inverted. A slight but insignificant rise in
evaluation of Hulshof across traditionalism emerges for politically sophisticated viewers of the
implicit appeal; mean trait evaluations rise from .69 among progressives to .75 for traditionalist
viewers of the implicit appeal. In contrast, a modest but insignificant decline in perceptions of
Hulshof presents among sophisticated participants exposed to the explicit appeal; mean
valuations fall from .81 to .76 across levels of traditionalism. In essence, for political
sophisticates, priming effects are muted, thus suggesting religiosity to play a reduced role in the
formation of political attitudes among the politically astute. Conversely, priming effects are
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pronounced among relative novices exposed to explicit religious appeals. For the politically
inattentive, explicit religious appeals activate existing religious beliefs, which are relied on
heavily to guide evaluations of political candidates.

Trait Evaluations

Trait Evaluations by Traditionalism among Sophisticates
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Figure 7.5 – Trait evaluations by traditionalism among political sophisticates
The finding that religious priming effects are moderated by political sophistication such
that novices appear most susceptible to priming effects is consistent with previous literature (e.g.
Krosnick & Kinder, 1990; Zaller, 1992; Zaller & Feldman, 1992). Krosnick and Kinder (1990)
argue priming effects to be more pronounced among novices due to less complex belief
structures. While sophisticates possess a diverse collection of mental considerations that tends to
mute the effect of a single piece of information, the sparse mental bins of novices make them
more susceptible to priming from exposure to limited information.
Applied to current results, political novices appear to be more reliant on their religious
beliefs once primed by exposure to the explicit religious appeal, while sophisticates likely
formulate opinions of Hulshof based on more diverse criteria, which perhaps includes
predispositions triggered by other ad aspects (e.g. lower taxes, smaller government, etc.). Such
an assumption dovetails with Huber and Lapinski’s (2006) contention that relative sophisticates
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are more likely to rely on existing predispositions relative to novices. A caveat here is current
study results appear to qualify the findings of Huber and Lapinski (2006). While Huber and
Lapinski (2006) find education to significantly moderate racial priming effects, present findings
that sophistication in the form of political attentiveness and knowledge moderates religious
priming effects suggests education simply serves as a proxy for sophistication. As the current
sample lacks educational variance, the finding that sophistication nonetheless attenuates priming
effects implies education as a moderator in other domains may actually be masking another
construct, assuming, of course, general equivalency in religious and racial priming processes.
The Role of Traditionalism and Political Sophistication
While results suggest sophistication to influence reliance on religiosity in forming
political evaluations, it remains unclear if religion is dismissed entirely as a relevant
consideration or if religiosity continues to shape political attitudes. To investigate the extent to
which religiosity remains consequential, I conducted simple slopes analyses examining the effect
of traditionalism at minimum and maximum levels of sophistication in each ad condition.
Results provide mixed evidence of reliance on religiosity as a function of both political
sophistication and ad exposure. While the effect of traditionalism is consistently evident within
the implicit condition at high levels of sophistication, no significant effects emerge among
explicit appeal viewers. Within the implicit appeal condition, traditionalism significantly predicts
general evaluations (β=.68, SE= .26, p<.01), competency (β=.50, SE= .25, p<.05), motivation
(β=.92, SE= .36, p<.05), proximity (β=.85, SE= .27, p<.01) and vote preference (β=6.55,
SE=2.97, p<.05) for Hulshof at high levels of sophistication. Moreover, trait evaluations and
affect, though not statistically significant, are positively signed and approach significance, thus
indicative of the general trend that religiosity continues to exert influence on political evaluations

129

for relative sophisticates. Conversely, no significant effects of traditionalism emerge across
dependent evaluations of Hulshof within the explicit appeal condition. Although six of the seven
outcome measures are positively signed as anticipated, none reach statistical significance.
A mirror image of these effects, however, emerges from simple slopes analyses
conducted at low levels of sophistication. While no significant effects of traditionalism occur at
high levels of sophistication within the explicit appeal, there is marked evidence of reliance on
religiosity among relative novices within the explicit condition. Indeed, traditionalism predicts
trait evaluations (β=1.04, SE= .50, p<.05), general evaluations (β=1.23, SE= .66, p<.10), affect
(β=1.19, SE= .57, p<.05) and candidate proximity (β=1.32, SE= .63, p<.05) for Hulshof at low
levels of political sophistication among explicit appeal viewers. Conversely, and in direct
contrast to effects for sophisticates, religiosity does not significantly predict any dependent
evaluations of Hulshof for relative novices exposed to the implicit appeal.
Results of the simple slopes analyses, thus, paint a conflicting picture of the effect of
religiosity across levels of political sophistication. While novices appear to rely heavily on
religion upon exposure to the explicit appeal, sophisticates do not. Traditionalism, however, is
tightly bound to evaluations among sophisticated viewers of the implicit appeal. The pattern of
effects therefore suggests the explicit appeal to be more effective at tapping religiosity among
relative novices, while the implicit appeal appears effective at reaching more politically astute
viewers. In essence, novices appear to cue on the overt religious messages, yet fail to grasp the
subtle religious associations of the implicit appeal. In contrast, a subtle approach appears to pay
dividends for candidates courting politically astute traditionalists. Such effects speak to the
need for campaign strategists to carefully consider the political sophistication of prospective
voters when crafting campaign communications.
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Backlash Effects – Experimental Procedures Overview
Having demonstrated that exposure to religious appeals primes religiosity resulting in
significant influences in evaluations of political candidates, I conclude formal analysis by
exploring the potential for candidates to experience backlash effects for mounting religious
campaigns. Study results to this point consistently suggest religiosity to be consequential in the
formation of political attitudes, but the presence of additional information, both partisan and nonpartisan, appears to blunt these effects. I therefore return to the effect of information on religious
priming effects by once again borrowing from racial priming literature to explore whether calling
attention to the use of religion in politics as an inappropriate violation of church-state norms
results in declining evaluations of candidates explicitly appealing to religion. In this vein, formal
analysis concludes with an examination of backlash effects emerging from an adversarial
information environment.
Consider, in the domain of racial priming, Mendelberg (2001) argues calling critical
attention to or “calling out” the use of implicit racial appeals serves to blunt the effect of the
appeals as viewers are made aware of the racial content and dismiss the ads as a violation of
racial egalitarian norms. The norm of racial equality has made explicit racial appeals largely
nonexistent, thus calling out racial appeals focuses on implicit appeals. Calling attention to
religious appeals, however, typically results from candidate’s explicit appeals to religion, for
example critical coverage of Rick Perry’s Response (Cominsky, 2011) or the religiosity of
multiple 2012 Republican presidential nominees (e.g. Goldberg, 2011; Lizza, 2011; Wilder,
2011). Indeed, unlike racial priming, it is the explicit use of religion that tends to precipitate
critical news coverage and commentary as opposed to more implicit appeals referencing the prolife position or traditional family values.
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As such, I focus examination on adverse call-out effects as it applies to explicit religious
appeals. I specifically investigate the extent to which calling out the use of explicit religious
appeals effectively blunts priming effects through a two-condition (Call out: Absent, Present),
between-subjects experiment administered to a sample of undergraduate LSU students drawn
from the Manship School of Mass Communication Experimental Subject Pool (N = 183).45
Subjects were presented a brief socio-political pretest identical to that used in Experiments #3
and #4. Following completion of the pretest, participants were assigned to one of two
experimental conditions as described below and instructed they would be viewing a political
campaign advertisement followed by a posttest survey eliciting their opinions of the candidate.
Pretest
As noted above, student participants completed an identical pretest to that employed in
Experiments #3 and #4.46 Consistent with the process detailed in Chapter 6,47 I created an
additive index measure of political sophistication (α=.60) and religious traditionalism (α=.94)
based on pretest responses. Both measures were recoded and scaled from 0 to 1, with 1
indicating greater sophistication and traditionalism respectively.
Stimuli
Upon completion of the pretest, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two
experimental conditions. Participants in the control condition (Call out: Absent) viewed an
explicit religious campaign ad, specifically Ronnie Musgrove’s “Choir Practice” ad described
below, while subjects in the treatment condition (Call out: Present) viewed the identical ad
followed by a second advertisement critical of religion in politics, specifically the “Democracy

45

The experiment was fielded from November 20-December 2, 2011, using the online survey provider Qualtrics.
See Appendix Survey Instrument #3 for complete questionnaires and precise question wording.
47
See discussion of pretest measures of Experiment #3 in Chapter 6 for more detail on creation of index variables.
46
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Not Theocracy” ad aired by First Freedom First in 2008. The follow-up advertisement thus
served to “call out” the use of religious appeals in political campaigns.
Ronnie Musgrove’s “Choir Practice” ad was selected as the religious campaign appeal
presented to both conditions given its particularly overt religious nature.48 The YouTube ad was
created by the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee and released in April of 2008 on
behalf of Musgrove’s U.S. Senate campaign in Mississippi. The minute-long ad follows
Musgrove at choir practice at the First Baptist Church of Jackson and includes repeated
statements by Musgrove extolling his views on
Christ and responsibilities of Christians (see
Figure 7.6). Interestingly, the ad was inexplicably
taken off YouTube shortly after its release, which
suggests the candidate’s campaign was

Figure 7.6 – Musgrove “Choir Practice” ad

uncomfortable with the overt religious theme of the ad and feared potential voter backlash.49 A
situation, if true, that makes for a compelling case to examine potential backlash effects
associated with the appeal. Subjects in the first condition (Call out: Absent) thus viewed the
Choir Practice ad as it aired with the only modification a minor edit to remove the partisan cue
identifying the ad sponsor in the last frame. The partisan cue was removed to minimize the
potential influence of partisan predispositions on evaluations of Musgrove. Save for the subtle
edit, the ad was presented as it originally appeared on YouTube.
Participants in the treatment condition (Call out: Present) viewed the identical Musgrove
ad immediately followed by the “Democracy Not Theocracy” ad aired in the 2008 election cycle

48

Ad copy is provided in the appendix. Additionally, the “Choir Practice” ad is available for viewing in its original
form at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ONQDwCzTzPU&feature=related.
49
In spite of being pulled, the ad remains available and was mentioned in political coverage of the race by local
news organizations such as The Commercial Appeal (Sullivan, 2008) and NPR (Elliot, 2008).
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by First Freedom First, a partnership of The Interfaith Alliance Foundation and Americans
United for Separation of Church and State (see Figure 7.7).50 First Freedom First was
specifically organized to call attention to the growing role of religion in politics, and during the
2008 election cycle, the organization released multiple advertisements critical of the mixing of
religion in politics. Hence, the roughly oneminute “Democracy Not Theocracy” ad presented
an ideal counter-appeal – in identical length and
media format – to rebut the use of explicit
religious appeals such as the Choir Practice ad.
Figure 7.7 – “Democracy Not Theocracy” ad

Posttest

Upon viewing the ad(s), subjects completed the same posttest as used in Experiments #3
and #4 with only minor modification to questions to account for a different candidate.51
Consistent with earlier procedures, I created additive indices for trait evaluations (α =.90),
general evaluations (r =.88), competency (α =.85), affect (α =.85), motivation (r =.70) and
candidate proximity (r = .71).52 In addition, the categorical vote preference measure is
examined. Consistent with previous analyses, all posttest variables were rescaled from 0 to 1,
with 1 indicating more positive evaluations of the candidate – in this case Ronnie Musgrove.
Calling out the use of Religious Appeals
To test whether exposure to the critical advertisement effectively blunts religious priming
effects resulting from the Choir Practice ad, I conducted a series of basic regression models
wherein I regressed each dependent variable on a dummy variable corresponding to ad condition

50

“Democracy not Theocracy” ad copy is provided in the appendix. The ad is also available for viewing in its
original form at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZpmq0nz7pY.
51
See Appendix Survey Instrument #3 for complete posttest questionnaire and question wording.
52
See Chapter 6 – Posttest for more detail on the creation of posttest index variables.
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exposure (0 for No call out, 1 for Call out), religious traditionalism and the interaction of the ad
condition and traditionalism, ad x traditionalism. The results of these models are presented in
Table 7.3 below. Cell entries provide OLS estimates and standard errors for the first six
dependent measures and ordinal regression estimates for vote preference.
If exposure to the ad critical of religion in politics reduces religious priming effects
relative to the Choir Practice ad, coding of the variables dictates we should observe negatively
signed estimates of the two-way, ad x traditionalism interaction. Negatively signed estimates
would indicate exposure to the Choir Practice ad followed by the Democracy Not Theocracy ad
results in a reduction in the effect of religiosity to influence evaluations of Musgrove. Recall,
however, hypothesized expectations suggest calling out the use of religious appeals in political
campaigns will not significantly attenuate priming effects owing to social acceptability of
religion in society and politics. Hence, we should observe no significant effect of exposure to
the critical advertisement.
As anticipated, no significant effect emerges for any of the seven dependent measures of
Musgrove among participants in the treatment condition as represented by the two-way estimates
across models. Moreover, only two of seven estimates – trait evaluations and competency – are
negatively signed and thus indicative of attenuation effects, and both estimates produce relatively
small effects.53 Given such inconsistent, modest effects, experimental results provide little
evidence that “calling out” the use of religion in politics, at least as operationalized in the current
study, produces notable adverse consequences for candidates mounting explicit religious appeals.
What is evident based on results in Table 7.3, however, is a profound and uniform effect
of religiosity on evaluations of Musgrove among viewers in the control (no call out) condition.
53

A power analysis using G*Power (Faul et al., 2009) on the effect size for competency reveals approximately 7,000
subjects per condition would be required to achieve statistical significance at p<.05 – a figure that would
simultaneously yield significant positive effects of the call out for candidate proximity, for example.
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The traditionalism estimates, which are uniformly significant across all evaluative dimensions of
Musgrove, capture the effect of religiosity among participants only exposed to the Choir Practice
ad. In effect, exposure to the explicit Choir Practice ad activates traditionalism, which
subsequently influences evaluations of Musgrove. Participants embracing more orthodox
religious beliefs evaluate Musgrove much more favorably upon exposure to the overt appeal.
Table 7.3 – Call-out effects on religious priming among self-identified Christian students
Call-out Effects on Religious Priming
Trait
Evaluations
.19
(.14)

General
Evaluations
-.04
(.18)

Competency

Affect

.04
(.16)

Traditionalism

.43**
(.13)

.47**
(.16)

Ad x
Traditionalism

-.19
(.17)

Constant

.31**
(.10)
-

Ad (Call-out)

Threshold 1
Threshold 2
Threshold 3
Threshold 4

.01
(.16)

Campaign
Motivation
-.07
(.19)

Candidate
Proximity
-.07
(.16)

Vote
-1.79
(1.53)

.41**
(.15)

.45**
(.15)

.58**
(.17)

.63**
(.15)

2.78*
(1.40)

.03
(.22)

-.06
(.19)

.01
(.20)

.04
(.23)

.08
(.20)

2.31
(1.87)

.25^
(.13)
-

.18
(.11)
-

.26*
(.12)
-

-.10
(.14)
-

.04
(.12)
-

.49
1.61
3.65
5.06

N
165
165
165
165
165
165
165
R²
.11
.11
.09
.12
.15
.23
Note: Models predicting trait evaluations, general evaluations, competency, affect, motivation, candidate proximity
and vote choice among a student sample. Ad variable is dummy coded with “1” corresponding to the call out and
“0” indicating no call out. Cell entries provide unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in
parentheses. *p<.05, **p<.01.

Not surprisingly given the strength and uniformity of the effect of religiosity in the
control condition, results from a simple slopes analysis conducted among viewers of the appeal
followed by the critical ad (i.e. call out condition) demonstrates similarly pronounced effects for
traditionalism. Indeed, traditionalism proves highly significant for every evaluative measure of
Musgrove in the call out condition as well. In essence, the Choir Practice ad viewed in isolation
or in conjunction with the ad critical of religion in politics activates traditionalism resulting in
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significant influences on opinions of Musgrove among study participants. Calling out the use of
religious appeals as a violation of church-state norms fails to blunt religious priming effects.
There is no significant adverse effect of exposure to the critical call out on evaluations of
Musgrove relative to the perceptions of Musgrove among viewers of only the Choir Practice ad.
Having stated that, a comparison of the ads used across experiments in terms of mean
evaluations for all available dependent measures reveals exposure to the Choir Practice ad to
produce lower evaluations relative to any other religious appeal analyzed.54 On every dependent
measure, viewers of the Choir Practice ad as a whole rate Musgrove less favorably than
participants exposed to any of the other religious appeals. Both adult and student participants
presented the original Chambliss “Values” ad rate Chambliss far more favorably. Similarly,
viewers of the non-partisan Harper “Hope” ad and viewers of the implicit and explicit Hulshof
“Values” ads rate each candidate in much more positive terms than viewers of the Choir Practice
ad rate Ronnie Musgrove. Simply put, the Choir Practice ad appears less effective in terms of
overall evaluations relative to the other ads, which perhaps speaks to it being taken down shortly
after placed on YouTube. Although the ad produces pronounced priming effects in resonating
with traditionalists, it is possible the overt religious nature of the appeal turns off viewers in
general. It also should be noted that the Musgrove ad fails to address any political issues, which
stands in contrast to the other ads, especially the Chambliss and Hulshof ads. Thus, it is possible
the lack of substantive political information likewise renders the Choir Practice ad less effective.
Considering Political Sophistication as a Moderator of Backlash Effects
As political sophistication was shown to moderate priming effects upon exposure to
implicit and explicit religious appeals, I similarly consider the potential of political sophistication

54

Mean evaluations across all participants in each study were compared for each dependent variable. The partisan
Harper appeals were excluded given the influence of partisan predispositions on candidate evaluations.
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to moderate the effect of exposure to the adversarial information environment represented by the
ad critical of religion in politics. I do so by extending regression models to include political
sophistication and corresponding interactions. Specifically, I regress each dependent variable on
a dummy variable corresponding to ad condition exposure (0 for No call out, 1 for Call out),
religious traditionalism, sophistication and the three-way interaction, ad x tradition x
sophistication as well as all lower order interactions. Results of these models are displayed in
Table 7.4 below. Cell entries provide OLS estimates and standard errors for the first six
dependent variables and ordinal estimates for the ordinal vote preference measure.
Accounting for the influence of political sophistication on religious priming effects alters
the manner in which exposure to the call out advertisement affects viewers’ evaluations of
Musgrove. Recall the base regression models above found no consistent effect of exposure to
the call out relative to the control condition as a function of one’s religiosity. Incorporating the
influence of political sophistication, however, changes that relationship. The two-way, ad x
traditionalism estimates are consistently positive once sophistication is included in the model.
Although none of the estimates reach statistical significance, the consistent trend points toward
activation of traditionalism at low levels of sophistication upon exposure to the call out.
Of particular interest, however, are the three-way estimates, which represent the potential
moderating influence of political sophistication on religious priming brought about by exposure
to the treatment condition. As is evident, all three-way estimates are consistently negative
indicating a general trend toward sophistication attenuating priming effects. None of the
estimates, though, rise to the level of statistical significance. As with the three-way implicit
models discussed above, however, the current model similarly suffers from marked collinearity55

55

The three-way interaction for all continuous variables yield tolerance levels of .002 and VIF statistics exceeding
450 – levels that suggest multi-collinearity is likely influencing model estimates.
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brought about by inclusion of the interaction variables. Thus, consideration should also be given
the consistent negative effect in lieu of focusing solely on statistical significance. From such a
perspective, the overall negative findings of the three-way interaction point toward higher levels
of sophistication muting priming effects emerging from exposure to the treatment condition.
Table 7.4 – The effects of political sophistication on calling out religious appeals among selfidentified Christian students
Effects of Political Sophistication on Calling out Religious Appeals
Trait
Eval’s
-.27
(.54)

General
Eval’s
-.54
(.70)

Competency

Affect
-.64
(.62)

Campaign
Motivation
-.84
(.74)

Candidate
Proximity
-.27
(.63)

.57
(.60)

-8.93
(6.11)

Traditionalism

-.53
(.49)

-.60
(.63)

-.91^
(.55)

-1.04^
(.57)

-.23
(.67)

-.31
(.58)

-8.83
(5.49)

Sophistication

-1.02^
(.58)

-1.19
(.74)

-1.56*
(.64)

-1.60*
(.66)

-1.16
(.79)

-.98
(.68)

-13.87*
(6.51)

Ad x
Traditionalism

.59
(.66)

.89
(.85)

.95
(.74)

1.17
(.76)

.93
(.91)

.59
(.78)

12.30
(7.46)

Ad x
Sophistication

.69
(.81)

.74
(1.04)

.91
(.90)

.95
(.93)

1.19
(1.10)

.27
(.95)

10.30
(9.33)

Traditionalism x
Sophistication

1.44*
(.72)

1.61
(.93)

2.00*
(.81)

2.24**
(.83)

1.25
(.99)

1.41^
(.85)

17.25*
(8.13)

Ad x Tradition
x Sophistication

-1.15
(.99)

-1.30
(1.27)

-1.52
(1.10)

-1.74
(1.13)

-1.37
(1.34)

-.75
(1.15)

-14.52
(11.31)

Constant

.98*
(.39)

1.03*
(.50)

1.20**
(.44)

1.32**
(.45)

.65
(.53)

.70
(.46)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-8.85
-7.70
-5.61
-4.19

Ad (Call-out)

Threshold 1
Threshold 2
Threshold 3
Threshold 4

Vote

N
165
165
165
165
165
165
165
R²
.14
.14
.15
.19
.17
.26
Note: Models predicting trait evaluations, general evaluations, competency, affect, motivation, candidate proximity
and vote choice among a student sample. Ad variable is dummy coded with “1” corresponding to the call out
condition and “0” indicating no call out condition. Cell entries provide unstandardized regression coefficients and
standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05, **p<.01.

Conclusion
Transitioning from the influence of various information environments on religious
priming effects, the first part of Chapter 7 explored differential priming effects between implicit
139

and explicit appeals based on theoretical expectations derived from racial priming literature (e.g.
Mendelberg, 2001; Huber & Lapinski, 2006). In a novel experiment testing exposure effects to
an explicit religious appeal versus a subtle, non-religious campaign spot espousing a pro-life
position and advocating traditional family values, results demonstrate both appeals promote
candidate evaluation in terms of individual religiosity. Consistent with expectations (H4), the
implicit appeal was as effective as the explicit version in activating religious traditionalism
resulting in orthodox participants evaluating the ad-sponsored candidate much more favorably.
Hence, candidates can effectively communicate with prospective voters through subtle methods
without appearing overly religious and risking critical news coverage (Kuo, 2006).
The finding that implicit appeals are effective in activating religious considerations
dovetails with prior research in other domains (e.g. Mendelberg, 2001; Valentino et al., 2002).
At the same time, research has also shown priming effects, including those effects arising from
implicit appeals, to be moderated by education and or political sophistication (e.g. Huber &
Lapinski, 2006; Zaller, 1992; Zaller & Feldman, 1992). To that end, further analyses conducted
on the current data demonstrate a modest effect of political sophistication to attenuate religious
priming. Once these effects are parsed, evidence emerges that novices appear to be more reliant
on religious beliefs upon exposure to the explicit appeal, yet fail to grasp the subtleties associated
with the subtle, implicit advertisement. In contrast, the effect of traditionalism on subsequent
candidate evaluations is pronounced among sophisticated viewers of the implicit appeal, thus
suggesting the implicit appeal to effectively resonate with more politically astute voters.
Such findings are congruent with scholars arguing priming to be more pronounced among
relative novices owing to less complex belief structures (e.g. Krosnick and Kinder, 1990) as well
as academics proposing priming effects to be pronounced among sophisticates owing to more
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integrated schemata necessary for priming connections to occur (e.g. Krosnick & Brannon,
1993). While current findings of priming effects for novices in the explicit condition speak to
the former position, the ability of a subtle, implicit appeal to resonate with relative sophisticates
buttresses the later view. Both findings, however, illustrate the importance of political
sophistication in considering the effects of religious appeals on potential voters. From the
strategist’s perspective, employment of explicit appeals appears advantageous to court politically
inattentive religious voters, while a more implicit communication strategy is likely to resonate
with more astute traditionalists.
Following examination of differential effects born of implicit and explicit appeals, the
chapter concluded with a return to information effects, specifically as it pertains to the potential
of adversarial information environments critical of religion in politics to foster a backlash effect.
Experimental results provide little evidence exposure to information critical of religion in politics
adversely affects candidate evaluations or attenuates priming effects. Though a candidate may
experience lower evaluations among religious progressives as exposure to a religious appeal
promotes evaluation on the basis of religious beliefs more generally, there is little evidence
adversarial information exacerbates negative evaluations or reduces more favorable candidate
evaluations among religiously orthodox individuals. Religious traditionalism was activated
among viewers of the overt religious appeal as well as viewers of the appeal followed by critical
information with no noticeable reduction in evaluation among treatment participants. Consistent
with hypothesized expectations (H5), calling out the use of religion in politics does not appear to
promote backlash effects – at least as operationalized in the current study.
The durability of religious priming in the face of a seemingly persuasive appeal critical of
the role of religion in politics likely speaks to the social acceptability of religion in greater
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society. In contrast to racial priming where the norm of racial egalitarianism powerfully
influences individual attitude formation such that calling out implicit racial appeals blunts
priming effects, the pervasive socialization of Americans to religion likely mitigates the ability
of adversarial information to attenuate religious priming effects. A caveat here is that calling out
racial priming focuses on implicit appeals, as individuals automatically dismiss explicit racial
appeals as a violation of egalitarian norms, while implicit appeals potentially activate latent
racial attitudes beyond awareness (Mendelberg, 2001). Hence, it is possible calling out implicit
religious appeals may yield demonstrable moderating effects. As noted above, however, critical
commentary on the strategic use of religion by political elites typically emerges from rather
overt, explicit communication as opposed to appeals to political positions that happen to
tangentially activate religiosity.
Moreover, it should be noted the current experiment focuses solely on call-out effects
resulting from the presence of information critical of religion in politics. Although the focus and
operationalization of call-out effects in this regard is reasonable in light of the general lack of
extant research exploring religious backlash effects as well as prominent critical news coverage
focusing on the religiosity of political elites, the possibility exists of alternative call-out effects.
Consider, given the pervasive socialization of many with religion, one questions whether call-out
effects may result from candidates or organizations openly criticizing a politician’s lack of
religiosity. That is, do candidates suffer adverse effects from being characterized as
nonreligious? In a similar vein, do candidates suffer backlash effects for not engaging in
religious rhetoric in the context of their own campaign? A Pew Research poll conducted during
the 2008 presidential campaign found 61% of respondents stating they would be less likely to
support a candidate that does not believe in God (Pew, 2007). Such statistics give rise to the
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possibility candidates may suffer negative effects for being perceived as insufficiently religious.
Thus, future research should consider designs that account for alternative backlash effects.
At the same time, however, scholars should not entirely dismiss the possibility of adverse
effects resulting from media coverage critical of a candidate’s use of religion for political gain.
Although the current experimental design produced little evidence of adverse effects for a
candidate’s religious appeal, it is possible an alternative experimental design may prove more
effective at unearthing potential moderating effects of calling attention to the use of religion by
politicians. Whereas the current design relied on an oblique advertisement critical of the
increasing mix of religion in politics more generally, it is conceivable a more direct stimulus
specifically referencing the candidate and their statements may prove more efficacious in terms
of observing any attenuating effects of critical attention on priming.
Possible design inadequacies aside, however, current study results nonetheless illustrate
the durability of religiosity in political evaluations. Consistent with results elaborated on in
previous chapters, present findings continue to demonstrate the influential role of religion in
politics.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
Overview
It has been nearly two centuries since Alexis de Tocqueville keenly observed the
interdependent relationship between religion and American democracy. Pundits and academics
alike have expounded on the bond forged of religion and politics since. The last three decades,
however, have witnessed marked growth in scholarship acknowledging the centrality of religion
in politics with particular emphasis given the effects of religion on public opinion (see e.g. Gold
& Russell, 2007; Hammond et al, 1994; Hunter, 1991; Layman, 2001; Layman & Carmines,
1997; Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Wuthnow, 1988). In spite of a corpus of work focusing on
myriad aspects of religion in American politics, there remains a lack of research examining the
consequences of religious communication in political campaigns.
The current study attempts to fill this void through an empirical exploration of the effects
of religious campaign appeals on prospective voters. Drawing on an array of academic literature,
this interdisciplinary investigation develops a theoretical framework and subsequent expectations
as to how religious appeals are likely to activate individual religiosity thereby influencing the
formation of political attitudes. Hypothesized expectations are then tested through a series of
controlled media priming experiments administered to college student samples and a
representative cross-section of adults throughout the United States. While the first set of
experiments focuses on the consequences of religious appeals in variable information
environments, later experiments examine priming effects as a function of appeal type (i.e.
implicit and explicit appeals) as well as the potential for candidates mounting religious
campaigns to experience backlash effects among viewers exposed to media coverage critical of
elites mixing religion in politics.
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Key Findings and Limitations
Consistent with hypothesized expectations, initial priming experiments drawn on a
college student sample and a national cross-section of adults demonstrate that exposure to
religious appeals activates religiosity in low-information environments leading to significant
shifts in evaluations of political candidates. Absent existing knowledge of a candidate, student
and adult viewers alike, when presented a solitary religious campaign appeal, cue on the
religious components in the ad and subsequently evaluate the candidate in keeping with their
religious views. More specifically, and consistent with the culture wars literature (Hunter, 1991;
Layman, 2001; Wuthnow, 1988), priming effects are shown to be most pronounced based on
religious traditionalism – that is, one’s religious beliefs relative to religious commitment or
affiliation with a particular religious tradition or denomination. Those individuals holding more
orthodox religious beliefs become significantly more likely to evaluate a candidate favorably
following exposure to an appeal incorporating religious cues.
Further parsing of priming effects through conditional effects analyses, however,
demonstrate modest differences between student and adult experimental participants. While both
age groups demonstrate significant priming effects such that exposure to religious cues results in
the activation of religious traditionalism thereby leading to significant changes in candidate
evaluations, subtle differences emerge in the locus of religious effects. Exposure to religious
cues appears to be more consequential for students at lower levels of traditionalism as evidenced
by relative progressives adversely evaluating an ad-sponsored candidate. In contrast, priming
effects are more pronounced at higher levels of traditionalism among adults in a nationally
representative sample. In essence, for adults, a disproportionate effect occurs among religious
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traditionalists as they become far more favorable toward a candidate, while greater priming
effects emerge among religiously progressive students resulting in less favorable evaluations.
When these models are expanded to account for exposure to additional, non-partisan
candidate information, religious priming effects among students and adults are reduced. That is,
when individuals possess more political knowledge about a candidate prior to viewing a religious
campaign appeal, they become less reliant on religious traditionalism in formulating evaluations
of a candidate. Confirming hypothesized expectations, relatively complex information
environments effectively attenuate religious priming effects, thus suggesting religion to become
less applicable in the face of increasingly diverse, secular political information.
It is important to note, however, the presence of additional secular information does not
completely displace religious evaluation; rather, it merely diminishes reliance on religion.
Traditionalism continues to exert a significant influence on the formation of political attitudes
regardless of information environment complexity. Simply put, religion remains a consequential
consideration in the minds of voters upon exposure to ads incorporating religious themes and
imagery. Nevertheless, results speak to the fact that potential voters are cognizant of competing
considerations when provided additional politically relevant campaign information. Far from
formulating decisions based solely on their particular religious beliefs, individuals thoughtfully
weigh competing religious and political considerations when evaluating political candidates.
Such findings reinforce the beneficial aspects of competitive campaigns offering more
substantive information environments (Kahn & Kenney, 1999).
Similar to the attenuation effects of additional non-partisan political information,
exposure to partisan cues in religious campaign advertisements likewise alters voter calculus by
reducing reliance on religion. As anticipated, exposure to a religious appeal absent any partisan
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cue results in a robust relationship between religiosity and subsequent posttest political
evaluations. The inclusion of partisan cues in religious campaign appeals, however,
simultaneously reduces the impact of religiosity on evaluations while strengthening partisanbased evaluations. In essence, the presence of partisan cues serves to activate existing political
predispositions thereby promoting partisan priming at the expense of religious priming.
The finding that religious evaluation is influenced by exposure to partisan cues is
congruent with a wealth of research that has consistently demonstrated the powerful effect one’s
partisan preferences exert on political behavior (e.g. Campbell et al, 1960; Downs, 1957; Nie et
al, 1976; Popkin, 1991; Lewis-Beck et al, 2008). In spite of the reduction in religious-based
evaluation brought about by exposure to partisan cues, religious beliefs nonetheless remain
consequential in shaping political attitudes. As demonstrated, religious traditionalism
significantly influenced the perceptions held by self-identified Republicans of a Democratic
candidate such that those embracing more orthodox beliefs responded more favorably than selfidentified Democrats. Indeed, religiously traditional Republicans even responded they would be
more likely to actively campaign for a Democratic candidate upon exposure to an appeal
presenting a candidate in a religious light. Hence, one’s religiosity plays a potent role in shaping
political attitudes even in the presence of an influential, incongruent partisan prime.
As results clearly demonstrate, religiosity heavily influences prospective voters’
perceptions of political figures. At the same time, study findings illustrate these effects become
modified in differing information environments. Thus, the environment in which religious
appeals are deployed is a critical factor in determining their relative effect on voters. Additional
information, be it partisan or non-partisan, influences individual reliance on religion as a
consideration in the development of political decisions.
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Transitioning away from the consequential role of information environments to influence
the manner in which religious appeals resonate with particular voters, the study additionally
examined the relative effectiveness of alternative appeal types. Relying heavily on racial
priming literature (Mendelberg, 1997, 2001; Huber & Lapinski, 2006), theoretical expectations
were developed suggesting implicit and explicit appeals to be equally effective in activating
religious traditionalism. Such expectations, as noted, run counter to theories of racial priming,
principally owing to the social acceptance of religion. As anticipated, both implicit and explicit
appeals prime religious traditionalism culminating in significant effects on candidate evaluations.
Hence, candidates, to the extent they draw on issues wedded to religion, can effectively activate
the religious beliefs of prospective voters without overtly referencing religion, and thereby risk
alienating voters or generating critical press coverage (Domke & Coe, 2008; Kuo, 2006).
Further explication of these effects suggests political sophistication to moderate the
manner in which implicit and explicit appeals resonate with voters. While explicit appeals appear
more consequential in shaping the perceptions of political novices, implicit appeals activate
traditionalism among political sophisticates. The influential nature of overt appeals to prime the
politically inattentive dovetails with research suggesting novices to be more susceptible to
priming effects (e.g. Krosnick & Kinder, 1990). Likewise, activation of traditionalism among
relative sophisticates speaks to more integrated schemata capable of connecting policy positions
of the implicit appeal with religious stances (Krosnick & Brannon, 1993). Much like
information environments influence the effect of religious appeals on potential voters, the
personal characteristics of individuals in terms of interest in and knowledge of politics likewise
appear to shape the manner in which appeals resonate with one’s religious beliefs.
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Returning to the effect of information environments on priming effects, formal analysis
concluded with an examination of possible backlash effects by exploring whether candidates are
adversely affected by media coverage critical of the presence of religion in politics. Once again,
given the socialization of many voters with religion, expectations suggested little likelihood of
backlash effects for candidates mounting religious campaigns. As expected, exposure to a
critical advertisement of the influence of religion in politics produced no significant adverse
effects among individuals first exposed to a candidate’s explicit religious appeal. Candidates do
not suffer a significant decline in evaluations when being “called out” for employing a religious
strategy – at least as demonstrated by experimental designs employed in the current study.
Indeed, social acceptance of religion in American society appears to insulate candidates from
suffering backlash effects for being called out for advancing religious themes. Results in this
regard tend to validate the observation of scholars in noting some of the most successful
politicians in recent years, especially in presidential politics, have not coincidentally been some
of the most effective and overt communicators of religious messaging (Domke & Coe, 2008).
As study findings make clear, one’s religion plays a critical role in shaping how
prospective voters evaluate political figures. Specifically, religious beliefs emerge as the most
diagnostic dimension by which religious appeals resonate with individuals. It is consistently the
case, across multiple advertisements analyzed, that exposure to religious appeals activates
traditionalism, and those participants embracing more orthodox beliefs respond by evaluating
candidates in significantly more favorable terms relative to individuals embracing religiously
progressive doctrine. While these effects are attenuated in more complex partisan and nonpartisan environments, religiosity continues to exert a marked influence on the formation of
political attitudes.
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As noted, study results further confirm the ability of candidates to speak to potential
voters through both implicit and explicit methods. Indeed, candidates need not overtly reference
religion to communicate with religious voters. Rather, by appealing to issues that have become
effectively wedded to religious positions, candidates can craft messages that resonate with
individuals without having to formally espouse religious themes or imagery.
Taken as a whole, the study speaks to the consequential nature of religion in politics,
especially the deeply personal, yet influential role religion plays in informing the political
attitudes of many individuals. At the same time, the study illustrates the influential role of media
in politics, for it is through agents of media that politics is communicated. Consistent with a
corpus of literature, study results, yet again, paint a persuasive picture of the power of political
priming (see Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 2007 for extensive review). Just as scholars have noted the
ability of news coverage to influence individual perceptions of political figures (e.g. Goidel et
al., 1997; Hetherington, 1996; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987), the current study extends priming to
religious campaign communication in confirming the ability of religiously-infused campaign
appeals to significantly influence the perceptions voters hold of prospective candidates.
Such findings, however, should be considered in light of study limitations. While results
provide compelling evidence of priming effects and the influential role of religious appeals on
prospective voters, the experimental nature of the studies necessarily limits generalizability.
Indeed, the experimental designs carried out in both a sterile media effects lab and through
online survey providers potentially introduce ecological bias owing to the artificial environments
in which participants viewed stimuli and completed questionnaires. Moreover, the studies make
use of college student samples, which, as noted, have been criticized for producing spurious
results relative to research drawn on representative adult samples (Sears, 1986).
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Having stated these concerns, it is important to note the study additionally incorporates a
nationally representative sample of U.S. adults. The fact religious priming effects emerge within
student and adult samples lends validity to the overall effects likely to be observed in the
electorate at large. In contrast to previous research exploring the effects of religious messaging
(Calfano & Djupe, 2009), the study intentionally employs political advertisements deployed in
actual campaigns to more accurately reflect the content and manner of religious messaging
presented potential voters . In spite of such efforts to improve external validity, caution should
nonetheless be observed in extrapolating effects to all voters. Although the experiments provide
valuable insight into effects resulting from exposure to religious appeals, further research as
described below should be undertaken to more fully explicate the influence of religious
messaging in political campaigns.
Contributions and Future Research
Limitations aside, however, the current study offers important contributions to advancing
understanding of the role of religion in modern American political campaigns. It does so by
providing empirical data to both confirm and qualify popular conceptions of how religion affects
potential voters. Moreover, study results simultaneously provide practical insight into the use of
religious appeals as a campaign strategy.
Scholars and pundits alike have long argued political elites have benefitted through
communicating targeted messages at religious voters, particularly Christian evangelicals (e.g.
Domke & Coe, 2008; Kuo, 2006), yet surprisingly little research has empirically examined that
proposition (but see Calfano & Djupe, 2009; Weber & Thornton, 2012). The current study,
however, provides empirical data to buttress that argument. Indeed, experimental results across
student and adult samples alike confirm the ability of religious appeals, even subtle implicit
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appeals, to significantly influence evaluations of political figures. Results clearly and
consistently substantiate that the manner and content of religious political messaging is critical to
the formation of political attitudes. Moreover, these results are bolstered by confirmation across
a national cross section of U.S. adults based on effects originating from “real world”
advertisements previously deployed in actual political campaigns.
Further, from the standpoint of political campaigns, results offer insight for campaign
strategists considering the deployment of religious appeals. As noted, caution should be taken in
overstating the significance of experimental results. Having stated that, study findings suggest
limited downside to mounting religious appeals, especially among adult Christian voters. While
results of the Saxby Chambliss experiments suggest a general roll off of support for Chambliss
among college participants, a net positive effect emerged among adult subjects exposed to
religious appeals. Hence, candidates and their campaigns would seemingly benefit from a dual
strategy of foregoing religious appeals among younger constituents, while simultaneously
courting older Christian voters through religious messaging.
Study findings likewise speak to the relative benefits of implicit and explicit messaging.
Although both implicit and explicit appeals resonate with self-identified Christians, implicit
messaging appears more effective at reaching political sophisticates. Explicit messaging,
however, more effectively resonates with relative novices. Thus, to the extent a voting public is
comprised of more politically attentive voters, candidates would be well advised to consider
more implicit communication. Conversely, campaigns operating in low-information
environments and catering to less politically sophisticated constituencies should thoughtfully
weigh the benefits of more explicit messaging.
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Beyond empirically confirming the ability of religious messaging to resonate with
religious individuals and informing campaign strategy, the study additionally contributes to a
better understanding of how one’s religious beliefs influence the formation of political attitudes
and how information environments subsequently alter reliance on religion. Although popular
media accounts often conceive of voters in rather monolithic terms such as the “female vote,”
“Hispanic vote” or “religious vote,” – as if all voted in lockstep – study results paint a much
more nuanced picture of religion and its influence on voters. Indeed, far from uniformity, study
results demonstrate stark differences in how religious appeals resonate with voters based on their
particular religious beliefs. While there is a tendency for exposure to religious appeals to result
in modestly lower evaluations among religious progressives, there is a concomitant effect among
relatively orthodox viewers yielding far more favorable candidate evaluations.
At the same time, results based on manipulations of information environments illustrate
that religious individuals thoughtfully consider alternative politically relevant information when
forming political evaluations. While religion remains an important consideration in the calculus
of religious voters, complex information environments presenting additional political
information, be it of a partisan or non-partisan nature, appear to promote decreased reliance on
individual religious beliefs and proportionately greater reliance on other political considerations.
Such a shift in reliance on alternative considerations speaks to the possibility of
underlying applicability effects driving the priming process. While the current study advances
priming literature through its extension of priming to religious campaign communications,
additional research should consider further explication of the psychological process underpinning
priming, especially in light of current study findings. Indeed, project findings hint that religious
priming may be, to a great extent, a function of applicability as opposed to accessibility effects.
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Priming effects have traditionally been explained in terms of construct accessibility, the
process by which recently activated constructs become more likely to move from long-term to
working memory and thus accessible for evaluation (Domke, Shah & Wackman, 1998; Iyengar
& Kinder 1987; Zaller, 1992). Current results, however, simultaneously suggest the presence of
applicability effects, which speak to the relationship, or fit, between the characteristics of
accessible constructs and stimulus features (Althaus & Mie Kim, 2006; Higgins, 1989; Higgins
& Chaires, 1980). Mental constructs demonstrating a better fit and thus deemed more
appropriate in a particular context are more likely to be relied on in evaluation (Higgins, 1996).
Consider, in low information conditions absent diverse political information, voters rely
heavily on their religious beliefs upon exposure to religious appeals. The significant moderating
effects of relatively complex information environments, however, suggest individuals deem
religious beliefs less applicable as an evaluative standard for prospective candidates when
presented alternative political information. Such findings call for further examination of the
psychological antecedents of religious priming effects. Indeed, although the current study
importantly extends research into priming with its focus on the consequences of religious
appeals, additional exploration of underlying psychological determinants would be helpful in
simultaneously promoting greater understanding of the influence of religious communication on
voter behavior and the priming process in general.
Beyond exploration of the psychological mechanisms underpinning religious priming,
results additionally call for further examination of priming effects in alternative information
environments. While the current study focuses on information environments characterized by
additional non-partisan candidate information as well as general partisan cues, it remains unclear
how religious appeals resonate in other environments, particularly competitive information
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environments. As candidates typically face opposition, one questions how contrasting
information from an opposing candidate may influence the effect of religious appeals on
prospective voters.
Similarly, as elections, and particularly competitive campaigns, are newsworthy events,
further examination of news environments would be beneficial in understanding how religion
operates in political campaigns. Does news coverage of the deployment of religious appeals and
the use of religion in campaigns impact the effectiveness of religious messaging? The
introduction of this dissertation referenced earned media coverage former Arkansas Governor
Mike Huckabee received after airing his “Believe” ad in the 2008 Iowa caucus, which seemingly
aided the relatively underfunded candidate in courting Iowa Republican voters, many of whom
self identified as Christian evangelicals (Langer, 2008; Luo, 2007; Parker, 2007).
At the same time, political elites “narrowcast” religious messaging in part to avoid
generating critical news coverage (Kuo, 2006). Indeed, as noted above, multiple Republican
candidates in the recent 2012 GOP primary campaign were the subject of critical news coverage
regarding their religious beliefs (e.g. Goldberg, 2011; Lizza, 2011; Wilder, 2011). Hence,
additional research into news coverage of religion in campaigns would help shed light on how
such coverage influences voters. Although experimental results in the current study found no
adverse effects brought about by exposure to an advertisement critical of religion in politics more
generally, it remains to be seen how news coverage may influence potential voters.
Moreover, and as noted in the discussion of Chapter 7, additional research should be
undertaken to examine alternative call-out or backlash effects. While the current study focused
on potential adverse effects emerging from exposure to critical coverage of religion in politics
more generally, it is plausible alternative effects may emerge from candidates being portrayed as
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insufficiently religious. Conversely, it remains to be seen what effects, if any, may emerge from
candidates counter arguing their religious beliefs should not be questioned. Such alternative
conceptualizations of potential call-out effects provide multiple avenues of future research.
Perhaps the most fruitful stream of future research in the area of religion in campaigns,
however, focuses on the actual deployment of religious appeals by political candidates. While
the current study intentionally focuses on micro-level aspects in an attempt to ascertain how
religious appeals resonate with individual voters, study findings give rise to how religious
appeals are likely to emerge in electoral contests. Indeed, experimental results provide the
foundation to derive informed expectations that could be tested vis-à-vis examination of actual
advertising data. Given the pronounced effects of religious appeals in resonating with more
religiously traditional individuals, for example, one would expect religious ads to air
disproportionately in more religiously conservative ad markets.
Similarly, the fact religious appeals resonate based on traditionalism with more orthodox
viewers responding favorably would suggest religious appeals to be more prevalent in
Republican primaries, as religious traditionalists have increasingly aligned with the Republican
Party (Fowler et al., 2004; Guth et al., 2006; Layman, 2001; Manza & Brooks, 1999). As
Republican candidates moderate their positions in an attempt to court swing voters (Downs,
1957), however, fewer religious appeals are likely to appear by GOP candidates in competitive
general elections. Conversely, to the extent Democratic candidates attempt to court increasingly
traditional voters over the course of a campaign, we should observe more religious appeals aired
by Democratic candidates in general campaigns. As evidenced by experimental results,
incorporating religious cues in political ads powerfully influences increasingly traditional
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viewers to the point self-identified Republican traditionalists become far more likely to support a
Democratic candidate.
The proposition religious appeals are likely to emerge within Republican primaries and,
conversely, to be deployed by Democratic candidates more often in general elections represents
just two conclusions drawn from the current study that could be extended as avenues of research
exploring the actual use of religious appeals in campaigns. Indeed, the implications of current
study results as applied to the practical deployment of religious appeals offer multiple avenues of
future research.
Beyond further research examining the practical implications of the current study, a final
word should be mentioned regarding exploration of religious priming in alternative political and
religious landscapes and among differing ideologies. The current investigation emphasizes
religious messaging designed to court Christian voters in the U.S., a logical focus given the
historical religious tradition of the U.S. and the fact Christian voters comprise the overwhelming
majority of voters. Nonetheless, questions arise as to how religious priming effects might play
out for other religions and in other political and religious environments.
In theory, candidates should be able to prime other religious traditions and in other
political contexts. That is, the psychology of priming should extend to other religious domains.
Having stated that, admittedly, the U.S. is unique among Western nations for its marked religious
observance. Thus, research exploring the extent to which religious appeals resonate with voters
of alternative faiths and nationalities provides an intriguing avenue to extend the current project.
Likewise, future research should more thoroughly consider the effects of religious
appeals through the lens of political ideology, especially as it relates to how religious messaging
functions for the political “left.” While the current study demonstrates exposure to tested
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religious appeals results in a modest decline in evaluations among religious progressives, who
happen to be disproportionately liberal, noted Democratic and liberal politicians have
nonetheless appealed to religion with seeming success – perhaps the most notable example being
former President Bill Clinton (Domke & Coe, 2008). As voters prefer candidates closest to their
political ideology (Down, 1957), perhaps more Democratic and liberal politicians are necessarily
insulated from backlash effects from religious progressives, especially in general campaigns, as
religious progressives are more likely to support liberal candidates over conservative candidates
on nonreligious policy dimensions. Such reasoning would simultaneously explain President
Clinton’s support from both liberal and moderate voting publics, in spite of marked religious
rhetoric that had the potential to alienate more religiously progressive individuals.
At the same time, however, consideration should be given the content of religious
messaging in terms of ideology. Perhaps the “left” and “right” employ qualitatively different
religious appeals yielding quantitatively different effects for religious progressives and
traditionalists. In this vein, it is worth noting that three of the four campaign appeals tested in the
current study were disseminated of Republicans, with the lone exception the Musgrove
advertisement. All four ads, including the Democratic Musgrove ad, however, generated similar
effects in promoting heightened evaluations among traditionalists and modestly rolling off
among progressives. Nonetheless, potential priming effects in terms of differences in content of
religious appeals across ideologically distinct candidates warrants further examination.
As is evident, the current study gives rise to numerous avenues of future research likely
to produce meaningful results to advance understanding of the consequences of religious appeals
in political campaigns. Only through continued thoughtful and rigorous research can we gain
insight into the influential role of religion in modern American politics and beyond.
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Experiment #1 & #2 Saxby Chambliss Web site (Information Factor)
Meet the Candidate
This is the website of Saxby Chambliss for U.S. Senate. Please read Saxby’s views on the issues. Once
you have finished reading the website, you will watch a political advertisment and complete some
questions about Saxby Chambliss.

SAXBY CHAMBLISS for U.S. SENATE
On the Issues










Economy
I believe we must make certain that we promote American manufacturing and work to benefit the
small business community in this country, as that is where the majority of the jobs in this country are
created. Most importantly, I am opposed to raising taxes and increasing the size of government.
Taxes
I support lower taxes to put more money back into the pockets of working American families. We must
continue working to eliminate the marriage penalty, the capital gains tax on investments, the death
tax, and further lower marginal tax rates across the board for working men and women. I also
support implementation of the FairTax, which would shift the federal government's method of
revenue collection from income to personal consumption.
Energy
If we are to have national security and economic independence, we need to reduce our dependence
upon foreign sources of energy. I will support policies that increase the diversification of energy
sources and develop domestic sources of energy, including drilling for oil, mining coal, and
developing hydroelectric, wind, and alternative energy sources.
Education
As the husband of a teacher who worked for more than 30 years in the classroom, I know there is no
more important job than educating America's young people. I’m a proud supporter of the landmark
education reform law, No Child Left Behind, which seeks to ensure America's children are reaching
their learning potential.
Second Amendment
As an avid sportsmen, I have been and will always be a staunch supporter of the 2nd Amendment.
Throughout my career I’ve always defended the rights of law abiding Americans to bear arms for not
only recreation, but also protection.
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Experimental Stimuli – Ad Copy
Experiment #1 & #2 – 2008 Saxby Chambliss “Values” Ad
“I believe the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution are as relevant today as
when they were written. I believe the American Dream is more possible today than ever
before. I believe in hard work, and I believe individuals should be able to keep the money
they earn rather than having it taken away from them in the form of high and unfair taxes.
I believe in personal choices, not government dictates. I believe Americans should be able to
choose their doctors, choose their schools and choose how they worship. I believe in
capitalism and competition. I believe in a loving and all-powerful God.
My beliefs and values require me to fight for smaller government, lower taxes, the sanctity of
life, the rights of individuals, for personal freedoms and responsibilities and the right of each
of us to help our children seek their dreams without government trying to control our lives.
I’m Saxby Chambliss, and I approve this message. I ask for your vote on November 4th.”
Experiment #3 – 2008 Gregg Harper “Hope” Ad
“I’ve probably learned the greatest lesson on how to treat people from my son Livingston,
who has special needs.
He is a blessing not just in our lives, but in so many lives.
He’s brought to life what we read in the Bible, and that means you put others ahead of
yourself.
Those values will be the values I take to Congress, and to carry what I believe is a servant’s
heart for the people in our district and to take that to Washington.
I’m Gregg Harper, and I approve this message.”
Experiment #4 – 2008 Kenny Hulshof “Values” Ad
“I spent my career as a prosecutor protecting victims. As governor , I’ll fight to protect our
values. The value of hard work. That’s why government needs to lower taxes.
The value of life and the traditional family. The value of moral clarity. You do what is right
no matter what the political consequences.
I’m running for governor because I believe Missouri’s government ought to be as good as its
people. I’m Kenny Hulshof, and I’d be honored to have your support.
For Governor, the candidate is Kenny Hulshof.”
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Experiment #5 – 2008 DSCC Ronnie Musgrove “Choir Practice” Ad
“As a Christian, we have a sense of duty, obligation, responsibility and more importantly
desire to help people in need.
It’s what the Bible teaches. It’s what our Sunday school class teaches. It’s what Christ
taught. And if we can’t have a sense of compassion to help people out, then it goes against
the flow of what the Bible teaches us.
To me, when we see people hurting, we should reach out to help them. That’s what I’ve been
taught ever since I was a child in church. That’s why I sing in the choir. To me, that’s what
being a Christian is about. That’s what being a public servant is about.”
Experiment #5 – 2008 First Freedom First “Democracy not Theocracy” Ad
“History is full of stories about good governments gone bad because they started telling
people what they could and couldn't believe.
Religion and spirituality are deeply personal decisions. It is not the role of government to
dictate a statewide religion; that's what the separation of church and state is all about. It
protects all of us from having our beliefs compromised by people who might disagree.
Safeguarding everyone's religious liberty is what we need to survive as a free society.
Separation of church and state protects all of us against interference in our decisions about
faith; we need to keep it this way. Sometimes we take it for granted, but we shouldn't.
Religious freedom is America’s bravest invention.
People came across oceans, to believe, freely, openly, each of us, differently, differently,
differently, together.
But if we protect one belief over another, if we favor one religion and not the other, then we
surrender that right, and sacrifice them all.
Mixing religion and government has made a mess of things in other countries. I’m glad for
the freedom our democracy gives us.”
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Survey Instrument #1
Pretest – Political Awareness
Some people constantly follow politics, while others aren't that interested in it. How interested
are you in politics?
1.
Very interested
2.
Interested
3.
Not interested
4.
Not interested at all
How closely do you pay attention to what is going on in government and politics?
1.
Very Closely
2.
Closely
3.
Not Closely
4.
Not closely at all
What job or political office does Nancy Pelosi currently hold?
1.
Treasury Secretary
2.
Senate Majority Leader
3.
Speaker of the House
4.
Secretary of State
5.
Supreme Court Justice
What job or political office does Bobby Jindal currently hold?
1.
Senator
2.
Governor
3.
Congressman
4.
Attorney General
5.
Secretary of State
What are the first 10 amendments to the U.S. Constitution called?
1
Articles of Confederation
2
Declaration of Independence
3
Bill of Rights
4
States Rights
5
Federalist Papers
What is the term in years of a U.S. Senator?
1.
2
2.
3
3.
4
4.
5
5.
6
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What is the name of the current Senate Majority Leader?
1.
Trent Lott
2
Nancy Pelosi
3.
John Roberts
4.
Harry Reid
5.
Newt Gingrich
Thinking about the issue of abortion, on the following scale, with 1 representing strongly pro
choice and 7 representing strongly pro life, how would you rate yourself?
Strongly Pro Choice 1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Pro Life
Thinking about the issue of legalizing gay marriage, on the following scale, with 1 representing
strongly support legalizing gay marriage and 7 representing strongly oppose legalizing gay
marriage, how would you rate yourself?
Strongly Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Oppose
Thinking about the issue of stem cell research, on the following scale, with 1 representing
strongly support government funding of stem cell research and 7 representing strongly oppose
government funding of stem cell research, how would you rate yourself?
Strongly Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Oppose
Thinking about the issue of school prayer, on the following scale, with 1 representing strongly
support prayer in school and 7 representing strongly oppose prayer in school, how would you
rate yourself?
Strongly Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Oppose
Thinking about the issue of posting the Ten Commandments in government facilities, on the
following scale, with 1 representing strongly support posting the Ten Commandments in
government facilities and 7 representing strongly oppose posting the Ten Commandments in
government facilities, how would you rate yourself?
Strongly Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Oppose
Thinking about the issue of individual gun rights, on the following scale, with 1 representing
strongly support the right of individuals to own firearms and 7 representing strongly oppose the
right of individuals to own firearms, how would you rate yourself?
Strongly Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Oppose
PID
When supporting a candidate, how important is it that a candidate share your political views?
1.
Very Important
2.
Important
3.
Not Important
4.
Not Important at All
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Thinking about your political ideology, please rate yourself on the following scale from 1 to 7
where 1 means very liberal and 7 means very conservative.
Very Liberal 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very Conservative
Generally speaking, which political party do you affiliate yourself with?
1.
Democrat
2.
Republican
3.
Independent
4.
Green
5.
Libertarian
6.
Other
How strongly do you identify with this political party where 1 means very weak and 7 means
very strong.
Very Weak 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very Strong
Religion
When supporting a candidate, how important is that a candidate share your religious views?
1.
Very Important
2.
Important
3.
Indifferent
4.
Unimportant
5.
Very Unimportant
How important is it that political officials hold strong religious beliefs?
1.
Very Important
2.
Important
3.
Unimportant
4.
Very Unimportant
Thinking about your religion, do you consider yourself to be?
1.
Mainline Protestant
2.
Evangelical Protestant
3.
Unaffiliated/Non-denominational Protestant
4.
Black Protestant
5.
Roman Catholic
6.
Jewish
7.
Muslim
8.
Not religious
9.
Other
Thinking about religion, how important would you say religion is in your life?
1.
Very Important
2.
Important
3.
Indifferent
4.
Unimportant
5.
Very Unimportant
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Which pair of terms below best describes your religious views?
1.
Fundamentalist/Evangelical
2.
Traditional/Conservative
3.
Mainline/Moderate
4.
Progressive/Liberal
5.
Not religious
Which of the following statements best describes your view of religious tradition?
1.
We should strive to preserve beliefs and practices
2.
We should strive to adapt beliefs and practices to new times.
3.
We should strive to adopt new beliefs and practices.
4.
Don't believe in religion
Which of the following best describes how often you attend church or a place of worship?
1.
Never
2.
Only for holidays, funerals or weddings
3.
About once a month
4.
About once a week
5.
Multiple times a week
Which of the following best describes how often you pray?
1.
Never
2.
Less than once a month
3.
About once a month
4.
About once a week
5.
About once a day
6.
Multiple times a day
Which of the following best describes how often you read the Bible?
1.
Multiple times a day
2.
About once a day
3.
About once a week
4.
About once a month
5.
Less than once a moth
6.
Never
Which of the following best describes how often you take part in activities of a church or place
of worship other than attending service?
1.
Never
2.
About once or twice a year
3.
About once a month
4.
About once a week
5.
Muliple times a week
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Which of the following statements best describes your feelings about the Bible?
1.
The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word.
2.
The Bible is the inspired word of God, but not everything in it should be taken
literally.
3.
The Bible is a book written by men and is not the word of God.
How certain is your belief in God?
1.
Absolutely certain
2.
Fairly certain
3.
Not certain
4.
Not certain at all
5.
I do not believe in God
How certain is your belief in heaven?
1.
Absolutely certain
2.
Fairly certain
3.
Not certain
4.
Not certain at all
5.
I do not believe in Heaven
How certain is your belief in the devil?
1.
Absolutely certain
2.
Fairly certain
3.
Not certain
4.
Not certain at all
5.
I do not believe in the devil
How certain is your belief in hell?
1.
Absolutely certain
2.
Fairly certain
3.
Not certain
4.
Not certain at all
5.
I do not believe in hell
How certain is your belief that Jesus Christ is the Son of God?
1.
Absolutely certain
2.
Fairly certain
3.
Not certain
4.
Not certain at all
5.
I do not believe Jesus Christ is the Son of God
Posttest
Did you have any problem viewing the ad?
1. Yes
2. No
Were you able to hear the ad? 1. Yes 2. No
182

Manipulation Check
Which of the following best describes this ad?
1.
It was an ad for Kathleen Sebelius, candidate for Governor.
2.
It was an ad for John McCain, candidate for President.
3.
It was an ad for Saxby Chambliss, candidate for Senate.
4.
It was an ad about our dependence on foriegn oil.
Traits
We will now ask you a few questions about how well certain terms describe Saxby Chambliss.
Thinking about Saxby Chambliss, how well does the term {WISE; FRIENDLY; SINCERE;
MORAL; STRONG; UNQUALIFIED; UNITELLIGENT; IRRESPONSIBLE; DISHONEST;
UNCARING} describe Saxby Chambliss?
1.
Extremely well
2.
Fairly well
3.
No opinion
4.
Not too well
5.
Not well at all
Affect
Thinking about Saxby Chambliss, does Saxby Chambliss make you feel HOPEFUL?
1.
Very hopeful
2.
Somewhat hopeful
3.
Not very hopeful
4.
Not hopeful at all
Does Saxby Chambliss make you feel ANGRY?
1.
Very angry
2.
Somewhat angry
3.
Not very angry
4.
Not angry at all
Does Saxby Chambliss make you feel PROUD?
1.
Very Proud
2.
Somewhat proud
3.
Not very proud
4.
Not proud at all
Does Saxby Chambliss make you feel DISAPPOINTED?
1.
Very disappointed
2.
Somewhat disappointed
3.
Not very disappointed
4.
Not disappointed at all
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General Evaluations
On a scale from 0 to 100 where 0 indicates "very negative" and 100 indicates "very positive,"
how would you rate your feelings toward Saxby Chambliss?
On a scale from 0 to 100 where 0 indicates "dislike very much" and 100 indicates "like very
much," how would you rate how much you like Saxby Chambliss?
Competency
55. Thinking about Saxby Chambliss, how competent do you think Saxby Chambliss would be
in dealing with {ECONOMIC; HEALTH CARE; FOREEIGN POLICY; EDUCATION;
SOCIAL} issues?
1.
Competent
2.
Somewhat competent
3.
Somewhat incompetent
4.
Incompetent
Proximity
How much do you agree with the statement: Saxby Chambliss shares my political views.
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree
3. Disagree 4. Strongly Disagree

How much do you agree with the statement: Saxby Chambliss shares my religious views.
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree
3. Disagree 4. Strongly Disagree
Vote
Regardless if you plan to vote, if you could, how likely would you be to vote for Saxby
Chambliss?
1. Very Likely
2. Likely
3. Unlikely 4. Very Unlikely
Candidate PID
Thinking about the political ideology of Saxby Chambliss, on a scale from 1 to 7 with 1 being
very liberal and 7 very conservative, where would you place Saxby Chambliss?
Very Liberal 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very Conservative
Would you say Saxby Chambliss is a
1. Democrat 2. Republican 3. Independent 4. Green 5. Libertarian
How strongly would you identify Saxby Chambliss with this party/political stance?
Very Weak 1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Very Strong
Candidate religion
How important is it that public officials and politicians rely on religion and their religious values
to guide their decisions?
1. Very Important 2. Somewhat Important 3. Somewhat Unimportant 4. Not at all Important
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How much do you think Saxby Chambliss relies on religion and religious values in his
decisions?
Strongly Relies on Religion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Does not rely on religion at all
Religious Guidance
How much do you rely on religion to guide how you think about political ISSUES?
1. Very Much
2. Somewhat
3. Not Very Much
4. Not at All
How much do you rely on religion to guide how you think about political CANDIDATES?
1. Very Much
2. Somewhat
3. Not Very Much
4. Not at All
How much do you rely on religion to guide how you think about PUBLIC OFFICIALS?
1. Very Much
2. Somewhat
3. Not Very Much
4. Not at All
Most people rely on their religious values in forming their political beliefs.
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree
3. Disagree 4. Strongly Disagree
Public Religion
How much do you agree with the statement: Organized religious groups should stand up for their
beliefs in politics.
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree
3. Disagree 4. Strongly Disagree
How much do you agree with the statement: Public funding should be available to churches and
houses of worship to provide social services for the needy?
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree
3. Disagree 4. Strongly Disagree
How much do you agree with the statement: Local communities should be allowed to post the
Ten Commandments and other religious symbols in public buildings if the majority agree?
1. Strongly Disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly Agree
How much do you agree with the statement: There should be daily prayer in all public schools?
1. Strongly Disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly Agree
How much do you agree with the statement: Organized religious groups of all kinds should stay
out of politics?
1. Strongly Disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly Agree
Saxby Issues
Thinking about the Saxby Chambliss commercial you just watched and the issue of abortion, on
the following scale, with 1 representing strongly pro choice and 7 representing strongly pro life,
how would you rate Saxby Chambliss?
Strongly Pro Choice 1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Pro Life
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Thinking about the Saxby Chambliss commercial you just watched and the issue of legalizing
gay marriage, on the following scale, with 1 representing strongly support legalizing gay
marriage and 7 representing strongly oppose legalizing gay marriage, how would you rate Saxby
Chambliss?
Strongly Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Oppose
Thinking about the Saxby Chambliss commercial you just watched and the issue of stem cell
research, on the following scale, with 1 representing strongly support government funding of
stem cell research and 7 representing strongly oppose government funding of stem cell research,
how would you rate Saxby Chambliss?
Strongly Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Oppose
Thinking about the Saxby Chambliss commercial you just watched and the issue of school
prayer, on the following scale, with 1 representing strongly support prayer in school and 7
representing strongly oppose prayer in school, how would you rate Saxby Chambliss?
Strongly Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Oppose
Thinking about the Saxby Chambliss commercial you just watched and the issue of posting the
Ten Commandments in government facilities, on the following scale, with 1 representing
strongly support posting the Ten Commandments in government facilities and 7 representing
strongly oppose posting the Ten Commandments in government facilities, how would you rate
Saxby Chambliss?
Strongly Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Oppose
Thinking about the Saxby Chambliss commercial you just watched and the issue of individual
gun rights, on the following scale, with 1 representing strongly support the right of individuals to
own firearms and 7 representing strongly oppose the right of individuals to own firearms, how
would you rate Saxby Chambliss?
Strongly Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Oppose
Demographics
Are you male or female? 1. Male 2. Female
What is your age?
Do you consider yourself to be?
1.
White
2.
Black/African American
3.
Hispanic/Latino
4.
Asian
5.
Native American
6.
Indian
7.
Other
You have reached the end of the survey. Thank you for your participation.
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Survey Instrument #2
Pretest – Political Awareness
Some people constantly follow politics, while others aren't that interested in it. How interested
are you in politics?
1. Very interested
2. Interested
3. Not interested
4. Not interested at all
What job or political office does Nancy Pelosi currently hold?
1. Treasury Secretary
2. Senate Majority Leader
3. Speaker of the House
4. Secretary of State
5. Supreme Court Justice
What are the first 10 amendments to the U.S. Constitution called?
1. Articles of Confederation
2. Declaration of Independence
3. Bill of Rights
4. States Rights
5. Federalist Papers
What is the term in years of a U.S. Senator?
1. 2
2. 3
3. 4
4. 5
5. 6
What is the name of the current Senate Majority Leader?
1. Trent Lott
2. Nancy Pelosi
3. John Roberts
4. Harry Reid
5. Newt Gingrich
Religion
On the following scale, how important is religion in your life?
1. Very Important
2. Important
3. Indifferent
4. Unimportant
5. Very Unimportant
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Which pair of terms below best describes your religious views?
1. Fundamentalist/Evangelical
2. Traditional/Conservative
3. Mainline/Moderate
4. Progressive/Liberal
5. Not religious
Which statement best describes your view of religious tradition?
1. We should strive to preserve beliefs and practices
2. We should strive to adapt beliefs and practices to new times
3. We should strive to adopt new beliefs and practices
4. Don’t believe in religion
Which of the following best describes how often you pray?
1. Never
2. Less than once a month
3. About once a month
4. About once a week
5. About once a day
6. Multiple times a day
Which of the following statements best describes your feelings about the Bible?
1. The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word.
2. The Bible is the inspired word of God, but not everything in it should be taken literally,
word for word.
3. The Bible is a book of fables written by men and is not the word of God.
How certain is your belief that Jesus Christ is the Son of God?
1. Absolutely certain
2. Fairly certain
3. Not certain
4. Not certain at all
5. I do not believe Jesus Christ is the Son of God
How often do you attend religious services?
1. More than once a week
2. Once a week
3. Once or twice a month
4. A few times a year
5. Once a year or less
6. Never
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What is your religion?
1. Baptist—any denomination
2. Protestant (e.g., Methodist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Episcopal)
3. Catholic
4. Mormon
5. Jewish
6. Muslim
7. Hindu
8. Buddhist
9. Pentecostal
10. Eastern Orthodox
11. Other Christian
12. Other non-Christian
13. None
PID
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a:
1. Strong Republican
2. Not Strong Republican
3. Leans Republican
4. Undecided/Independent/Other
5. Leans Democrat
6. Not Strong Democrat
7. Strong Democrat
In general, do you think of yourself as:
1. Extremely liberal
2. Liberal
3. Slightly liberal
4. Moderate, middle of the road
5. Slightly conservative
6. Conservative
7. Extremely conservative
Posttest
Did you see the video?
1. Yes
2. No
Manipulation Check
Which of the following statements best describes the video clip you viewed?
1. A political advertisement about Barack Obama
2. A political advertisement about Saxby Chambliss
3. A political advertisement about John McCain
4. A political advertisement about Elizabeth Dole
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Traits
Thinking about Saxby Chambliss, in your opinion how well does the term {QUALIFIED;
MORAL; DISHONEST; STRONG} describe Saxby Chambliss?
1. Extremely well
2. Fairly Well
3. No opinion
4. Not too well
5. Not well at all
General Evaluation
On a scale from 0 to 100 where 0 means “dislike very much” and 100 means “like very much,”
how much do you like Saxby Chambliss?
Vote
On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means “not likely at all” and 10 means “very likely,” how likely
is it you would vote for Saxby Chambliss if you could?
Proximity
How much do you agree or disagree with the statement: Saxby Chambliss shares my political
views.
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree
3. Disagree 4. Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
How much do you agree or disagree with the statement: Saxby Chambliss shares my religious
views.
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree
3. Disagree 4. Strongly Disagree
You have reached the end of the survey. Thank you for your participation.
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Survey Instrument #3
Pretest – Political Awareness
Some people constantly follow politics, while others aren't that interested in it. How interested
are you in politics?
1.
Not interested at all
2.
Not Interested
3.
Somewhat Interested
4.
Very interested
How closely do you pay attention to what is going on in government and politics?
1.
Not closely at all
2.
Not Very Closely
3.
Closely
4.
Very Closely
What job or political office does Joe Biden currently hold?
1.
Senate Majority Leader
2.
Speaker of the House
3.
Vice President
4.
Secretary of State
5.
Chief Justice
What job or political office does Bobby Jindal currently hold?
1.
Senator
2.
Attorney General
3.
Vice President
4.
Governor
5.
Secretary of Defense
What are the first 10 amendments to the U.S. Constitution called?
1
Articles of Confederation
2
Declaration of Independence
3
Bill of Rights
4
States Rights
5
Federalist Papers
How long is the term of a U.S. Senator?
1.
2 years
2.
3 years
3.
4 years
4.
5 years
5.
6 years
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What is the name of the current Senate Majority Leader?
1.
Dick Cheney
2
Barack Obama
3.
John Boehner
4.
Margaret Thatcher
5.
Harry Reid
Thinking about the issue of abortion, on the following scale, with 1 representing strongly pro
choice and 7 representing strongly pro life, how would you rate yourself?
Strongly Pro Choice 1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Pro Life
Thinking about the issue of legalizing gay marriage, on the following scale, with 1 representing
strongly support legalizing gay marriage and 7 representing strongly oppose legalizing gay
marriage, how would you rate yourself?
Strongly Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Oppose
Thinking about the issue of stem cell research, on the following scale, with 1 representing
strongly support government funding of stem cell research and 7 representing strongly oppose
government funding of stem cell research, how would you rate yourself?
Strongly Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Oppose
Thinking about the issue of school prayer, on the following scale, with 1 representing strongly
oppose prayer in school and 7 representing strongly support prayer in school, how would you
rate yourself?
Strongly Oppose
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Support
Thinking about the issue of posting the Ten Commandments in government facilities, on the
following scale, with 1 representing strongly oppose posting the Ten Commandments in
government facilities and 7 representing strongly support posting the Ten Commandments in
government facilities, how would you rate yourself?
Strongly Oppose
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Support
Thinking about the issue of individual gun rights, on the following scale, with 1 representing
strongly oppose the right of individuals to own firearms and 7 representing strongly support the
right of individuals to own firearms, how would you rate yourself?
Strongly Oppose
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Support
PID
Thinking about your political ideology, please rate yourself on the following scale from 1 to 7
where 1 means very liberal and 7 means very conservative.
Very Liberal 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very Conservative
In terms of your political party affiliation, how would you describe yourself on the following
scale, where 1 means strong Democrat and 7 means strong Republican?
Strong Democrat
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strong Republican
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When supporting a candidate, how important is it that a candidate share your political views?
1.
Not Important at All
2.
Very Unimportant
3.
Neither Important nor Unimportant
4.
Very Important
5.
Extremely Important
Religion
When supporting a candidate, how important is that a candidate share your religious views?
1.
Not Important at All
2.
Very Unimportant
3.
Neither Important nor Unimportant
4.
Very Important
5.
Extremely Important
How important is it that political officials hold strong religious beliefs?
1.
Not Important at All
2.
Very Unimportant
3.
Neither Important nor Unimportant
4.
Very Important
5.
Extremely Important
Thinking about your religion, do you consider yourself to be?
1.
Mainline Protestant
2.
Evangelical Protestant
3.
Unaffiliated/Non-denominational Protestant
4.
Black Protestant
5.
Roman Catholic
6.
Jewish
7.
Muslim
8.
Not religious
9.
Other
Thinking about religion, how important would you say religion is in your life?
1.
Not Important at All
2.
Very Unimportant
3.
Neither Important nor Unimportant
4.
Very Important
5.
Extremely Important
Which pair of terms below best describes your religious views?
1.
Fundamentalist/Evangelical
2.
Traditional/Conservative
3.
Mainline/Moderate
4.
Progressive/Liberal
5.
Not religious
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Which of the following statements best describes your view of religious tradition?
1.
We should strive to preserve beliefs and practices
2.
We should strive to adapt beliefs and practices to new times.
3.
We should strive to adopt new beliefs and practices.
4.
Don't believe in religion
Which of the following best describes how often you attend church or a place of worship?
1.
Never
2.
Only for holidays, funerals or weddings
3.
About once a month
4.
About once a week
5.
Multiple times a week
Which of the following best describes how often you pray?
1.
Never
2.
Less than once a month
3.
Once a month
4.
2-3 times a month
5.
Once a week
5.
2-3 times a week
6.
Daily
Which of the following best describes how often you read the Bible?
1.
Never
2.
Less than once a month
3.
Once a month
4.
2-3 times a month
5.
Once a week
5.
2-3 times a week
6.
Daily
Which of the following best describes how often you take part in activities of a church or place
of worship other than attending service?
1.
Never
2.
Less than once a month
3.
Once a month
4.
2-3 times a month
5.
Once a week
5.
2-3 times a week
Which of the following statements best describes your feelings about the Bible?
1.
The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word.
2.
The Bible is the inspired word of God, but not everything in it should be taken
literally.
3.
The Bible is a book written by men and is not the word of God.
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How certain is your belief in God?
1.
Absolutely certain
2.
Fairly certain
3.
Not certain
4.
Not certain at all
5.
I do not believe in God
How certain is your belief in heaven?
1.
Absolutely certain
2.
Fairly certain
3.
Not certain
4.
Not certain at all
5.
I do not believe in Heaven
How certain is your belief in the devil?
1.
Absolutely certain
2.
Fairly certain
3.
Not certain
4.
Not certain at all
5.
I do not believe in the devil
How certain is your belief in hell?
1.
Absolutely certain
2.
Fairly certain
3.
Not certain
4.
Not certain at all
5.
I do not believe in hell
How certain is your belief that Jesus Christ is the Son of God?
1.
Absolutely certain
2.
Fairly certain
3.
Not certain
4.
Not certain at all
5.
I do not believe Jesus Christ is the Son of God
Posttest
Did you have any problem viewing the ad? 1. Yes

2. No

Were you able to hear the ad? 1. Yes 2. No
Manipulation Check
Which of the following best describes this ad?
1.
It was an attack ad for Nancy Pelosi for Senate.
2.
It was an ad for Barack Obama for President.
3.
It was a values ad for {INSERT CANDIDATE} for {INSERT OFFICE}.
4.
It was an ad about dependence on foreign oil.
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Traits
We will now ask you a few questions about how well certain terms describe _____. Thinking
about {INSERT CANDIDATE NAME}, how well does the term {WISE; FRIENDLY;
SINCERE; MORAL; STRONG; UNQUALIFIED; UNINTELLIGENT; IRRESPONSIBLE;
DISHONEST; UNCARING} describe {INSERT CANDIDATE NAME}?
1.
Not well at all
2.
Not too well
3.
Fairly well
4.
Extremely well

Affect
Thinking about Saxby Chambliss, does _________ make you feel HOPEFUL?
1.
Not hopeful at all
2.
Not very hopeful
3.
Fairly hopeful
4.
Extremely hopeful
Does _______ make you feel ANGRY?
1.
Extremely angry
2.
Fairly angry
3.
Not very angry
4.
Not angry at all
Does _______ make you feel PROUD?
1.
Not proud at all
2.
Not very proud
3.
Fairly proud
4.
Extremely proud
Does _________ make you feel DISAPPOINTED?
1.
Extremely disappointed
2.
Fairly disappointed
3.
Not very disappointed
4.
Not disappointed at all

General Evaluations
On a scale from 0 to 100 where 0 indicates "very negative" and 100 indicates "very positive,"
how would you rate your feelings toward Saxby Chambliss?
On a scale from 0 to 100 where 0 indicates "dislike very much" and 100 indicates "like very
much," how would you rate how much you like Saxby Chambliss?
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Competency
Thinking about ________, how competent do you think _______ would be in dealing with
{ECONOMIC; HEALTH CARE; FOREIGN POLICY; EDUCATION; SOCIAL} issues?
1.
Extremely incompetent
2.
Fairly incompetent
3.
Fairly competent
4.
Extremely competent
Motivation, Vote, Proximity
If ______ were running for office in your state, how motivated would you be to actively
campaign for ________?
1.
Not motivated at all
2.
Not very motivated
3.
Undecided
4.
Fairly motivated
5.
Very motivated
If ______ were running for office in your state, how likely would you be to put a ______ bumper
sticker on your car or place a _________ sign in your yard?
1.
Very Unlikely
2.
Unlikely
3.
Undecided
4.
Likely
5.
Very Likely
Regardless if you plan to vote, if you could, how likely would you be to vote for _______?
1.
Very Unlikely
2.
Unlikely
3.
Undecided
4.
Likely
5.
Very Likely
How much do you agree with the statement: _________shares my political views.
1.
Strongly Disagree
2.
Disagree
3.
Neither Agree or Disagree
4.
Agree
5.
Strongly Agree
How much do you agree with the statement: _________ shares my religious views.
1.
Strongly Disagree
2.
Disagree
3.
Neither Agree or Disagree
4.
Agree
5.
Strongly Agree
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Candidate PID
Thinking about the political ideology of Saxby Chambliss, on a scale from 1 to 7 with 1 being
very liberal and 7 very conservative, where would you place Saxby Chambliss?
Very Liberal 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very Conservative
Thinking about the partisanship of _______, would you say he is a:
1.
Strong Republican
2.
Weak Republican
3.
Strong Democrat
4.
Weak Democrat
5.
Independent
6.
Libertarian
7.
Other
Candidate religion
How important is it that public officials rely on their religious beliefs to guide their decisions?
1.
Not at all important
2.
Very unimportant
3.
Neither important nor unimportant
4.
Very important
5.
Extremely important
How much do you think _____ relies on his religious beliefs in making decisions?
1.
Not at all
2.
Not very much
3.
Neutral
4.
Somewhat
5.
Very much
Religious Guidance
How much do you rely on religion to guide how you think about political ISSUES?
1. Not at all 2. Not very much 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat 5. Very much
How much do you rely on religion to guide how you think about political CANDIDATES?
1. Not at all 2. Not very much 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat 5. Very much
How much do you rely on religion to guide how you think about PUBLIC OFFICIALS?
1. Not at all 2. Not very much 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat 5. Very much
Most people rely on their religious beliefs in forming their political decisions.
1.
Strongly Disagree
2.
Disagree
3.
Neither Agree nor Disagree
4.
Agree
5.
Strongly Agree
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Public Religion
How much do you agree with the statement: Organized religious groups should stand up for their
beliefs in politics.
1.
Strongly Disagree
2.
Disagree
3.
Neither Agree nor Disagree
4.
Agree
5.
Strongly Agree
How much do you agree with the statement: Public funding should be available to churches and
houses of worship to provide social services for the needy?
1.
Strongly Disagree
2.
Disagree
3.
Neither Agree nor Disagree
4.
Agree
5.
Strongly Agree
How much do you agree with the statement: Local communities should be allowed to post the
Ten Commandments and other religious symbols in public buildings if the majority agree?
1.
Strongly Disagree
2.
Disagree
3.
Neither Agree nor Disagree
4.
Agree
5.
Strongly Agree
How much do you agree with the statement: There should be daily prayer in all public schools?
1.
Strongly Disagree
2.
Disagree
3.
Neither Agree nor Disagree
4.
Agree
5.
Strongly Agree
How much do you agree with the statement: Organized religious groups of all kinds should stay
out of politics?
1.
Strongly Disagree
2.
Disagree
3.
Neither Agree nor Disagree
4.
Agree
5.
Strongly Agree
Candidate Issues
Thinking about the ______ commercial you just watched and the issue of abortion, on the
following scale, with 1 representing strongly pro choice and 7 representing strongly pro life, how
would you rate _____?
Strongly Pro Choice 1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Pro Life
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Thinking about the ______ commercial you just watched and the issue of legalizing gay
marriage, on the following scale, with 1 representing strongly support legalizing gay marriage
and 7 representing strongly oppose legalizing gay marriage, how would you rate ______?
Strongly Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Oppose
Thinking about the ____commercial you just watched and the issue of stem cell research, on the
following scale, with 1 representing strongly support government funding of stem cell research
and 7 representing strongly oppose government funding of stem cell research, how would you
rate _____?
Strongly Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Oppose
Thinking about the _______ commercial you just watched and the issue of school prayer, on the
following scale, with 1 representing strongly oppose prayer in school and 7 representing strongly
support prayer in school, how would you rate ________ ?
Strongly Oppose
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Support
Thinking about the ______ commercial you just watched and the issue of posting the Ten
Commandments in government facilities, on the following scale, with 1 representing strongly
oppose posting the Ten Commandments in government facilities and 7 representing strongly
support posting the Ten Commandments in government facilities, how would you rate ______ ?
Strongly Oppose
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Support
Thinking about the ______ commercial you just watched and the issue of individual gun rights,
on the following scale, with 1 representing strongly oppose the right of individuals to own
firearms and 7 representing strongly support the right of individuals to own firearms, how would
you rate ________ ?
Strongly Oppose
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 Strongly Support
Demographics
Are you male or female? 1. Male 2. Female
What is your age?
Do you consider yourself to be?
1.
White
2.
Black/African American
3.
Hispanic/Latino
4.
Asian
5.
Native American
6.
Indian
7.
Other
You have reached the end of the survey. Thank you for your participation.
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